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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Blame and Credit in Organizations:  
Theory and Evidence Explaining the Responses of Leaders after Failure and Success 
by 
Jasmine Morlee Huang 
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019 
Professor Kurt T. Dirks, Chair 
The blame and credit literature has operated largely on the assumption that actors want to reduce 
the blame assigned to them and increase assigned credit (Gioia & Sims, 1985; Greenwald, 1980; 
Shaver, 1985). As a result, much of the literature has focused on the shifting of blame away from 
the self and of credit towards the self (e.g., Crant & Bateman, 1993), rather than other behaviors 
that are less self-serving (e.g., blame-taking, Gunia, 2011). This dissertation explores a variety of 
blame and credit behaviors and explains why leaders may enact different types of blame and 
credit behaviors. In Chapter 2, I conducted a Pilot Study of semi-structured interviews with 
coaches to examine their thought processes leading up to communications of blame and credit. 
Study 1 painted a more comprehensive picture of the expressions and patterns of blame and 
credit which arise during post-game press conferences of NFL coaches. In Chapter 3, I drew 
from and integrated four separate literatures to develop a theoretical model proposing that there 
are four motives that drive leader blame and credit behaviors, and that contextual factors may 
influence the relationship between motive and behavior. In Chapter 4, I conducted three studies 
to test key elements of the theoretical model, combining an online field survey and experimental 




different blame behaviors in light of unsuccessful outcomes in particular. Overall, this 
dissertation (1) evolves our understanding of the communication and variety of blame and credit 
in organizations, (2) establishes a theoretical model delineating the motives driving leader blame 
and credit behaviors, and (3) provides empirical evidence that supports the validity of the 
theoretical model. This is the first paper of its kind to provide theory and scientific evidence 
regarding the motives behind blame and credit behaviors of leaders. In doing so, this dissertation 
brings to the forefront the importance of leaders’ blame and credit behaviors in organizations, 







Chapter 1: Motivation and Central Concepts 
 
Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold 
and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon 
the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion 
to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone. 
--Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, speech written in case D-Day invasion failed 
June 5, 1944 
In February 2014, General Motors (GM) issued a recall of 780,000 Cobalt and Pontiac 
G5 cars sold between 2005 and 2007. Six days later, with pressure mounting from the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, GM expanded the recall to 1.37 million cars. Later, it 
came to light that GM had been aware of a defect in the cars’ ignition switch system but had 
failed to warn the public of the defect or issue a recall. In fact, GM engineers had first noticed 
the problem as early as 2001 and again in 2004, yet no changes or recommended solutions were 
implemented due to budgetary concerns. The result was hundreds of accidents between 2005 and 
2010 related to the ignition switch problem, many fatal (Blau, 2016). In total, GM ultimately 
issued 84 recalls that affected more than 30 million vehicles in the aftermath of the, by that time, 
widely publicized faulty ignition switch scandal (Blau, 2016; DeBord, 2014).  
Ripple effects of the crisis included a $3 billion cut in GM shareholders’ value over a 
four-week period between March and April of 2014 (Lachappelle & Bost, 2014) and an eventual 
$900 million fine paid to federal prosecutors (Ivory & Vlasic, 2015). In light of revelations of the 
deadly ignition switch problem, the company’s CEO, Mary Barra, fired twelve employees, 






(Blau, 2016). Barra stepped forward and publicly took full responsibility for the problems facing 
the major automaker (Colvin, 2014). Moreover, despite that the defects occurred before Barra 
became CEO in January of 2014, she “[took the] hit, over and over again” and refused to blame 
the typical easy targets (i.e., middle management) (DeBord, 2014).  
The example of CEO Barra contrasts with the CEOs of major financial firms following 
the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. Three years prior to GM’s mass recall, in January 2011, the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) found the Financial Crisis to be avoidable but 
caused by a multitude of factors, including “widespread failures in financial regulation and 
supervision,” “dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many 
systemically important financial institutions,” poor preparation by the U.S. government for the 
crisis, and “a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency” 
by financial institutions (Financial Inquiry Commission, 2011: xviii-xxii). The Commission held 
public congressional hearings in Washington, D.C., during which executives of four major 
financial firms, including the Morgan Stanley chairman and CEOs of JPMorgan Chase, Goldman 
Sachs, and Bank of America, were witnesses. The financial executives testified to their 
companies’ involvement in the financial meltdown, such as Goldman Sachs’ selling of securities 
containing subprime mortgages and subsequently shorting those investments to hedge their risk 
(Puzzanghera, 2010), and Morgan Stanley traders betting billions of dollars in the subprime 
mortgage market, which eventually nearly forced the company into bankruptcy.   
Despite evidence connecting actions taken by Wall Street firms and their employees to 
the massive financial meltdown, however, the executives avoided taking blame for the crisis. 
They “admitted making mistakes” and explained that they were “among the many players, from 






last decade” and said that the “system” and “poor government regulation played a role in the 
crisis” (Puzzanghera, 2010).  
The contrast between the Wall Street executives and CEO Mary Barra prompts the 
question of what motivates leaders to different types of acknowledgements of accountability 
following a negative event like a scandal or crisis. In both of these situations, multiple 
individuals and groups of people at varying levels of each organization made decisions that 
contributed to the occurrence and magnitude of the outcome. Moreover, the complexity of these 
events adds to the range of response options that executives in each organization might consider 
in their public (and private) reactions. Similarly, an equally complex or ambiguous series of 
decisions can trigger positive events, such as successes, after which a leader could communicate 
accountability in the form of the placement of credit towards or away from him or herself.  
1.1 Motivation 
Blame is a social explanation for failure, and people naturally assign it following a failure 
(Shaver, 1985; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). In a normative sense, individuals are blamed 
because they engage in behaviors that have led to negative consequences, incurring additional 
blame if they knew the negative event would occur, acted voluntarily in doing so, and/or 
provided no justification (Shaver, 1985; Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003). In a descriptive sense, 
blame is often assigned outside of these criteria, in particular when the negative event evokes 
negative emotions (Alicke, 2000). Thus, the ascription of blame hinges on one’s subjective 
interpretation of the series of events leading to the negative event or failure. Additionally, 
because of the ambiguous nature of organizational events (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005), 
an individual’s interpretation of the event may differ from another’s. Although credit is not the 






for success. Importantly, credit is often assigned more liberally than blame (Pizarro, Uhlmann, & 
Salovey, 2003).  
Blame has been examined from numerous scholarly perspectives, including psychology 
(Alicke, 2000), sociology (Tilly, 2008), anthropology (Douglas, 1992), philosophy (Shaver, 
1985), legal studies (Pennington & Hastie, 1986), and psychiatry (Brickman et al., 1982). Much 
of this work, however, has focused exclusively on blame-assignment, as opposed to other forms 
of blame behaviors, such as the blame-taking case of GM CEO Mary Barra. 
Furthermore, literature on organizational attributions suggests that there are particular 
individuals in organizations who are blamed more frequently – an organization’s leaders, or 
senior managers. There are at least two reasons for this outcome. First, individuals inside 
organizations may subscribe to the “romance of leadership,” the belief that leaders determine the 
fate of their organizations (Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). Here, people believe that 
failures and negative outcomes imply that the leader or senior manager did something wrong in 
the case of a negative outcome or right in the case of a positive outcome. Thus, the theory 
indicates a belief in the link between the events and the senior leaders’ actions (Lee & Tiedens, 
2001;  3.Meindl et al., 1985; Salancik & Meindl, 1984). One example of this theory is when a 
football coach loses his job when his team underperforms. Second, leaders are often blamed by 
“proxy” as the representative of the organization or team that has fallen short (e.g., Gibson & 
Schroeder, 2003; Zemba, Young, & Morris, 2006). The idea that leaders may be blamed “by 
proxy” is illustrated in instances in which leaders, such as CEOs, whose actions are most likely 
removed from the negative outcome, are blamed or expected to take blame for a crisis.  
Theories on self-enhancement and the promotion of self-image may explain why much of 






behaviors (e.g., blame-taking). These theories operate on the assumption that actors want to 
reduce the blame assigned to them and increase assigned credit. The motivation to avoid threats 
to self-esteem drives individuals to take credit for successful outcomes more than they take 
blame for unsuccessful outcomes, as well as take credit for diffuse achievements and blame 
others for diffuse failures (Shaver, 1985; Gioia and Sims, 1985). For example, Crant and 
Bateman (1993) found that accounting firm employees who employed the use of tactics such as 
self-handicapping and causal accounts were able to diminish the amount of blame assigned for a 
failure. This finding highlights that individuals may strategically present information in order to 
sway others’ assignments of blame or credit in order to shift blame away (i.e., to protect the self) 
and to shift credit towards themselves (i.e., to enhance the self) (Crant & Bateman, 1993).  
Although it seems unlikely, that the current academic literature places more weight on the 
act of blame giving, rather than blame-taking, may imply that individuals generally do not take 
blame in organizations. Indeed, in recent years, popular news media outlets have addressed the 
idea that managers and leaders may in fact reap benefits from taking blame, not only individually 
but across their groups and organizations as well (Bregman, 2013; Sharer, 2014; Suddath, 2012). 
Furthermore, at least one organization explicitly promotes a culture of blame-taking: U.S. Navy 
SEALs are taught that “someone has to be able to take the blame when things go wrong” 
(Cannon and Cannon, 2003: 87); they are instructed not to “shirk or run away” but to “take the 
hit” (92). Thus, given the acknowledgment of the potential benefits of blame-taking in the 
popular press and anecdotal documentation of blame-taking occurrences in some organizations 
(e.g., U.S. Navy SEALs, CEO Mary Barra at GM), there exists evidence that managers and 






Moreover, although existing research has not comprehensively examined the wide variety 
of blame and credit behaviors, the notion of taking blame has not been completely overlooked. 
Specifically, in his dissertation work, Gunia (2011) investigated the incidence and effectiveness 
of blame-taking within organizations. Through eight studies using surveys, scenario 
manipulations, and laboratory methods, Gunia established that blame-taking occurs less 
commonly than evasion in light of a failure. His work further illustrated that people believe that 
they would engage in blame-taking over evasion, and that they prefer acts of blame-taking to 
remorse and acts of remorse to evasion. Indeed, his dissertation suggests that blame-taking is 
linked to positive perceptions of the transgressor’s character, whereas evasion is not. 
Nevertheless, beyond this work on the incidence and effectiveness of blame-taking, there 
remains a wide gap in our understanding of the other ways in which blame (and credit) may be 
communicated, and importantly, why.   
Given that the current literature focuses disproportionately on blame giving rather than 
other forms of blame behaviors, the question of how these other types of blame behaviors 
compare deserves attention. Similarly, the question of what other types of credit-related 
behaviors exist and how they compare also needs attention. We know little with respect to what 
other types of acknowledgements of blame and credit may look like in organizations; that the 
organizational literature has not delved into the topic of blame-taking specifically exposes a void 
in existing theory. Consequently, the literature does not consider that there may be situations in 
which blame-taking may be natural, appropriate, or even beneficial. We also know little about 
when and why individuals take blame, as well as the factors and conditions that contribute to 
such events. Further, what drives leaders to engage in disparate types of blame and credit 






explanation behind the tendency for an individual to assign blame and take credit, we lack a full 
understanding of when and why someone might choose to take or share blame or assign or take 
credit. In sum, the blame and credit literature does not currently address the motives and 
consequences of these behaviors and does not adequately examine the various types of blame 
and credit behaviors enacted by leaders. This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of 
why leaders choose to engage in different types of blame and credit behaviors. In addition to 
identifying the drivers of these various behaviors, this dissertation identifies contextual factors 
that influence the effects of these motives on blame and credit behaviors.   
1.2 Central Concepts and Assumptions 
1.2.1 Diffuse events. The scope of this paper includes diffuse but not concentrated 
events. Specifically, it includes negative and positive events that are diffuse in nature because 
they cannot readily be attributed to a single source or cause. A diffuse failure is seen as a 
negative event for which several parties are likely to be responsible (Shaver, 1985). Conversely, 
diffuse successes are seen as positive events for which several parties are responsible. In 
contrast, concentrated events are those in which the event can be directly attributed to a single 
source or party. The scope of this paper does not include concentrated events. Whereas 
concentrated failures prescribe apologies as an appropriate response, Gunia (2011) suggests that 
diffuse events require a different response, such as blame-taking, or the taking of personal 
responsibility for a diffuse negative event (i.e., failure). The cases of the Financial Crisis of 
2007-2008 and the GM ignition switch scandal can be classified as events for which numerous 
factors and decisions could be attributed to the eventual outcomes (i.e., a diffuse failure, or a 






The abundance of possible causes and the division of labor in organizations (Weber, 
1928) contribute to the ambiguity surrounding ownership of a negative outcome (i.e., diffuse 
failure) or a positive outcome (i.e., diffuse success). The positive and negative events examined 
in this paper are complex in that there are multiple potential variables that led to the outcome. 
Although there may be certain factors that are more salient, the sequence of decisions in the 
events ultimately leading to the outcome are interdependent and cannot be easily disentangled. In 
addition, the diffuse outcomes studied are bounded in that the set of possible individuals or 
groups being blamed or credited is not infinite; instead, there is a finite set of potential 
individuals who can incur blame or credit for an event. Further, that individuals are employed by 
the same organization does not necessarily mean that they are equally culpable for or connected 
to a diffuse success or failure within the organization.  
Moreover, the direction of the outcome, positive or negative, is generally dependent on 
the perspective of the focal individual or group. Outcomes may be positive for one party yet 
negative for another, and likewise, negative outcomes may be negative for one party yet positive 
for another. Organizational members may face uncertainty when determining whether an event 
constitutes a success or a failure (Ginzel et al., 2004). Whether an outcome is positive or 
negative is dependent on a reference point. According to Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) 
prospect theory, the psychological reference point corresponds to the current “level,” or status 
quo, but this level may be shaped by other factors, such as recent changes to this level or 
comparisons to other parties. Kahneman and Tversky’s ideas have also given rise to the idea that 
reference points can change, that they can vary by individual, and that subjective perceptions of 
an outcome are dependent on its deviation from some reference point, which results in a “gain” 






positive or negative nature of the diffuse outcomes in this dissertation are dependent on a 
reference point set by the leader. The leader must manage this reference point and frame her 
communications (e.g., regarding blame and credit) accordingly following a positive or negative 
outcome. A loss could be seen as a gain, depending on the reference point; for example, if profits 
come in below expectations, a leader may frame this as a positive outcome because of the 
reference point being set even lower than the actual profits earned. Therefore, because of 
reference dependence, some losses may feel like wins and some wins may not feel as positive, 
and leaders may frame their communications according to this reference dependence.  
In prospect theory, the reference point plays a prominent role, yet this point can change 
over time (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Given a series of outcomes, the hedonic consequences 
of an outcome may cause one’s reference point to change, and the consequences of a subsequent 
outcome then depend on the adaption of this reference point. Relatedly, various researchers have 
also studied changes in behavior and their relationship to changes in aspiration levels (e.g., 
Lopes, 1987; March 1988). An aspiration level is a specific type of reference point, defined as 
“the smallest outcome that would be deemed satisfactory by the decision maker” (Schneider, 
1992: 1053). When evaluating an outcome, comparisons to an aspiration level are made to 
determine if the outcome is a success or failure (Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988). 
Furthermore, according to adaptive aspirations theory, an organization’s aspiration levels may 
change over time; these levels are set and adjusted in response to goals in previous periods, 
experiences with respect to that goal in the previous period, and comparisons made to other 
organizations (Cyert & March, 1963). This suggests that an individual’s aspirations levels can vary 
as well, in line with assertions made by prospect theory. In this dissertation, the leader is the 






aspiration level, which too may be subject to change based on past outcomes and on social 
comparisons. Ultimately, the leader’s subjective reference point determines the positive or 
negative nature of an outcome, and the leader can choose to respond to the outcome depending 
on their subjective interpretation of whether it is positive or negative. 
1.2.2 Blame and credit behaviors. When unanticipated behavior occurs, we expect an 
account or explanation of the behavior to follow (Scott & Lyman, 1968). In a similar vein, 
following a diffuse negative event such as an organizational failure, we expect a representative 
of the organization to give an account or explanation of the event. Leaders of organizations are 
often the individuals expected to step forward and make a statement regarding the event. 
Acknowledgments of positive events exist as well; when an organizational success occurs, 
leaders and members of those organizations may also give reasons for successes that other 
individuals and organizations can use as exemplars or guidelines for achieving success. In this 
paper, I define a leader as a formal leader within an organization who is in a formal relationship 
with one or more subordinates as their direct manager (or direct supervisor). I define a blame 
behavior as a voluntary behavior of designating internal responsibility for a negative outcome to 
an individual or group of individuals, either the self or followers. Similarly, a credit behavior is a 
voluntary behavior of designating internal responsibility for a positive outcome to an individual 
or group of individuals, either the self or followers. Thus, both blame and credit behaviors shift 
blame or credit toward a specific person or group of people, through the taking, sharing, or 
assigning blame or credit. 
In addition, the apology is not included in the scope of this dissertation. Blame-taking and 
apologizing are closely related concepts, but the apology is distinctive because it involves an 






two components, one that acknowledges responsibility and another that conveys remorse. In an 
apology, the acknowledgement of responsibility may be directed toward the group and not 
necessarily the self. In contrast, blame-taking does not include the regret component of 
apologizing, and beyond an acknowledgment of responsibility, blame-taking is solely the 
voluntary shouldering of or designation of responsibility categorically unto oneself.  
1.2.3 Audiences. The organizational communications literature divides communications 
into two groups of stakeholders: internal and external (Cornelissen, 2008). Internal 
communications refer to those that are distributed inside an organization, whereas external 
communications are those to stakeholders outside of an organization. Similarly, research on 
marketing and ad campaigns have referred to internal communications as those directed toward 
employees and external communications as those directed toward consumers (Celsi & Gilly, 
2010). The distinctions between internal and external audiences in the communications literature 
parallel Weiner’s (1986) notion of locus and controllability. In a crisis context, the locus 
indicates whether the cause of the crisis is internal or external to the organization, and 
controllability refers to whether the organization has control over whether it can prevents the 
crisis (i.e., an internal locus is associated with a controllable crisis, whereas an external locus is 
associated with uncontrollable crisis). A crisis perceived to fall within the boundaries of an 
organization is then classified as having an internal locus, and one that falls outside the 
boundaries of an organization are classified as having an external locus (Lee, 2004).  
For the purposes of this research, the audience is defined as the individual or group of 
individual who observe a leader’s blame and credit behaviors. Blame and credit behaviors are the 
designations of internal responsibility for an outcome toward an individual or group within the 






with differing consequences. In this dissertation, the distinction between an external and an 
internal audience stems from the organizational communications and crisis communications 
literature. Therefore, an external audience is comprised of individuals who are not formally 
members of the organization – namely, they are external to the organization. These individuals 
can be consumers of what the organization produces, but they are not official members of or 
employed by the organization. For example, users of an end product or fans of sports teams can 
be affected by behaviors of an organization, but they are not an official or formal member of the 
organization. An external audience includes stakeholders and the general public, but not 
employees of an organization. Leaders of organizations, such as coaches or executives, will 
provide opinions or statements to the media, and as recipients of that information, the general 
public can be considered an external audience for blame and credit behaviors that may be 
incorporated in these communications.  
Conversely, an internal audience is comprised of individuals who are official employees 
of the organization. An internal audience may be aware of the public communication (e.g., blame 
or credit behaviors) from individuals within the organization, such as a leader to an external 
audience, but blame or credit behaviors may also be communicated to them in an internal setting. 
Acknowledgements of blame and credit to an internal audience are thus private and intended to 
be disclosed only within the organization.  
In this dissertation, I also distinguish between two types of internal audiences: the intra-
team audience and the extra-team audience, terminology that is also inspired by the 
organizational communications literature that divides audiences into internal and external 
categories (e.g., Cornelissen, 2008; Lee, 2004). The intra-team audience includes individuals or 






sales team that fails to meet its collective sales target are an intra-team audience, as are coaches 
and football players on a team that win a football game. These individuals might incur blame or 
receive credit based on closer proximity to the outcome compared to the extra-team audience. 
The extra-team audience includes parties who are formal members or employees of the 
organization but not directly involved in the diffuse event. These extra-team parties may be other 
people (e.g., other employees, other managers) or groups within the organization (e.g., other 
teams in the same organization or department) who are not considered potential causes of the 
outcome because, for example, their roles and actions are isolated from the diffuse event. Both 
intra-team and extra-team internal audiences can include individuals who are above, below, or of 
equal hierarchical rank to the individual engaging in the blame or credit behavior.  
1.3 Overview 
In this dissertation, I examine how and why leaders, defined in this paper as formal 
leaders in the role of a manager or supervisor, of organizations communicate accountability by 
addressing blame and credit. This dissertation contributes to and extends the conversation about 
blame and credit behaviors in the workplace by deepening our understanding of the distinct ways 
in which leaders express blame and credit to an external audience and leaders’ perspectives on 
their own blame and credit behaviors to an internal audience. I then develop a theoretical 
framework delineating the motives and related factors driving such behaviors internally within 
organizations. Chapter 1 provided the general motivation for studying the selected topic and 
clarified concepts central to this dissertation in particular. 
In Chapter 2, I take an exploratory approach to identify numerous blame and credit 
behaviors beyond those previously emphasized in the literature. In the initial Pilot Study, I use an 






conscious processes of leaders of sports teams, coaches. These leaders may be aware of their 
conscious thought processes prior to and during their communication of blame and credit to team 
members situated hierarchically (and internally) below them. In Study 1, I survey statements 
made by professional American football coaches in a public setting that address blame and credit 
following the win or loss of a football game. The purpose of this study is to develop a more 
comprehensive picture of what expressions of blame and credit look like, as well as to identify 
any patterns regarding these behaviors. Together, these two studies (i.e., Pilot Study and Study 1) 
address the distinctions among different blame and credit behaviors, providing suggestions for 
why some leaders may engage in one type of behavior over the other.   
Chapter 3 builds upon conclusions drawn from the Pilot Study and Study 1 and develops 
a model arguing that leaders’ tendencies to engage in blame and credit behaviors are not always 
driven by self-serving biases. I explore the reasons behind these disparate behaviors by 
proposing that there is a set of commonly experienced motivations that drives leaders to enact 
various blame and credit behaviors beyond shifting blame away and credit towards oneself. 
Drawing from a variety of literatures, I identify four broad categories of motives driving blame 
and credit behaviors. The set of motives introduced in Chapter 3 provide a method for 
categorizing the key common explanations for why leaders might choose to enact one type of 
blame or credit behavior over another. Thus, Chapter 3 contributes to the existing literature by 
expanding our understanding of why leaders engage in specific types of behavior through a new 
theoretical framework. 
Next, in Chapter 4, I describe three studies (Studies 2, 3 and 4) conducted to test key 
elements of the theory proposed in the third chapter regarding leaders’ motivations to shift blame 






motives developed in Chapter 3, as well as potential moderating variables. Study 2 is an online 
field survey study conducted with a sample of working managers. Study 3 is an experimental 
study conducted with a sample of undergraduates, testing the main effects of the model. Finally, 
Study 4 is an experimental study using a procedure similar to Study 3 that additionally tests the 
moderating effect of reward structure. I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 5, presenting the key 
takeaways and contributions, implications, and proposed future steps.  
In sum, this dissertation contributes to the understanding of the communication of blame 
and credit in organizations, the distinctions among different types of blame and credit behaviors, 
and the motives driving these types of behaviors. It both exposes and extends the opportunity for 
future exploration of the downstream consequences of blame and credit behaviors. It does so by 
initiating a dialogue about why leaders engage in disparate behaviors, such as blame-taking and 
credit-giving. Examining these factors, as well as contextual factors, allows for a deeper 
understanding of the variation in behaviors across leaders. I aim to offer practical guidance for 
managers and other formal leaders about how to navigate their set of response options following 
a positive or negative organizational event. Thus, this dissertation paves the way for future 
research on how blame and credit behaviors can improve the nature, efficiency, and effectiveness 






Chapter 2: Introductory Studies 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The blame and credit literature has not yet delved into the variety of ways in which 
organizational leaders acknowledge blame and credit following diffuse positive and negative 
outcomes. Although scholars have examined blame assignment behaviors, much of this work has 
operated on the assumption that individuals act to reduce blame and increase credit assigned to 
them. As a result, within the literature, we know little with respect to the other blame behaviors 
that might exist or what they look like, as well as credit behaviors beyond credit taking. This 
dissertation addresses this void by surveying a context in which acknowledgements of blame and 
credit arise with regularity and investigating the display of these types of behaviors and how they 
compare to one another.  
In this chapter, I conduct exploratory work to create a more comprehensive picture of 
blame and credit behaviors. In the Pilot Study, I interview two organizational leaders to address 
and develop an understanding of private, internal blame and credit behaviors. The objective of 
the Pilot Study is to enhance our understanding of why leaders choose to engage in certain types 
of blame and credit behaviors and how they view these processes themselves. 
The objective of Study 1, an exploratory study qualitative in nature, is to illustrate that a 
variety of blame and credit behaviors exist, and these expressions may not occur in symmetric 
ways in the public context of the study. By identifying and mapping out distinct categories of 
blame and credit, I uncover existing patterns in these types of behaviors. I also explore both 
public and private blame and credit behaviors, determining that these behaviors vary when 






Pilot Study). The private context of behaviors observed in the Pilot Study and the opportunity to 
probe the thought processes of those who directly enact these behaviors, on top of the mapping 
of blame and credit behaviors in a public arena through Study 1, will prompt a conversation 
regarding the possible motivations behind various blame and credit behaviors from the 
perspective of the leaders.  
2.2 Pilot Study: Coach Interviews  
In order to begin to understand blame and credit behaviors enacted by leaders, I first 
looked to leaders of sports teams. While I am interested in how coaches communicate blame and 
credit toward an external audience, enhancing my understanding of how they communicate 
blame and credit toward an internal audience helps identify potential opportunities for conceptual 
development and data collection. Namely, in this study, I wanted to answer the question of how 
coaches determine which blame and credit behaviors to engage in when communicating with an 
intra-team audience of their athletes. 
I conducted two rounds of semi-structured, in-depth interviews with two coaches at a 
mid-sized, private university in the Midwest with an athletic program competing in Division III 
of the National Collegiate Athletic Association. In-depth interviews that are scheduled in 
advance and take place in a private setting are conducive to trust and candor on part of the 
interviewee (Padgett, 2008). In addition, advance preparation of an interview guide with 
questions and probes allows the interviewer to clarify the goal of the interview (e.g., Seidman, 
2006; Weiss, 1994). Qualitative interviewing also gives the interviewer the opportunity to decide 
whether to probe further or to cover broader or additional topics, providing some control over 
data collection. Challenges with this technique include striking a balance between the general 






physically and emotionally taxing based on the topics discussed and the length of the interview. 
To address these challenges, I prepared ahead of time and consulted various resources to develop 
my interview guides and protocols.  
The purpose of the interviews was to gain further insight into how coaches themselves 
believed they made decisions regarding blame and credit behaviors and their general approach to 
communicating with the team (e.g., giving feedback). Thus, the focus of the Pilot Study was on 
coaches’ perceptions of their own process of coaching and communicating blame and credit, as 
well as their personal “philosophy” and reasons for doing so. 
2.2.1 Method. I developed interview questions with the objective of conducting semi-
structured interviews. The interview guides were developed to create a short, in-depth interview 
that was both discursive and dialectical (Soss, 2014). The interviews were dialectical in that there 
was not one single path to be taken, allowing the element of unpredictability of a conversation to 
occur. I wanted to maintain the presence of a goal of the interview while still allowing the 
interviewee, the coach, to prioritize what information to share in the interview. The dialectical 
aspect of the interviews was reflected in that the interview was a back-and-forth conversation 
instead of one single person dominating the conversation, and the discursive aspect was reflected 
in the natural flow of the interview from topic to topic, similar to a conversation. I needed to 
moderate the discussion but they needed to provide the information for which I was looking.  
The first interview protocol included questions to provide a basis for understanding the 
circumstances and context in which the coach leads. These questions focused on how the 
coaches perceived their role as coach and the role of the athletes, as well as how the coaches 
communicated with the athletes. The later interview questions in this protocol directly addressed 






questions that were developed based on what I learned from the first interview. I probed deeper 
into the coaches’ growth over their career regarding providing communication and feedback to 
the team, as well as their personal opinions about leading and growing a team. I developed 
questions in certain topical domains (e.g., responsibilities of coach, communication to team, 
career trajectory, and lessons learned) and annotated these questions for my own use with probes 
(Padgett, 2008). These probes would remind me to ask the coach a specific question in case they 
did not cover it spontaneously.  
I conducted two rounds of semi-structured interviews with the men’s basketball coach 
and women’s softball coach at the university. I met with each coach for one hour in each session, 
and the second interview occurred approximately three months after the first. The basketball 
coach was male, his age was 79 years, and he had served as the head basketball coach at the 
university for 37 seasons and as assistant coach for one season. He had previously spent 9 
seasons as assistant coach at a Division I university and was a former Division III basketball 
player. The softball coach was female, her age was 44 years, and she had served as the head 
softball coach at the university for one season. Previously, she had been the head coach at a 
Division I university for eight seasons and assistant head coach at another Division I university 
for six seasons. She was a former Division I softball player, in addition to being a former 
member of the U.S. National Team and the U.S Olympic Team.  
2.2.2 Results. Both coaches emphasized process over outcome. This was interesting 
because outcomes in sports are often what the stakeholders (e.g., owners, fans, and media) focus 
on and value. Although the coaches emphasized process over the outcome in the interviews and 
we might assume this is what they actually do with their teams, a coach can also make 






(i.e., wins and losses). The coaches also conveyed an awareness of the importance of sensitivity 
to the needs of the players, explaining that one player’s reaction to a blame or credit behavior 
might be very different from another’s, i.e., one athlete might experience the communication as 
constructive and another as humiliating. Both coaches also spoke at length about building a 
relationship with the players. They believed that understanding their players and creating a high 
level of trust with them would help them, as the coach, to provide effective and compelling 
feedback and directives to an athlete.  
Furthermore, the coaches were insistent that they cannot (i.e., should not and do not) 
place blame on the team members because doing so might lead to reduced morale, weakened 
relationships with athletes, or negative emotions that disrupt the process and progress of the 
team. They both acknowledged the possibility that athletes experience blame when given 
feedback during and after practices and games. As a result, although coaches may not think they 
are blaming players, the players may interpret words and actions in a manner different from what 
their coaches intended. The coaches voiced the importance of building rapport with the athletes 
so that they, as the coach, would know the best course of action to take when communicating 
blame or credit – whether it was after the outcome of a game, during a game, or during practice 
while refining skills to be exhibited during an official game. Nevertheless, both coaches 
emphasized that they were the leaders of a team and therefore both had the final say in 
communicating blame and credit, and once they carefully thought through what engaging in 
specific blame or credit behaviors would achieve, would communicate it accordingly.  
2.3 Study 1: Public Acknowledgements of Blame and Credit  
Private, internal communications may differ from statements made to the public (i.e., to 






exercise more restraint in press conference dialogue and body language than they do when 
speaking privately with the team (e.g. in the locker room or during practices), public statements 
that a coach makes that communicate blame and credit arise with regularity and are ripe for 
analysis. Because the current literature has focused heavily on blame assignment and credit 
taking over other types of possible blame and credit behaviors, our knowledge of other types of 
acknowledgements and how they compare and contrast to self-serving blame and credit 
behaviors is lacking. In order to further our understanding of how and when individuals 
acknowledge blame and credit, I examine actors’ expressions of blame and credit in 
organizations. Using an exploratory approach, I conducted a study in a professional sports 
context to map out various types of blame and credit behaviors that leaders engage in in the 
public to discover patterns indicating that actors tend to approach potential incidents of blame 
and credit in predictable ways. 
2.3.1 Study context. Mary Barra’s blame-taking statement was in response to an 
unexpected anomaly and, as a result, is inherently irregular, resulting in unpredictable 
communications. Therefore, it is not possible to analyze similar situations and construct a valid 
dataset. Acknowledgments of blame and credit, however, occur with regularity and consistency 
during professional sports postgame press conferences. During these conferences, each head 
coach addresses the public through the professional sports media. Coaches often take this 
opportunity to make evaluative and explanatory statements, including reflections on the game 
played, explanations for actions or outcomes, and/or assessments of the team’s performance and 
condition. Archives of coaches’ press conferences are publicly available on many sports teams’ 
official websites, and that makes them a source of data for systematically examining 






Behaviors in professional athletics provide a good source of comparison for behaviors in 
other organizations. Professional sports are becoming increasingly recognized as a huge and 
globally expanding business that has reshaped cultures around the world (Mooney & White, 
2014; Morss, 2012). For example, in the past couple of years, the controversy surrounding 
corruption in the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) increased the 
recognition of professional sports associations operating as businesses (Ozanian, 2015). 
Moreover, in contrast to manufacturing companies, which are rapidly incorporating automation 
into their operations and thus diminishing the human factor (McAfee, 2013), the human factor 
remains central in professional sports. Consequently, examining human behaviors, especially 
those of an individual observed to be the leader (i.e., coach) of a group or organization of people 
(i.e., a sports team), through postgame press conferences provides case studies in which 
acknowledgments of blame and credit arise with regularity. 
Study 1 examines postgame press conferences in the National Football League (NFL), 
one of the four major professional sports associations in North America. The NFL is a profitable 
business; in the 2015 season alone, the NFL brought in over $13 billion dollars in revenue, up 
from $8.5 billion in revenue in 2010 (Belzer, 2016), which was distributed among the teams. 
Revenue in the NFL comes from licensing agreements, sponsorships, merchandise, and ticket 
sales, but most critically from television rights fees (Rocco, 2015). In 2015, the largest 
proportion of revenue was accounted for by television rights at about $5 billion from CBS, NBC, 
FOX, and ESPN combined (Kutz, 2016).  
During its season, NFL games occur weekly, with each team receiving one bye week. 
Because games are played once a week, coaches and teams have time to analyze the previous 






occur more frequently, such as in Major League Baseball (in which teams play games almost 
every day, with about one day off every ten days), resulting in less time to reflect and practice 
between games. Journalists and fans of baseball also have less time to focus on the events of one 
contest before they are superseded by the next. Thus, any given football press conference has 
greater salience.  
Postgame press conferences by NFL head coaches provide a rich dataset for 
acknowledgments of blame and credit given the extent of their responsibilities as head coach of 
the team. Some coaches are involved with the intricacies of team membership and game 
execution (e.g., in obtaining players and calling plays). But most NFL coaches are regularly in 
charge of postgame analysis, game planning, managing practices, making adjustments during the 
game (often aided by communication from staff members from a “bird’s-eye view,” via headset), 
providing a framework for schemes and formations, and ultimately leading “on and off the 
field—in and out of the locker room” (Garda, 2013). Because NFL coaches are deeply involved 
with their players before and after the game, and because football games move at a pace allowing 
for awareness of almost every decision made by the team on the field during the game, postgame 
statements of NFL coaches are often reported extensively in the media and widely analyzed by 
sports journalists.  
In the NFL, policies regarding press conferences have been implemented with the 
approval of franchise owners, to sustain public interest which, in turn, translates into advertising 
revenue. Postgame press conferences occur approximately 10-12 minutes after the completion of 
each game, and the coach and “at least one star player of the game” arrive at an interview area 
near or inside the home and visiting team locker room areas (NFL Media Access Policy, 2015). 






can provide comments without being prompted explicitly, but news media people oftentimes 
guide the “interview” by asking the coach open-ended questions. Coaches, as well as athletes, 
most likely receive professional media training paid for by the owners of the franchise. Because 
coaches’ statements during press conferences are so widely reported and scrutinized, coaches are 
trained in order to cast the organization and themselves in a better light. As a result, some of the 
statements made during post-game press conferences are likely a combination of what 
professionals believe are normatively proper responses and coaches’ gut responses made under 
stressful conditions (e.g., severe losses), which may not cast the organization in as favorable a 
light.  
2.3.2 Methods.   
Post-game press conference transcriptions. I focused on NFL postgame press 
conferences from the 2015 regular NFL season. Because of resource constraints, I randomly 
selected 12 NFL teams to be included in this study, as listed in Table 2.1. At the time of data 
collection (and currently), all head coaches in the NFL were male.1 The dataset included 14 total 
head coaches instead of 12 because two teams fired and replaced the head coach midseason.2 
Within the subset of 12 teams, 12 coaches were white, one was Hispanic, and one was African 
American. 
 
                                                 
 
1 There has never been a female head coach in the NFL, although the Buffalo Bills made history in January 2016 by 
appointing the first full-time female coach in NFL history, Kathryn Smith, who was the special teams quality control 
coach for the Bills during the 2016 season (Rodak, 2016). To date, there have been three women on full-time NFL 
coaching staffs (Florjancic & Lai, 2018).  
2 The Philadelphia Eagles fired head coach Chip Kelly after Game 15 (6-9 record), and offensive coordinator Pat 
Shurmur took over as interim head coach for the final week of the 2015 season. The Tennessee Titans fired head 
coach Ken Whisenhunt following Game 7 (1-6 start), and tight ends coach Mike Mularkey replaced him as interim 










Video files of post-game press conferences were obtained from each of the 12 NFL teams’ 
official team websites, and the videos ranged from approximately 3 minutes to 16 minutes. I 
transcribed 192 NFL postgame press conferences given by 14 head coaches of 12 teams from video 
into text. I collapsed each conference into logical subsections or “blocks” and preserved the 
chronological ordering of these blocks for the sake of the organization and systemization of the 
coding and analytic processes. 
Coding the post-game press conference transcription data. The analytic approach 








Arizona Cardinals Bruce Arians 13-3 2-2 ✔ 11-5
Baltimore Ravens John Harbaugh 5-11 1-3 10-6
Carolina Panthers Ron Rivera 15-1 3-1 ✔ 7-8-1
Cleveland Browns Mike Pettine 3-13 1-3 7-9
Denver Broncos Gary Kubiak 12-4 3-1 ✔ 12-4
Green Bay Packers Mike McCarthy 10-6 2-2 ✔ 12-4
Houston Texans Bill O'Brien 9-7 2-2 ✔ 9-7
New Orleans Saints Sean Payton 7-9 0-4 7-9
San Francisco 49ers Jim Tomsula 5-11 2-2 8-8
Chip Kelly
Pat Shurmur





 Philadelphia Eagles coach Chip Kelly was fired after Game 15, ending with a 6-9 record. Interim coach Pat Shurmur was 
appointed and ended the season with a 1-0 record.
b
 Tennessee Titans coach Ken Whisenhunt was fired after Game 7, leaving with a 1-6 record. Interim coach Mike Mularkey 









respect to asymmetry and occurrences of acknowledgments of blame and credit. I informally 
tested these themes and hypotheses in subsequent analyses.  This process is described below. 
This methodological approach draws on aspects of grounded theory research design in an effort 
to understand and theoretically explain a process, action, or interaction (e.g., blame and credit 
behaviors and acknowledgements) (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) through multiple phases of coding, 
in addition to aspects of content analysis in order to quantify incidents of certain phenomena 
(e.g., instances of blame and credit) (Creswell, 2013). I used these quantifications as variables in 
conducting regression analyses in order to help identify patterns and compare frequencies of 
blame and credit acknowledgements across coaches.  
First, during the transcription of the postgame press conferences, I took notes alongside 
logical subsections or blocks of the press conference, developing significant themes or distinct 
comments. Every transcribed press conference was transferred to a matrix which allowed me to 
view coaches’ statements by block (down) and by theme or coding category (across), as well as 
by game-level data (also across). This provided a systematic line-by-line (or rather, block-by-
block) coding procedure.  
Along with the initial emergent themes, I established preliminary, broad categories (i.e., 
open coding; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) that would account for focal concepts of the study – for 
example, “Blame” and “Credit” to indicate instances where either was acknowledged. Next, I 
sorted comments and subsections into this emergent set of topical categories using descriptive 
and process coding, some categories of which were predetermined prior to coding and some 
were established “in vivo,” to capture what seemed like frequent themes or chunks of data 
(Saldaña, 2016). Descriptive coding uses a word or short phrase to summarize the basic topic of 






2009), and process coding (or action coding) uses gerunds to connote action in the data (e.g., 
“Taking blame,” “Assigning credit”) (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007; Charmaz, 2002, 2008; Corbin 
and Strauss, 2008; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). After open coding each set of eight press 
conferences, (i.e., half of the regular season games for each team), I compared notes among the 
eight press conferences in each set to ensure that the use of the coding scheme was consistent 
and to see if any new patterns had surfaced.  
After the first round of open coding, I completed two iterations of more focused coding. I 
used narrow concept coding to search for “the most salient categories” and to make decisions 
regarding which initial codes from the first round made “the most analytic sense” (Charmaz, 
2006). The coding categories were also narrowed to distinguish between taking, sharing, 
deflecting, and assigning blame and credit, to highlight instances of mixing blame and credit, and 
to flag important events that corresponded to these behaviors, such as winning and losing streaks 
and breaks in those streaks. I conducted a final and third iteration of coding to ensure that I 
reached a point of saturation in which all text blocks were coded appropriately. Lastly, I revisited 
the press conference transcriptions to ensure that I had not missed relevant codes and to confirm 
certain patterns I identified were classified correctly during the coding and mapping processes.  
Team-level data. During and after the transcription of the postgame press conference 
videos, I also collected information from the official websites of each team regarding each game 
for each press conference. Team-level variables included the team’s final record for the 2015 
season, the previous (2014) season, and the 2015 preseason record, as well as whether the team 
earned a spot in the postseason playoff tournament (see Table 2.1).  
Individual game-level data. For each game, I recorded the name of the opposing team, 






positive (>0) if the team won and negative (<0) if the team lost (e.g.., a score margin of -14 
denotes that the team lost by 14 points). I recorded the season record up to and including that 
specific game and the record margin including that game, which was positive (>0) if the team 
had more wins than losses and negative (<0) if more losses than wins. I also noted whether the 
opposing team was a division opponent and the location of the game (i.e., home or away). I 
recorded the number of consecutive wins and the number of consecutive losses; for example, if 
the team lost Game 7 and Games 4, 5, and 6 were also lost, Game 7 would be coded as “4 
consecutive losses.” I recorded the team’s rank in the NFL prior to that game.  
I accessed historical data regarding Vegas betting odds and point spreads for each game 
and recorded the betting spread as a way of measuring the most likely, or the expected, outcome 
of each game (FootballLOCKS.com, 2016). 3  Using betting odds and point spreads is important 
in determining whether the outcome of a game is considered positive or negative (i.e., a gain or a 
loss), as outcomes are reference point dependent (see Chapter 1). While the reference point may 
sometimes be simply neutral, in that a win is a successful outcome and a loss is an unsuccessful 
outcome, the reference point may also vary and depend on the team’s previous game record 
leading into the current game.  
                                                 
 
3 The point spread in sports betting is the key unit of measurement between the two NFL teams playing against one 
another. The point spread indicates how much better one team is perceived to be than another (Odds Shark, 2016; 
TheSportsGeek.com, 2016). The betting moneyline would then refer to the amount an individual would need to bet to 
win (i.e., profit) $100. For example, if the point spread was -3 (i.e., the team is favored to win by 3 points) and you 
bet the moneyline of -110 (i.e., you bet $110), and the team covers the spread and wins, you would earn $100. 
Conversely, if you bet on the underdog in the same game on the moneyline of +120, a $100 bet would win you $120 
if the underdog ultimately won the game. There was a record $132.5 million placed in bets on Super Bowl 50 at the 






A negative spread (<0) indicated that the team was favored and a positive spread (>0) 
indicated that the team was the underdog. Based on the betting point spreads (i.e., + vs. -) and 
result of the game (i.e., W vs. L), I coded whether the outcome of the game was an unexpected 
loss (unexpectloss) or an unexpected win (unexpectwin). As a result, if the spread was less than 
zero (i.e., they were the favorite to win) but the team lost the game, the game was coded as an 
unexpected loss (unexpectloss=1), and if the spread was greater than zero (i.e., they were the 
underdog) but the team won the game, the game was coded as an unexpected win 
(unexpectwin=1).  
Based on the betting spread and the final score margin of the game, I computed the 
difference between the predicted outcome of the game (by using the betting spread) and the 
actual outcome of the game and called this variable the “bet versus actual” (betvsactual). For 
example, if the betting spread was -5.5, then the most likely outcome, or predicted outcome, of 
the game was that the team would win by at least 5.5 points. If the actual outcome of the game 
was a 13-24 loss, this would be a score margin of -11 points. The difference between 5.5 points 
and -11 points is -16.5, and thus betvsactual = -16.5. From this variable, I calculated magnitude, 
or the absolute value of betvsactual, which denotes the magnitude, or severity, of the difference 
between the actual final score of the game and the predicted, most likely outcome of the game 
based on the Vegas betting spread.  
Lastly, based on the betting spread data and the final score of the game, I computed two 
binary variables. The first binary variable (negative violation, negv) denoted whether the team 
underperformed and did not meet the predicted expectation of the bettors (i.e., lost when they 
were expected to win, or won by a smaller margin than they were expected to win by) – thus, 1 = 






violation of predicted expectations. The second binary variable (positive violation, posv) denoted 
whether the team “overperformed,” exceeding the predicted expectation of the bettors (i.e., won 
when they were expected to lose, or lost by a smaller margin than expected). 
2.3.3 Results.  
Types of blame and credit behaviors (acknowledgements). I observed several types of 
acknowledgments with respect to blame and credit. The range of acknowledgments in the dataset 
created goes beyond what Crant and Bateman (1993) examine by including not only the 
assignment and taking of blame or credit but also deflection and sharing. As in Gunia’s (2011) 
characterization of blame-taking, the act of assuming personal responsibility for a diffuse 
negative outcome was evident in statements acknowledging that an actor takes full responsibility 
for an outcome (e.g., “this is my fault,” “this is on me,” “I take responsibility for this loss”). The 
data also revealed that a diffuse failure may also lead to expressions that convey the sharing of 
blame among a group of people (e.g., “this is on us,” “we didn’t do it right,” “no one to blame 
but ourselves”), the deflection of blame away from oneself or any one group or indivdual in 
particular (e.g., “this is no one’s fault,” “I can’t give you a reason”, “feel like we ran out of 
time”), or the assignment of blame unto another actor or group (e.g., “he did something wrong,” 
“he made poor decisions”).  
A diffuse success (i.e., a diffuse positive outcome) elicited parallel acknowledgements of 
credit. Taking credit, or the act of assuming personal responsibility for a diffuse positive event 
(i.e., diffuse success), conveys that the success is attributed to the actor and to decisions he or she 
made, whereas assigning credit conveys that the success is attributable to another actor or party 
(e.g., “he did a great job,” “the offense did a great job”). Sharing credit conveys the sharing of 






played well as a team,” “we got it done on the field”), and lastly, deflecting credit attributes the 
cause of the success to an external source, either tangible (e.g., a person or group) or intangible 
(e.g., luck, timing: “we were fortunate … that we got away with it today”).  
I aggregated the statements coded as acknowledging blame or credit – specifically, 
taking, assigning, deflecting, and sharing either blame or credit – at the game level. To do so, I 
computed the number of times each type of blame- or credit-acknowledgment was made during a 
single post-game press conference. Thus, I counted the number of times every type of blame- or 
credit-acknowledgment was made in a specific post-game press conference, and how many times 
each coach used each type of acknowledgment across the entire season. For more complete 
examples of various acknowledgments of blame and credit, see Table 2.2 and Table 2.3.  
I discovered an observable asymmetry between parallel acknowledgments of blame and 
credit (see Appendix A for boxplot comparisons) that has not previously been addressed. The 
asymmetry is most prominent for credit- versus blame-sharing and credit- versus blame-taking. 
Notably, leaders took blame quite often but almost never took credit; only one instance of credit-
taking was coded in the entire 192 post-game press conference dataset. This single instance was 
coded simultaneously as assigning credit to a specific player as well as the coach taking credit; 
the coach, Ron Rivera, of the Carolina Panthers briefly referenced a decision he made that 
contributed to an important play call that gave the team an advantage: 
“On the fourth down, I decided to go for it because I felt comfortable and confident that 
we were winning at the point of attack on that drive and thought it was a good 
opportunity to go for it. I’m really pleased with what Jerricho Cotchery (wide receiver) 
did, with that catch, willing to get that first down conversion. It was huge.”  
The analyses conducted in this study that delve further into the above observations, along 























Violations of expectations. When unexpected behavior occurs, it violates expectations 
and warrants an explanatory account (Scott & Lyman, 1968). Leaders of organizations, 






unexpected win or an unexpected loss. With a violation of expectations, the magnitude of the 
violation may influence how a leader chooses to address blame or credit. 
For the data collected, a positive violation of expectations was operationalized by two 
variables: unexpectwin  (i.e., if the team was the underdog but ultimately won the game) and 
posv (i.e., if the team won when they were expected to lose, or lost by a smaller margin than they 
were expected to lose). A negative violation of expectations was operationalized by two 
variables: unexpectloss (i.e., if the team was favored to win but ultimately lost the game) and 
negv (i.e., if the team lost when they were expected to win, or won by a smaller margin than they 
were expected to win).  
The data provide preliminary support for the above ideas. For games that were 
unexpectedly won, sharing credit (M = 4.06, SD = 2.79) occurred significantly more than taking 
credit (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00), t(31) = 8.23, p < .001. For games in which the team won when they 
were expected to lose, or lost by a smaller margin than they were expected to lose, sharing credit 
(M = 3.54, SD = 2.46) occurred significantly more than taking credit (M = 0.01, SD = 0.10), t(90) 
= 13.69, p < .001. This significant difference, extreme beyond asymmetry, was likely driven by 
the fact that only one coach took credit only one time across all 192 postgame press conferences 
in the dataset. For games that were unexpectedly lost, sharing blame (M = 6.06, SD = 3.35) 
occurred significantly more than taking blame (M = 0.37, SD = 0.81), t(38) = 9.76, p < .001. For 
games in which the team lost when they were expected to win, or won by a smaller margin than 
they were expected to win, sharing blame (M = 4.89, SD = 3.29) occurred significantly more 
than taking blame (M = 0.67, SD = 1.32), t(124) = 11.60, p < .001.  
In addition, the data provide preliminary evidence that a positive violation of 






smaller loss than is expected) is more likely to result in a leader sharing credit with others on the 
team or in the organization than taking credit. Similarly, for a negative violation of expectations 
(e.g., a loss when a win is expected, a more substantial loss than is expected, or a smaller win 
than is expected), a leader will more often share blame with others on the team or in the 
organization than take blame for the negative violation.  
Magnitude of the violation. Although the direction of the violation of expectations may 
influence the tendency of a leader to share rather than take blame or credit, the magnitude, or 
severity, of that violation should also impact behavior. The magnitude (i.e., severity) of the 
violation was operationalized using the magnitude variable, which denotes the magnitude of the 
difference between the actual final score of the game and the predicted, most likely outcome of 
the game (based on the Vegas betting spread). I estimated regression models to examine if the 
criterion variable, the magnitude of the violation (measured both using the magnitude variable, 
as well as the negv and posv variables), was a significant predictor of specific blame and credit 
behaviors (i.e., taking, sharing, assigning, deflecting).  
For unexpected wins, the magnitude of the positive violation was a marginally significant 
predictor of a coach sharing credit, b = 0.14, t(30) = 0.09, p = .087. The magnitude of the 
unexpected win also explained a marginally significant proportion of variance in occurrence of 
sharing credit, R2 = 0.09, F(1, 30) = 3.14, p =.087. The regression of the magnitude of the 
violation using the variable posv (i.e., if the team won when they were expected to lose, or lost 
by a smaller margin than they were expected to lose) predicting sharing credit was not significant 
(p = 0.14). Hence, for positive violations of expectations, there is preliminary evidence 






credit. Thus, for an unexpected win (e.g., when the margin by which the team won increases), a 
leader is likely to share credit.  
Similarly, as the severity of the negative violation worsens, there is more blame to spread 
around for the diffuse failure. Although the linear regressions of the magnitude variable of 
unexpected losses predicting sharing or predicting taking blame were not significant, the results 
were more compelling when examining the magnitudes of negative violations using the negv 
variable (i.e., if the team lost when they were expected to win, or won by a smaller margin than 
they were expected to win). For negative violations of expectations (i.e., negv), the magnitude of 
the violation significantly predicted occurrences of a coach sharing blame, b = 0.12, t(93) = 3.21, 
p = .002; the magnitude of the violation also explained a significant proportion of variance in 
sharing blame, R2 = 0.10, F(1, 93) = 10.30, p = .002. For negative violations of expectations, the 
magnitude of the violation also marginally significantly predicted occurrences of a coach taking 
blame, b = 0.03, t(93) = 1.95, p = .055; the magnitude of the violation also explained a 
significant proportion of variance in sharing blame, R2 = 0.04, F(1, 93) = 3.79, p = .055.  This 
relationship may be more prominent for the negv variable compared to the unexpectloss variable 
because lumping unexpected losses with any of the slightest “negative” outcomes (e.g., winning 
by a smaller margin than expected) might have warranted a stronger acknowledgment of blame 
compared to only unexpected losses. Therefore, for negative violations of expectations, there is a 
positive relationship between magnitude and both sharing and taking blame: as the negative 
violation of expectations becomes worse, sharing and taking blame are more likely to occur 







The Pilot Study previews and enriches the ideas uncovered in Study 1 by taking a semi-
structured interview approach to examine how and why coaches enact blame and credit 
behaviors internally to members of the team. Public acknowledgements of blame and credit, such 
as in the NFL, are directed more toward an external audience (although an internal audience, e.g. 
team members, have access and exposure to such statements), whereas coaches’ private 
communications of blame and credit to athletes on the team are directed to an internal audience. 
These communications may be more candid and may have a stronger impact on both the 
individuals on the team and the team as a collective.  
Thus, the Pilot Study provides insight into two coaches’ thought processes and strategies 
regarding blame and credit behaviors as a method of giving feedback to the athletes. The fact 
that these two coaches believed that blame and credit should be dispensed carefully following an 
actual outcome (i.e., a win or a loss of a game) and, instead, more frequently directed toward the 
process that led to the outcome raises an interesting point: as the leader of the team, the coach, 
following a diffuse outcome, may tend to think back to the series of events that contributed to the 
outcome instead of blaming or crediting a player or the team for the outcome itself. Thus, they 
may exercise care with respect to when they enact a blame or credit acknowledgement – for 
example, speaking to a specific skill or play that the team or team member failed to demonstrate 
during the game that was expected of them, rather than the ultimate result of the game. Implied 
in this behavior is that if the person or group had been able to demonstrate a specific 







Given that coaches in the NFL are perceived as the leader of the team with myriad 
responsibilities, the insights drawn from the constructed dataset in Study 1 are likely most useful 
in considering organizations and groups with similar hierarchical structures. I selected the 
context of professional sports, namely the NFL, because it allowed me to directly examine blame 
and credit behaviors in a sample of coaches over an entire football season during which each 
team experiences diffuse events that are both positive and negative in relation to a reference 
point. Further, these behaviors were precisely recorded with no measurement error.  
The findings in Study 1 map out the conditions and factors that shape how individuals, 
specifically leaders, may acknowledge blame and credit following a diffuse outcome at the team 
or organizational level. Although natural inclinations to promote a positive self-image and 
manage impressions advocates that individuals will claim credit and shirk blame, acts of taking 
and sharing blame do transpire and have been largely ignored in the literature. An asymmetry 
between blame and credit does exist, and elements of blame-taking and -sharing, as well as 
credit-giving and -sharing, should be included in a more comprehensive picture of this 
asymmetry. My findings that coaches shared and deflected blame and credit to a greater extent 
than taking and assigning blame and credit thereby support both the asymmetry and call for 
further study. Notably, the fact that credit-taking occurred only once in the data illustrates that 
credit-taking is a deviation from what is considered a normative response during a press 
conference and likely contrary to the media training coaches receive. The data demonstrate that 
there are circumstances and factors related to both the individual leader and the 
environment/situation that lead to the taking, assignment, and sharing of credit and blame. The 
patterns observed in Study 1 provide a starting point for exploring what motivates actors to 






A key limitation for both of these studies is that they involve the context of sports at the 
professional level and collegiate level. The context for Study 1 was selected because it allowed 
examination of the ways in which individuals acknowledge blame and credit across a sample of 
coaches over an entire football season during which each team experiences diffuse events that 
are both positive and negative. Given the regularity and timing of NFL games and the uniformity 
of the postgame press conference arrangement with news media, I was able to analyze statements 
of blame and credit, along with other statements made during press conferences, with reference 
to situational features and team-level characteristics. It is important to consider how my findings 
and conclusions translate and compare to other organizational contexts other than sports. Given 
that coaches of sports teams are indeed perceived as the leader of the team with myriad 
responsibilities, my insights are likely most useful in considering organizations and groups with 
similar hierarchical structures. In other organizations with relatively flat structures, 
acknowledgments of blame and credit may occur differently. My findings have implications for 
groups within organizations and organizations themselves, particularly those with structure and 
norms similar to the NFL, as the nature of the postgame press conferences sampled in this study 
involve blame and credit behaviors that are directed toward and observed by an external 
audience (i.e., the public) rather than an internal audience (e.g., the athletes or assistant coaches), 
although the internal audience is also able to observe the coaches’ statements.  
Furthermore, Study 1 is limited to the study of male actors and their behavior, and 
women may behave differently, depending on the organization. Individuals in other firms may 
also be subject to disparate organizational cultures and norms that perceive blame and credit in a 
more or less extreme manner. It is quite possible that coaches, both those in the NFL and the 






example, in the context of NFL press conferences, coaches rarely took personal credit for a 
positive outcome and rarely blamed specific players for a negative occurrence, which may be an 
artifact of the professional media training they receive. These behaviors may be more prevalent 
in other organizational contexts.  
Existing literature does not fully address the range of blame and credit behaviors that 
leaders enact in organizations, and instead focuses more heavily on blame placement and credit 
taking. In terms of public expressions of blame and credit, findings from Study 1 demonstrate 
that leaders of teams communicate blame and credit in disparate ways, shifting blame and credit 
in different directions (e.g., taking, sharing, assigning, and deflecting). Previously, because of the 
lack of a comprehensive map of various blame and credit behaviors in organizations, it was 
impossible to determine the balance of such behaviors. Study 1 provides preliminary evidence 
that, in general, leaders shift more blame towards themselves and more credit away from 
themselves and toward others.  
Based on the responses to interview questions in the Pilot Study as well as additional 
information conveyed during these interviews, some coaches may be cognizant of how they 
communicate to players and sensitive to the potential variation of responses across the team to 
their blame and credit behaviors. But not all coaches may lead in a similar way or have a parallel 
leadership philosophy. Coaches from different schools or sports or with different genders, 
backgrounds, and levels of experience may act in ways that are different from one another. In 
addition to these observable differences, leaders of sports teams may also be driven by 
motivations that are less easily observed. What separates a coach who avoids blaming the players 
for a loss and instead shares blame from a coach who outright blames the team for each mistake? 






leaders engage in certain blame and credit behaviors in that these two coaches both understood 
that, as leaders, their behaviors would indeed impact the team (e.g., their “subordinates”) and 
future elements related to the team – for example, future performance outcomes, team dynamics, 
and the relationship of the coach with specific or all players.  
Thus, leaders of organizations may have different motivations for engaging in certain 
blame and credit behaviors. Although the two coaches interviewed for the Pilot Study believe 
that they deliberately act and react to the performance of athletes on the team, insights from this 
study suggest that individuals may not be aware of the exact motive driving their behavior, even 
if they have consciously thought through their actions. Therefore, the objective of Chapter 3 is to 
outline a set of motives that helps explain why individuals, and particularly leaders, express 
blame and credit in specific ways. Following the development of the theory delineating these 






Chapter 3: The Motives Driving Private Blame and Credit 
Behaviors 
 
The Pilot Study used a semi-structured interview approach to understand private blame 
and credit behaviors from the perspective of two coaches of collegiate sports teams. The findings 
from Study 1 provided evidence that leaders of teams do, in fact, publicly communicate blame 
and credit in disparate ways, shifting blame and credit in different directions. In addition, the 
acknowledgements of blame and credit observed in Study 1 were asymmetric: leaders shifted 
more blame toward themselves and more credit away from themselves and toward the team 
overall. Together, the studies in Chapter 2 introduced the idea that different motives explain why 
people engage in various types of blame and credit behaviors. In Chapter 3, I construct a theory 
that addresses what motivates leaders to enact different types of blame and credit behaviors, 
taking into account contextual factors (i.e., organizational culture and reward structure) that act 
as moderators of the relationship between each motive and associated blame and credit 
behaviors. 
3.1 Introduction 
Imagine a software development team of ten people working to deliver a banking 
technology software (i.e., a trading platform) product to a client, a financial investment firm. The 
team is one of many within a larger organization. A manager, who ranks hierarchically above the 
team members, is included in the ten-member team and leads the team and delegates tasks across 
individuals. These individuals all have different responsibilities, ranging from gathering business 
requirements of the product (from the investment firm), translating these business “asks” into 






tests on the product, repairing defects that arise during software testing, compiling the code onto 
the proper channels, and executing the live release of the product by the deadline set by the 
client. This entire process occurs over several months and requires frequent iterating, heavy 
collaboration across individuals on the team, and clear communication among team members, as 
well as effective task delegation by the leader. Decisions made and actions taken throughout the 
duration of the project, though likely attached to a standard set of procedures, are interdependent 
and carry risks.  
Now imagine that the development team presents the final product to the client and the 
software goes “live” to end users. In the first week of its use, end users discover a defect not 
previously detected by any of the members of the software build team that critically impairs the 
ability to execute certain types of trades and causes investors to lose a significant but not 
catastrophic amount of money. The defect is not linked to a specific individual’s work, and the 
interdependence and complexity of the software development lifecycle adds to the ambiguity of 
the situation and source of the defect. Thus, the failure of the team to deliver on expectations is a 
diffuse negative outcome. Yet in this unexpected negative situation, the development team, 
disappointed and worried after its failure to deliver a quality product to the client, will expect an 
account or explanation of the outcome (Scott & Lyman, 1968) likely from the leader of the team.  
Envision a parallel scenario in which the trading software goes beyond what the business 
client requested, by executing trades more quickly or providing additional functionality that 
minimizes the time investors spend clicking through windows or entering figures. The 
unexpected positive nature of this outcome might also warrant an explanation from the leader, an 
account of the team’s success. In these two contrasting examples, the leader has a number of 






the blame or credit that they may expect her to address. Why might a leader shift blame towards 
herself and away from the team in the case of the diffuse negative outcome (or vice versa)? In 
the case of the diffuse positive outcome, what might drive a leader to shift credit away from 
themselves and towards the team (or vice versa)?  
Although the current literature on blame and credit has examined specific types of 
behaviors, such as blame assignment and credit taking (e.g., Crant & Bateman, 1993; Gunia, 
2011; Shaver, 1985; Gioia and Sims, 1985; Greenwald, 1980), it has not fully addressed other 
blame and credit behaviors. As a result, there is great potential to develop theories to increase our 
understanding of what motivates leaders to engage in different types of blame and credit 
behaviors following a diffuse outcome. Extending our understanding of why leaders might 
choose to engage in one behavior over another will allow us to educate managers and leaders of 
organizations and teams on why they may be engaging in these types of behaviors, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally.  
3.2 Definitions and Boundary Conditions 
Blame behavior is the voluntary designation of responsibility for a negative outcome 
internally towards the self or group of individuals (e.g., self, subordinates, followers), whereas 
credit behavior is the voluntary designation of responsibility for a positive outcome internally 
towards the self or group of individuals. Credit and blame behaviors can be envisioned on two 
separate spectrums of behavior (see Figure 3.1). On the spectrum of credit behaviors, credit is 
shifted toward others on one end (i.e., assigning credit) and toward the self on the opposite end 
(i.e., taking credit), with sharing credit in the middle (e.g., sharing credit with the self and 






toward the self on one end (i.e., taking blame) and toward others on the other end (i.e., assigning 
blame), with sharing blame in the middle.  
 
Figure 3.1. Spectrum of Blame and Credit Behaviors. 
 
As uncovered in Study 1, leaders may also deflect blame and credit. Deflecting behaviors 
can be classified in two ways. Deflection may be observed merely as a description of a positive 
or negative outcome, without placing blame or credit on an individual or group. Deflection can 
also appear in the form of an excuse or justification, attributing an event to an external, rather 
than internal, cause that may not necessarily involve another person or group – for example, to 
good or bad fortune or to situational factors. The opposite ends of the spectrum of blame and 
credit behaviors depicted in Figure 3.1 signify blame or credit being shifted toward other people 
or to the self, which does not include deflecting behaviors that shift blame or credit on other 
individuals. Descriptions or factual summaries of what happened following a positive or negative 
outcome are sometimes interpreted as deflection, but these statements are not blame or credit 
behaviors that designate responsibility for an outcome towards the self or group of individuals. 
Therefore, in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation, I focus on the assigning, sharing, and taking 
of blame and credit rather than the deflecting of either, and the subsequent theory and studies 






Moreover, the theoretical model in Chapter 3 involves diffuse events, or outcomes that 
cannot readily be attributed to a single source or cause. Several parties may be responsible for 
the outcome. Furthermore, the model applies to events that are meaningful to the leader but does 
not include events of very small or very large magnitude. Events of very large magnitude may 
impact a leader’s behaviors beyond medium-sized outcomes that are typically encountered by 
organizations and teams because they may cause catastrophic consequences. Leaders may not 
think that events of a very small magnitude warrant a response as compared to events of 
relatively more impact. Therefore, the theory presented in Chapter 3 assumes that diffuse 
outcomes are those that are substantive and meaningful, but not extreme in magnitude. These 
successful or unsuccessful outcomes rise to a leader’s level of consciousness enough to warrant a 
communication of blame or credit, but not so much that they threaten the viability of the 
organization.  
Lastly, the theory constructed in Chapter 3 establishes a set of motives that drive leaders 
to enact different blame and credit behaviors following positive and negative outcomes. In this 
theoretical model, a motive is an individual difference that is more state-like than trait-like and 
can be viewed as a long-lasting state. It is not a characteristic that is ephemeral or that changes 
dramatically – it lasts for a longer period of time, but is not permanent. In this chapter, the 
theoretical propositions argue that a leader’s motives induce her blame and credit behaviors, and 
thus that these motives are linked to how a leader communicates blame and credit.  
3.2.1 Blame-taking versus apology. Blame-taking is different from apology. 
Management scholars define an apology as including both an expression of fault (similar to 
blame-taking) and an expression of regret or remorse (Kim et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2006), such 






& Cooper, 2009: 411) and the apologizer “must acknowledge responsibility… and express regret 
… these are the definitional qualities of apologies” (Scher & Darley, 1997: 129). Thus, an 
apology, as defined in the management literature, includes two elements: a component that 
conveys fault and another that conveys remorse. The Oxford dictionary defines “apology” as “a 
regretful acknowledgement of an offense or failure” and “apologize” as “to express regret for 
something that one has done wrong” (Apologize, 2016; Apology, 2016). Blame-taking is only 
part of an apology and is analogous to the expression of fault (e.g., “I take the blame for this 
outcome,” “this is my fault”), and it does not necessarily include an expression of regret (e.g., “I 
am sorry that this happened”).  
Although scholars have looked at the role of apologies in repairing trust following a 
violation, this body of work has operated largely on the assumption that in organizational and 
work settings, termination of a relationship may not be an option. In order for the trust repair 
process to begin, the parties each must be willing to put in the effort to repair a relationship they 
deem worth repairing (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). However, why individuals might be willing to 
put in effort and how they come to the calculus that the benefits of continuing the relationship 
outweigh the costs has not yet been examined. In this dissertation, I examine the antecedents, 
specifically the possible motives, behind why leaders may enact certain blame and credit 
behaviors. The motives driving blame and credit behaviors may help inform potential 
antecedents of apologies as well.  
3.2.2 Focal audience. In the current and subsequent chapters (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), 
the scope of blame and credit behaviors pertains only to internal behaviors. Study 1 examined the 
public acknowledgements of blame and credit made by professional football coaches to an 






focuses solely on blame and credit behaviors enacted toward an internal audience. Based on 
responses to interview questions in the Pilot Study, coaches focus heavily on and understand that 
their behaviors in private with the athletes (e.g., during practice, on the sidelines of a game) have 
implications beyond public press statements. Coaches also seem to have varying reasons for 
acting in a certain way or deliver a particular message. Therefore, the scope of Chapters 3 and 4 
focuses on the private communications and interactions between leaders and their subordinates 
(i.e., members of the internal audience – the players, formal members of the team)  
In addition, with respect to these internal, private communications, the scope of Chapters 
3 and 4 includes communications of blame and credit concerning the intra-team internal 
audience rather than the extra-team internal audience. To clarify, an organization refers to a 
social structure with hierarchy and division of labor (Hall, 1987; Scott, 1964; Weber, 1928). 
Within an organization, I differentiate between two types of internal audiences: the intra-team 
audience and the extra-team audience. The intra-team audience refers to individuals and parties 
directly involved in the event and diffuse outcome who could sustain blame or receive credit due 
to their proximity to the outcome. Both types of audiences include individuals and groups who 
can be hierarchically situated above, below, or at a laterally equivalent level with the individual 
or group involved in the diffuse event or the individual engaging in the blame or credit behavior. 
On the other hand, the extra-team audience refers to parties affiliated with or located within the 
organization and who are not directly involved in the diffuse event (e.g., other managers or 
employees who are not involved in the event). The extra-team audience may have reactions to 
the leader and her behaviors and communications, even though the audience is not a formal 






In the example of the software development team described previously, the intra-team 
audience is comprised of the leader or manager and the members of the development team. The 
extra-team audience includes other employees, teams, and managers within the organization who 
were not working on the specific project, as well as the business client to whom the product was 
delivered. The extra-team audience parties who are official members of the organization in 
which the event occurred but not directly related to the event (i.e., not formal members of the 
team). They are not relevant to the blame and credit behaviors enacted by leaders, but can be 
observers with their own perceptions and reactions to these behaviors.  
3.3 Motives Driving Blame and Credit Behaviors 
Leaders enact various blame and credit behaviors that include the taking, sharing, and 
assigning of credit or blame. These credit behaviors occur along a spectrum that shifts blame (or 
credit) toward the self (i.e., taking) or toward others (i.e., assigning), with sharing of blame (or 
credit) occurring in the middle of the spectrum (see Figure 3.1). In the following sections, I 
introduce four theoretical perspectives on motives that cause leaders to enact specific types of 
blame and credit behaviors toward the self or toward others: (1) ego-defensive, (2) impression 
management, (3) implicit beliefs, and (4) relationship building motives. Based on the two-
dimensional classification scheme established in the paragraphs following, this set of motives 
encompasses the most common drivers at play in interpersonal processes and thus for engaging 
in blame and credit behaviors, but may not be exhaustive.  
The literatures from which I extracted these motives differs, and as a result, I introduce 
each of these four motives separately. This accounts for the possibility that they may result in 
divergent predictions based on differing assumptions; in Chapter 3, I tie these different 






the set of motives of blame and credit behavior associated with them, I also establish a way to 
categorize the motives on two dimensions. This classification scheme provides a way to organize 
four classes of motives that comprise the most common reasons for a leader’s blame and credit 
behaviors. 
The classification scheme I developed as part of the theoretical model classifies each 
motive on two dimensions: objective and direction. A visual depiction of the matrix composed of 
these two dimensions is shown in Table 3.1. The primary dimension, the objective of the motive, 
refers to whether the behavior driven by the motive is enacted with the purpose of influencing 
either image or performance. An image objective indicates that the motive is associated with 
ultimately enhancing one’s image, whereas a performance objective indicates that the motive is 
related to enhancing performance, either of self or of others (e.g., subordinates, the team).  
 
Table 3.1 Categorizations of the Four Motives Driving Blame and Credit Behaviors 
  2. Direction 
  INWARD OUTWARD 
1. Objective 
IMAGE Ego-defensive motive 
Impression management 
motive 
PERFORMANCE Implicit beliefs motive Relationship building motive 
 
The secondary dimension, the direction of the motive, refers to whether the objective of 
the motive is directed either inward or outward. An inward direction indicates that the goal of the 
motive is self-focused (e.g., related to one’s own ego or beliefs); whereas, an outward direction 






relationships with others). The direction of the motive is different from the concepts of 
individualism and collectivism. For example, the objective of an individual’s motive may be to 
enhance performance, but this objective could be in an inward direction – e.g., to enhance one’s 
own performance. Moreover, the objective of an individual’s motive could be to enhance image, 
and this objective could be in an external direction – e.g., to enhance one’s image with respect to 
how others perceive and see the individual. In addition, the fact that the objective of image has 
an outward direction does not mean that it is necessarily collectivistic in nature, because being 
perceived favorably by others may not be directly aligned with collectivistic or joint goals or 
norms.  
In the following section, each motive is presented not only in terms of, first, its image or 
performance objective and, second, its inward or outward direction, but also with propositions 
regarding the motive’s relationship to blame and credit behaviors. Each motive is presented 
separately because the research supporting each is distinct. This chapter thus unifies these four 
theoretical spaces to explain why individuals are driven to enact blame and credit behaviors 
toward the self and toward others. The motives are presented in order of their objective: those 
with an image objective are presented first (i.e., ego-defensive and impression management 
motives), followed by those with a performance objective (i.e., implicit beliefs and relationship 
building motives). A diagram depicting the proposed relationship between the motives with 
blame and credit behaviors can be seen in Figure 3.2.  
3.3.1 Ego-defensive motive. Literature on relational and motivational psychology has 
operated on the assumption that humans are universally motivated to promote and defend a 
positive self-image (Greenwald, 1980). This literature indicates that individuals will take credit 






Greenwald states that “people perceive themselves readily as the origin of good effects and 
reluctantly as the origin of ill effects,” citing evidence that people accept more credit for 
successful outcomes and assign more blame for unsuccessful outcomes (Greenwald, 1980: 605).  
These arguments from psychology function on the assumption that blame threatens a positive 
self-esteem, whereas credit strengthens a positive self-esteem. The motivation to avoid threats to 
self-esteem thus drives individuals to reduce the blame and increase the credit assigned to them 
(Shaver, 1985) because individuals may see blame and credit behaviors as ways to maintain their 
ego.  
 
Figure 3.2. Diagram of Motives Driving Blame and Credit Behaviors. 
 
Displaying an ego-defensiveness bias when it comes to attributing causality for 






of taking blame for shortcomings (Ross, 1977). This pattern was observed in governmental 
hearings after the financial crisis. The ego-defensive motive has an image objective because the 
goal is ultimately related to enhancing sense of self-image and perceptions of self – or her ego. 
With respect to the secondary motive dimension, direction, the ego-defensive motive driving 
blame and credit behaviors has an inward direction because the image objective refers to image 
and perceptions of the self. Research on ego-defensiveness suggests that because individuals are 
more likely to take credit for successful outcomes than take blame for unsuccessful outcomes in 
order to preserve a positive ego, therefore, leaders motivated strongly by a desire to protect and 
promote ego should enact blame and credit behaviors consistent with an ego-defensiveness bias.  
Proposition 1. Leaders motivated to protect and defend their ego will tend to enact blame 
behaviors toward others and credit behaviors toward the self. 
 
3.3.2 Impression management motive. The impression management literature defines 
impression management itself as “the process by which individuals attempt to control the 
impressions others form of them,” which can be traced back to notion that “people have an 
ongoing interest in how others perceive and evaluate them” (Leary & Kowalski, 1990: 34). In the 
context of this dissertation, actors prefer to be seen by others in a favorable light, and leaders in 
particular are motivated to be seen as competent and effective in their roles (Pfeffer, 1981). 
Because individuals in leadership positions may feel the need to maintain a sense of authority 
and competency, they could enact behaviors to ensure that others view their competency 
favorably (e.g., Elsbach, 2003; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983). 
With respect to the impression management motive, “others” refers to the both the intra-team 
and the extra-team audience. Leaders may be concerned with the perceptions and evaluations of 






hierarchical rank. Leaders may also recognize that blame and credit behaviors can be used to 
strategically shape their reputation and others’ views of them so that other parties (e.g., extra-
team audience members) believe they are responsible for successes rather than failures (e.g., 
Crant & Bateman, 1993). Furthermore, individuals may believe that they have more to gain from 
being seen positively by others than they have to lose by casting others in a negative light, and 
therefore, the benefits to being seen in a positive light may outweigh the costs of putting others 
in a negative light.  
As a result, leaders strongly influenced by a desire to preserve their image in the eyes of 
others, in particular the extra-team audience, may be motivated to maintain their status. The 
impression management motive is similar to the ego-defensive motive in that both of these 
motives have the primary objective of serving image. Therefore, these two motives are 
appropriately grouped into an image objective bucket. The ego-defensive and impression 
management motives, however, are dissimilar in their direction. The ego-defensive motive is 
directed inward while the impression management motive has an outward direction, associated 
with how others perceive the actor. This idea aligns with those from impression-management 
theory, which suggests that actors prefer to be seen by others in a favorable light (Gioia and 
Sims, 1985; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983; Tedeschi, Schlenker, 
& Bonoma, 1971). The outward direction of the impression management motive does not 
indicate that this motive is collectivistic in nature; instead, it simply denotes that individuals 
motivated to manage impressions attempt to do so to enhance their image (i.e., the objective of 
the motive). Specifically, they prefer to be perceived favorably in the eyes of others (i.e., the 






I expect that leaders motivated to maintain their authority and competency as leaders may 
act to manage these impressions accordingly, and as a result, leaders who are motivated to 
manage others’ impressions will shift blame away from and credit towards themselves.  
Proposition 2. Leaders motivated to manage impressions will tend to enact blame 
behaviors toward others and credit behaviors toward the self.  
 
3.3.3 Implicit beliefs motive. The third motive, the implicit beliefs motive, is the first 
motive out of four that falls into the bucket of a performance objective. The implicit beliefs 
motive operates on ideas from implicit leadership theory, or preconceptions of the patterning of 
leadership variables (Eden & Leviatan, 1975). Implicit theories of leadership represent 
followers’ subjective view of a leader. Implicit leadership theory derives from Rosch’s (1977, 
1978) categorization theory, in which individuals create and possess schemas in their mind that 
store exemplars of different types of leaders. Literature on implicit leadership theories (ILTs) 
suggests that congruency between follower ILTs and leader behavior is linked to more positive 
evaluations of leaders (Nye & Forsyth, 1991). Positive ILTs are those “ideal” leader qualities 
such as being charismatic and team-oriented. When leaders exhibit these qualities, subordinates 
may show higher overall well-being, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment 
(Epitropaki & Martin, 2005). In the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness (GLOBE) project, House and colleagues (1999) developed and validated a 112-
item leadership behavior scale that measured the image of an ideal leader, or an effective leader. 
The scale determines if an individual believes a behavior or characteristic greatly inhibits or 
greatly contributes to an individual being an outstanding leader. In the GLOBE project, House 






characteristics such as being team-oriented, charismatic, participative, and humane, and excluded 
characteristics like being self-protective and autonomous.  
From the literature on ILTs, we know that individuals hold stored conceptions of traits 
associated with leadership that inform their ILTs and lay theories about “good leadership.” These 
ILTs may prompt leaders to enact credit and blame behaviors in particular ways. Individuals 
want to communicate their desired identity (e.g., “a good leader”), and others will use these 
messages to make inferences about them (Belk, 1988, Berger and Heath, 2007). Moreover, 
leaders who have their own ILTs regarding how a “good leader” acts may believe that wasting 
tangible and intangible resources on the allocation of blame for a diffuse event will preclude 
optimal performance outcomes. These leaders may want to behave in ways they believe a “good 
leader” would in order to enhance performance outcomes. 
Literature outside of academia suggests that people have lay beliefs about “good leaders,” 
namely that good leaders take blame rather than shirk blame or place blame on their employees. 
American business-related news media have published articles on how to “navigate the blame 
culture,” “stop playing the blame game,” and other blaming-related topics (e.g., Donner, 2011; 
Fast, 2010; Patel, 2014; Zimmerman, 2011). Although there may be variations in implicit beliefs 
about how a good leader acts, the implicit beliefs motive outlined here operates on the 
assumption that, in general, individuals believe that a good leader acts in ways that are more 
team- rather than self-focused. Thus, the implicit beliefs motive contrasts with the ego-defensive 
and impression management motives.  
The primary dimension, the objective, of the implicit beliefs motive is to improve the 
performance of the leader, and subsequently the team, through the actions that an ideal, or good, 






“ideal” leader, the leader hopes to perform well. The objective of this motive is performance-
based, the motive’s direction, and the secondary dimension, is inward rather than outward 
because this motive presumes the leader is attempting to deliver a high quality “performance” as 
the leader. A leader who holds these implicit beliefs about good leadership and attempts to act 
accordingly as a leader does so to fulfill her personal belief about how a good leader should act. 
Conceptualization of ideal leadership, or ILT, is closely related to individual self-concept. In a 
similar vein, individuals want to work for leaders who match their ILTs, and individuals may 
also want to be the type of leader for whom they would want to work (e.g., Epitropaki & Martin, 
2005). ILTs may influence a leader’s behavior because individuals are motivated to behave 
consistently with his or her own self-concept (e.g., Lord & Brown, 2001), which is related to 
idealized conceptualizations of leadership. Thus, by trying to behave congruently with her 
personal beliefs regarding good leadership, the leader is attempting to match their implicit 
theories regarding ideal leadership with her behaviors as a leader. Thus, I expect that leaders 
driven by the implicit beliefs motive will enact blame and credit behaviors congruent with the 
qualities of what a “good leader” would do.  
Proposition 3. Leaders who are motivated to fulfill positive ILTs will tend to enact blame 
behaviors toward the self and credit behaviors toward others. 
 
3.3.4 Relationship building motive. Leadership behaviors that occur through 
interpersonal exchanges can help develop the relationship between a leader and a member (for 
example, LMX) by establishing norms of reciprocity and patterns of interdependence 
(Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Interdependence in social 
exchanges involves mutual and complementary arrangements; thus, social exchanges are defined 






reciprocity is key to understanding the interdependent nature of social exchanges because if one 
party supplies a benefit (i.e., an individual takes the blame for an undesirable outcome), the 
receiving party should respond correspondingly in the future. Social exchange theory assumes 
that exchange relationships that follow expectations of reciprocity will “evolve over time into 
trusting, loyal, and mutual commitments” (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005: 875). Therefore, 
leaders may believe that employees will repay a supportive employer with hard work (e.g., if 
leader supplies a benefit, receiving party will respond in kind in the future). 
For example, the gesture of taking blame may be considered a high quality social 
exchange that enhances perceptions of organizational support. Stronger relationships between a 
leader and her followers may then enhance team performance. Scholars suggest that perceived 
organizational support predicts organizational commitment, and that organizational commitment 
improves with increased perceptions of organizational support (Settoon et al., 1996; Masterson et 
al., 2000). Not only does greater organizational commitment positively influence job 
performance (Rhoades, Eisenberger, & Armeli, 2001), but high levels of perceived 
organizational support have also been linked to better job performance (Eisenberger et al., 2001; 
Randall, Cropanzano, Bormann, & Birjulin, 1999; Wayne et al., 1997). Therefore, interpersonal 
exchanges in the form of blame and credit behaviors may be used as a way to establish and 
strengthen the relationship between a leader and her subordinates.  
Blame and credit behaviors may also be seen as a way to build trust and respect. Trust in 
a leader is defined as the expectation or belief that the leader has good intentions toward the 
group and that the team can rely on the leader’s actions or words (Dirks, 2000). If a leader 
assigns the blame to a subordinate or subordinates for a failure, trust in the leader may decrease. 






failure was a result of poor leadership and of the leader’s behavior. By blaming her own 
leadership instead of the behavior of the team members, the leader may be perceived as more 
trustworthy because she is fulfilling her role as a leader, which strengthens the quality of the 
relationship between leader and subordinate. As a result, leaders may believe that blame and 
credit behaviors are viable means to augment the relationship with a subordinate. 
A leader motivated by the potential benefits of social exchange may engage in behaviors 
that could be perceived as supportive of her followers. Yet the converse argument can be made 
that leaders will behave in ways that do not necessarily augment their relationship with a 
subordinate, but instead protect the relationship and their followers from harm (e.g., Rosen et al., 
2011). Leaders may enact certain blame and credit behaviors in order to establish a relationship 
(e.g., placing credit, taking blame), but they may also be motivated to avoid certain blame and 
credit behaviors. These leaders do not wish to harm their followers (e.g., avoiding placing direct 
blame, avoiding taking credit) and instead wish to protect them as a way to maintain their high 
quality relationship (e.g., Scandura & Graen, 1984). As a byproduct of that protection, leaders 
may believe that employees will repay them in the future in accordance with the story of 
interdependent exchange and mutual obligations as outlined by social exchange theory 
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). 
 with hard work (e.g., if leader supplies a benefit, receiving party will respond in kind in 
the future) – these perceived mutual obligations may lead some leaders to believe that . 
The objective of the relationship building motive is to augment performance. By building 
relationships and improving relationship quality with subordinates, leaders driven by the 
relationship building motive aim to ultimately see performance improvements. Thus, the implicit 






objective bucket. Furthermore, a leader driven by a relationship building motive thus works to 
establish and maintain her relationships with followers (i.e., subordinates and other individuals 
who are a part of the intra-team audience) in order to enhance performance. Thus, the 
relationship building motive can be classified as being directed outward, as the leader behaves to 
uphold the relationship and/or avoid harming the other individual. I expect that leaders driven to 
develop positive relationships with subordinates will exhibit blame and credit behaviors to that 
end. 
Proposition 4. Leaders motivated to strengthen relationships with their subordinates will 
tend to enact blame behaviors toward the self and credit behaviors toward others. 
 
Although it is possible that other motivations also exist, the proposed set of four motives 
include the most common motives that influence leaders’ blame and credit behaviors and 
communications. These can be envisioned as individual differences, or characteristics, with 
internal drivers. These motives are not fleeting, but they also are not permanent. Each of the 
motives introduced are states that are relatively long-lasting drivers of a leader’s blame and 
credit behaviors, compared to ephemeral states. I argue that individuals are driven to some extent 
by each of the four motives presented, but that one motive (e.g., to manage impressions) may 
outweigh one (or all) of the other motives (e.g., to build and strengthen relationships with 
subordinates). In short, a leader holds some level of each of the four motives, but some motives 
are more salient than others. Therefore, one (or more) motive may be more salient for a leader, 
and this motive may have heightened impact on her blame or credit behaviors. Conversely, (or 
more) motive may be more muted for a leader, and this motive may have diminished influence 






3.3.5 Relaxing the assumption of an internal, intra-team audience. The scope of the 
motives introduced above is limited to the blame and credit behaviors of a leader directed toward 
the internal, intra-team audience – that is, those individuals who are officially affiliated with (i.e., 
employed by) the organization and directly involved in the event and diffuse outcome, such that 
they could sustain blame or receive credit due to their proximity to the outcome. The impression 
management motive, as delineated above, relaxes this assumption slightly to allow for certain 
leaders who may be motivated to manage the impressions that both the internal intra-team 
audience and extra-team audience (e.g., other employees who do not report to that leader, other 
managers with similar hierarchical rank) have of them. For the impression management motive, 
this difference in assumption with respect to the audience of the behaviors enacted by a leader 
stems from the notion that some leaders may be motivated to be viewed as competent in their 
role by others within the organization (Elsbach, 2003; Pfeffer, 1981). Thus, blame and credit 
behaviors beyond what a leader directs toward an internal, intra-team audience can be studied for 
other motives as well. In the following section, I will explain how different types of audiences 
may change how motives manifest as blame and credit behaviors.  
To begin, the boundaries that separate the external audience from the internal audience, 
as well as the intra-team from the extra-team audiences within the internal audience, can be 
thought of as either open or closed. The boundary may affect the extent to which leader blame 
and credit behaviors may be observed or visible to one or more audiences. Boundaries, then, 
allow us to explore the isolation of an audience from the behaviors that another audience 
observes. An open boundary refers to a porous boundary through which all leader behaviors and 
communications pass easily and are not isolated to a specific audience. For example, when there 






team audience are observable by the internal, intra-team audience. An NFL press conference is 
an example of an open boundary that is accessible and observable by both internal and external 
audiences. On the other hand, a closed boundary refers to a boundary through which the 
behaviors and communication from the leader cannot and do not pass and are isolated to a 
specific audience. For example, when there is a closed boundary, behaviors enacted toward an 
external audience (or an internal, extra-team audience) are not observable by the internal, intra-
team audience.   
In addition, the type of audience observing the leader’s blame or credit behavior and the 
boundaries associated with these audiences will not influence the two motives categorized as 
having an inward direction with respect to objective (i.e., ego-based motive and implicit beliefs 
motive). The behaviors predicted by these motives will not change because the objective of both 
the ego-based motive and implicit beliefs motive is directed inward instead of outward and is 
focused on the self (i.e., one’s own ego or own beliefs) rather than on others in the environment 
(i.e., the perceptions and relationships one has with other individuals). Leaders driven by the 
ego-based motive or the implicit beliefs motive will not act differently toward different types of 
audiences. For example, a leader driven most strongly by the implicit beliefs motive, to enact 
behaviors congruent with those of an ideal leader and with positive ILTs, will want to behave 
consistently with this idealized conceptualization of leadership in front of an external audience as 
well as in front of all types of internal audiences.  
Conversely, because their objective is directed outward instead of inward, the impression 
management motive and relationship building motive may be affected by different types of 






Impression management motive. When boundaries between audiences are closed, 
leaders who are driven by the impression management motive may then view their resulting 
blame and credit behaviors as a means to tailor their image to a specific audience (e.g., an 
external audience, an internal intra-team audience, or an internal extra-team audience) because 
leader behaviors observed by one audience are not visible to another. Furthermore, leaders may 
feel the need to manage impressions differently when communicating to internal extra-team 
audiences situated hierarchically above, below, or laterally (Ginzel et al., 2004). Toward 
superiors, a leader may engage in blame and credit behaviors directed toward an upward, extra-
team audience that protect her image of being competent in a leader role. As a result, the leader 
may shift credit toward the self and blame away, as predicted. In a laterally equivalent or in a 
downward direction (e.g., toward an extra-team audience member who is hierarchically situated 
below), a leader may be driven in a similar manner – to shift blame away and credit toward (e.g., 
Crant & Bateman, 1993).  
Consider next a leader who would like to be viewed by others in a favorable light to 
individuals at her same hierarchical rank or to lower level employees who either report or do not 
report to them (e.g., either the intra-team audience or extra-team audience). This leader may wish 
to manage the impression of being a certain type of leader (for example, team-oriented, 
generous, or humble). In this case, for the leader, managing impressions might mean shifting 
credit away toward others and shifting blame toward the self to appear as though one is a humble 
and/or team-oriented leader. A similar prediction can be made for an external audience; if a 
leader wishes to protect an image of being competent in front an audience with closed 






behaviors may be less likely to occur and perhaps reversed if the leader wishes for the external 
audience to perceive him or her as being a generous, humble, or team-oriented leader. 
In a situation in which there are open boundaries across the different types of audiences, 
leaders’ behaviors will be visible to a variety of audiences, both internal and external. With open 
boundaries, leaders may then enact behaviors that maintain the impression that the leaders wish 
to manage in light of the highest priority audience. For example, if the leader has a low priority 
to cater to the external or the internal, extra-team audience, and instead, the leader’s top priority 
is to maintain an impression of being a competent leader in the eyes of the internal, intra-team 
audience, she may then shift blame toward others and shift credit toward themselves in front of 
an audience with open boundaries. If she is most inclined to be perceived as a favorable, team-
oriented leader in the eyes of the internal, intra-team audience (and lower on the list of priorities 
are the internal, extra-team audience and the external audience), however, she may shift credit 
toward others and shift blame toward the self. The desire and motivation to be perceived as 
team-oriented may lead her to engage in relationship building. In this sense, the manifestations of 
blame and credit behavior stemming from one’s drive to manage impressions may be congruent 
with the manifestations of behavior stemming from a drive to build relationships. Whether the 
boundaries between audiences are closed or open may influence what impression a leader wishes 
to manage and how.  
Relationship building motive. When boundaries across audiences are closed, a leader’s 
blame or credit behavior observed by one audience is not visible to and is isolated from the 
purview of other audiences. As a result, the leader may attempt to use blame and credit behaviors 
as a means to build relationships with other types of audiences. As previously described, an 






leader’s blame and credit behaviors communicated toward an upward, internal, extra-team 
audience may not be the most effective means to build relationships. Yet, if this is the case, then 
a leader who is driven to build relationships with her superiors, or the internal audience members 
situated hierarchically above, may shift blame toward the self and shift credit away toward others 
(e.g., their own employees and team members) in order to signal that they can be held 
accountable in the organization. Nevertheless, building a relationship with a superior may 
sometimes mean promoting one’s own competence, and that would then fall in line with the 
impression management motive and the behavior linked to that driver.  
In contrast, if the extra-team audience to which the leader is communicating blame or 
credit is located at an equivalent level or downward, a leader driven to build relationships with 
these types of audiences may want to signal that she is trustworthy and not the type of leader to 
throw others under the bus (e.g., Rosen et al., 2011). Thus, in these cases, a leader may be 
inclined to shift blame toward the self and shift credit toward others. With respect to building a 
relationship with an external audience while boundaries across audiences are closed, the blame 
or credit behaviors enacted by a leader and communicated to these parties may be slightly 
different. Because these behaviors are not visible to anyone within the organization (either the 
intra-team or extra-team audience), the relationship that the leader wishes to build with external 
audience members (i.e., family members, partners, friends) is outside the scope of the 
organization. Therefore, leaders may be less likely to engage in behaviors that directly serve to 
build relationships with individuals who work in the same organization, let alone individuals 
who work for them or on their teams.  
In cases where there are open boundaries across the different types of audiences, leaders’ 






boundaries, leaders may then enact behaviors that either protect their relationships with their 
subordinates or protect their subordinates directly (or both) in an effort to preserve and maintain 
positive relationships with their employees. When boundaries are open across audiences, a leader 
will likely engage in the same blame and credit behaviors in front of all audiences as they would 
an internal, intra-team audience (i.e., shifting blame toward the self and shifting credit toward 
others) because they do not wish to harm the relationship they do have and want to have with 
their subordinates. Acting in a way that shift blame toward their subordinates and credit toward 
the self could potentially harm their subordinates as well as the relationship.  
3.4. Individual- and Group-focused Moderating Factors 
 Although these motives are internal and can be visualized as long-lasting states and as 
individual differences or characteristics, there may also be contextual factors, such as 
organizational culture or reward structure, which contribute to variation in blame and credit 
behaviors as well. When an individual walks into a different context, the factors within that 
context will influence the relationship between the motives and blame and credit behaviors. A 
contextual factor may change the blame or credit behavior that a leader ultimately enacts, even 
though she may continue to be driven by a specific motive (or motives). In the previous section, I 
argued that leaders who hold certain motives, or characteristics, will tend to enact certain blame 
or credit behaviors across situations, but it is important to address that contextual factors may 
either decrease or increase the behavioral manifestations of those tendencies or motives. 
Individuals will continue to hold certain motives; those motives may continue to exist, but the 
relationship from a leader’s natural motives to her behaviors may be amplified or attenuated.  
In the following section, I introduce two contextual factors that may influence the degree 






the reward system. I introduce these two specific motives because they are prominent factors in 
organizations that fit well with the theory developed in this chapter. Each of these motives are 
likely to affect how an individual behaves because they change the way certain behaviors, in 
particular blame and credit behaviors, are valued or perceived within an organization. I also 
highlight these two contextual factors because they are likely to affect the objective of an 
individual’s motivation to act in a certain way. Indeed, the two factors delineated may switch a 
leader’s focus toward image or toward performance (i.e., related to the objective dimension of 
the motive), and in doing so, the relationship between the leader’s motive and their natural blame 
and credit behaviors may be altered. While contextual factors do not change whether the 
individual has a particular motive, these contextual factors may change how a leader decides to 
behave, and, in turn, their blame and credit behaviors.  
Specifically, I look at each of these factors in terms of how individual- or group-focused 
they are. In a sense, the extent to which a factor is individual- or group- focused can be related to 
the constructs of individualism and collectivism.4 While collectivism and individualism has been 
studied at the societal level, collectivistic and individualistic values can be present at the 
organizational level as well (Earley, 1993), for example, through the attraction, selection, and 
attrition mechanism (Schneider, 1987). As part of this theoretical model, I incorporate the effects 
of individualistic and collectivistic values in an organization rather than of a society. In extant 
literature, the individualism construct refers to a concern for oneself and immediate family, 
                                                 
 
4 At this point, the current theoretical model focuses on organizational cultural differences and has yet to encompass 
national cultural differences. National and societal cultural differences are addressed in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.3: 
Future Research). In Chapter 5, cultural differences, including individualism versus collectivism and low versus 






personal autonomy and self-fulfillment, and the link from identity to personal accomplishments 
(Hofstede, 1984); thus it is conceptualized more broadly as “a worldview that centralizes the 
personal … and peripheralizes the social” (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002: 5). In 
contrast, the collectivism construct assumes that the group, or collective, binds and mutually 
obligates individuals to further the goals of the group. In a similar vein, organizational cultures 
and reward systems can each be categorized as individual-focused or group-focused.  
I argue that the individual-focused versus group-focused nature of the contextual factors 
(i.e., organizational culture and reward system) may shape, and more specifically, moderate the 
relationship between a leader’s natural motive and subsequent blame and credit behavior due to 
the contextual factor’s impact on the objective of the motive. When leaders are subject to 
individual-focused factors, such as an individualistic organizational culture or an individual 
reward structure, they may be more likely to act in the service of their own image because the 
environment emphasizes the importance of the individual and her own accomplishments. On the 
other hand, when leaders are exposed to group-focused factors, such as a collectivistic 
organizational culture or shared reward structure, they may be more likely to act to further the 
performance of the group as a whole, through actions of their own, because the environment 
emphasizes the importance of the collective and its shared interests. 
3.4.1 Organizational culture. The culture of an organization is rooted in and 
characterized by the values, beliefs, and assumptions held by organizational members, which in 
turn shape which members and elements of the organization’s operations become salient and 
how individuals within the organization perceive and interact with one another (Denison, 1996; 
Trice & Beyer, 1993; O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996). Culture contributes to an organization’s 






the emphasis an organization’s culture places on collectivistic or individualistic values and 
potential behaviors within the organization.  
 Whether an organization places an emphasis on individualistic or collectivistic values is 
related to task environment, organizational history, or industry; both individualism and 
collectivism are considered “legitimate and effective models of organizational functioning” 
(Chatman & Barsade, 1995: 424; e.g., Lincoln, Olson, and Hanada, 1978; Chatman and Jehn, 
1994). In an organizational culture with strong individualistic values (i.e., individual-focused), 
organizational members place priority on the pursuit and maximization of individual goals. 
Examples include encouraging employees to think independently and to make decisions on their 
own (Chatman & Barsade, 1995). People in these environments tend to focus on their own and 
others’ specific unique abilities and traits, categorizing them into what makes them different and 
unique from others. Conversely, in organizational cultures that emphasizes collectivistic values 
(i.e., group-focused), members place priority on shared goals and collective action. The focus is 
on joint objectives, shared interests, and commonalities among others in the organization. 
Examples include employees sharing responsibilities, brainstorming ideas together, and making 
decisions as a group.  
 Drawing on the example of the software development team’s failure (or success), the 
organizational culture perceived by the members of that team and specifically the leader of that 
team will shape their behaviors. Namely, whether the culture tends toward individualistic or 
collectivistic values and norms might change a leaders’ behavior through the impact of these 
values on to what extent particular blame or credit behaviors they enact, despite their motive(s). 
For example, if the team fails to deliver a successful product to the client, the leader’s propensity 






tends to drive her behaviors. The extent to which the organization’s culture stresses collectivistic 
or individualistic values, however, may suppress the behaviors linked to her impression 
management motive and activate different behaviors instead. 
 To clarify the link from individualistic and collectivistic cultures to the set of four 
motives and the proposed ensuing blame and credit behaviors, I focus on the classification of the 
motives in terms of their objective, in the classification scheme developed in Chapter 3 (see 
Table 3.1). The objective of a motive refers to whether the resulting blame or credit behavior is 
enacted with the goal of either influencing the individual’s (i.e., the leader’s) image or 
influencing the performance. In an individualistic organizational culture with individual-focused 
norms, people are fixated more on meeting (and exceeding) their own goals and on their own 
unique characteristics and accomplishments. As a result, individualistic values are more 
congruent with the ego-defensive and the impression management motives, both of which have 
the objective of enhancing one’s own image in terms of either one’s own ego or how others 
perceive them. In contrast, in a collectivistic organizational culture with group-focused norms, 
members tend to fixate on the optimization of shared objectives and goals and on their shared 
interests. Therefore, collectivistic values are more congruent with the implicit beliefs and the 
relationship building motives, which, in turn, have the objective of enhancing performance, 
either through one’s own performance as a leader or through the improvement of relationships 
with subordinates. Although leaders will continue to harbor a particular motive(s), organizational 
culture may change the likelihood of that motive manifesting as certain blame and credit 
behaviors, rather than changing whether the individual continues to hold that motive.  
As a result, when a leader’s motive(s) is incongruent with the organizational culture, the 






tendencies associated with this motive and instead activate behaviors that are more aligned with 
the organizational culture. Thus, the individualism or collectivism of an organizational culture 
will moderate the relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors.  
Proposition 5. The relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors will vary 
based on organizational culture. 
a) In an organizational culture with an emphasis on collectivistic values, the 
relationship between the ego-defensive and impression motives and blame and credit 
behaviors is weaker than in a culture which emphasizes individualistic values.  
b) In an organizational culture with an emphasis on individualistic values, the 
relationship between the implicit beliefs and relationship building motives and blame 




 3.4.2 Reward structure. Organizations can employ reward structures by which to 
distribute rewards to two or more individuals, thereby motivating employees and allocating 
resources. Reward structures have been grouped into two “pure” types (e.g., Deutsch, 1949b; 
Johnson and Johnson, 1989; Tjosvold, 1982): individual rewards (sometimes known as 
“competitive”) and joint or shared rewards (also known as “cooperative”). Individual rewards are 
more individual-focused and are based exclusively on the performance of one individual and are 
may be referred to as “competitive” because individuals are rewarded for outperforming others 
(e.g., Pearsall et al., 2010). Shared rewards are more group-focused and provide a common 
interest for individuals to work together and perform well because the reward depends on 
collective performance. In a department store, employees may be compensated based on 
individual or shared rewards. For example, when an individual employee in the furniture 
department receives an annual bonus of $1,000 because she has exceeded her annual, personal 
sales target by 10%, this constitutes an individual reward. When all the employees in the 






their annual departmental profit goals by 5%, this constitutes a shared reward. In another 
example, Nucor, a steel production company, implements a shared reward system such that 
steelworkers making batches of steel receive a bonus tied to the production of defect-free steel 
during the group’s entire shift (Hope, 2009). It follows, then, that individual rewards are 
classified as more individual-focused because members are rewarded for performance based on 
their individual achievements, whereas shared rewards are more group-focused because 
members are rewarded for joint contributions to the organization (e.g., Triandis, 1989).  
Similar to organizational culture, in an individual-focused, individual reward structure, 
leaders may be more likely to focus on themselves and the maximization of their own 
achievements while disregarding or even minimizing the achievements of others. This type of 
reward structure is more congruent with the ego-defensive motive and the impression 
management motive, both of which have the objective of enhancing image in terms of either how 
a leader sees herself or how others perceive her, respectively. Conversely, in a group-focused, 
shared reward structure in which individuals are rewarded based on the performance of the 
group, leaders may be more likely to focus on the collective and the optimization of their 
behavior in an effort to bolster performance overall. The shared reward structure thus stresses a 
focus on collective outcomes and is more congruent with the implicit beliefs motive and the 
relationship building motive, both of which have the objective of enhancing performance 
through exhibiting the characteristics of an “ideal” leader and building relationships. Even 
though leaders will continue to harbor a particular motive(s), the reward system of their 
organization may change the tendency of that motive translating into certain blame and credit 






As a result, when a leader’s motive(s) is incongruent with the reward structure, the 
emphasis on individual or shared rewards may then effectively suppress the behavioral 
tendencies associated with this motive and instead activate behaviors that are more aligned with 
the reward system. Thus, the individual or shared nature of the reward structure will moderate 
the relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors.  
Proposition 6. The relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors will vary 
based on reward structure. 
a) Under a shared reward structure, the relationship between the ego-defensive and 
impression motives and blame and credit behaviors is weaker than under an 
individual reward structure. 
b) Under an individual reward structure, the relationship between the implicit beliefs 
and relationship building motives and blame and credit behaviors is weaker than 
under a shared reward structure. 
 
 Together, the four motives outlined in this chapter – the ego-defensive, impression 
management, implicit beliefs, and relationship building motives – provide the most common 
reasons for leaders’ blame and credit behaviors towards an internal audience following a diffuse 
outcome. Although other motives may exist, these four motives should be viewed as a set within 
which most other motivations fall. I proposed two contextual factors that contribute to this 
variation as well. The extent to which organizational culture or reward structure is more focused 
on the individual or on the collective may influence the relationship from motives to blame and 
credit behaviors. When a leader’s motive is incongruent with the contextual factor of 
organizational culture or reward structure, she may enact blame and credit behaviors that are not 
predicted by her motive and instead are more aligned with the organizational culture or reward 
structure. In Chapter 3, I delineated a theoretical framework of the motives that explain why 
leaders express blame and credit in specific ways, as well as the impact of contextual factors. In 






Chapter 4: Empirically Testing the Drivers of Blame and 
Credit Behaviors 
 
 In Chapter 3, the theoretical development of a model comprised of a set of four motives 
and two contextual moderators, organizational culture and reward structure, addressed what 
motivates leaders to engage in distinct types of blame and credit behaviors. In Chapter 4, I report 
a set of studies that empirically test the key theoretical elements introduced in Chapter 3. In 
Study 2, I collected field data using survey methods in order to provide preliminary evidence that 
links the four motives to blame and credit behaviors of leaders, as well as the moderating effect 
of organizational culture in terms of individualism and collectivism. Thus, this study aimed to 
confirm the main effects from the motives to blame and credit behaviors as outlined in the 
previously stated propositions. In addition, I conducted two laboratory experiments, Study 3 and 
Study 4, to test the hypothesized causal relationships between the motives and blame and credit 
behaviors, in addition to reward structure as a moderator. These studies involved tasks to be 
completed by the lab participant and a trained confederate, a motive manipulation, and reward 
structure manipulation. Together, the contribution of the studies in Chapter 4 serve as the extent 
of evidence supporting the theoretical model of motives driving blame and credit behaviors 
developed in Chapter 3.  
4.1 Development of Hypotheses 
4.1.1 Ego-defensive motive. As outlined in Chapter 3, individuals whose blame and 
credit behaviors are driven by the ego-defensive motive see their behaviors as ways to maintain a 
positive self-image. The ego-defensive motive is oriented internally towards one’s own ego and 






operationalized by the construct of narcissism. As a concept, narcissism was introduced in the 
psychological literature by Ellis (1898) and influenced Freud’s (1957) thinking, leading him to 
identify different indicators of narcissism, including self-admiration and a tendency to see others 
as an extension of one’s self. Although narcissism has been viewed as a clinical mental disorder 
in the past, scholars have also maintained that narcissism can be conceptualized and measured as 
a personality dimension (Emmons, 1987; Raskin & Terry, 1988). As a result, psychologists have 
developed a psychometric scale for measuring narcissism beyond its designation as a clinical 
syndrome (e.g., Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI), Raskin & Hall, 1979). Clinicians focus 
on outliers, individuals who are narcissistic to a clinical, extreme level as to impair their social 
functioning in serious ways, whereas personality theorists focus on the full range of narcissistic 
expressions, which encompass the less extreme, subclinical manifestations of narcissism.  
Research has suggested that narcissism is positively associated with self-esteem 
(Emmons, 1987; Morf and Rhodewalt, 1993) and biased self-enhancement (John and Robins, 
1994), while it is negatively associated with the discrepancy between one’s sense of self and 
one’s sense of ideal self (Emmons, 1987). Research has also suggested that narcissists regulate 
their self-esteem by engaging in the defensive process of grandiose self-conceptualization as a 
way of reinforcing their sense of self-importance, for example by winning admiration (Raskin et 
al., 1991). Cognitively speaking, narcissism involves a belief that one possesses superior 
qualities. In terms of motivation, narcissists have a strong need to have one’s superiority 
reaffirmed. The craving for further admiration may lead a narcissist to engage in both 
exhibitionism and the diminishment of others. Thus, leaders who are more narcissistic may be 
more likely to take credit (rather than assign credit) for successful outcomes and assign blame 






Hypothesis 1a. There is a positive relationship between leader narcissism and blame 
behaviors toward others. 
 
Hypothesis 1b. There is a positive relationship between leader narcissism and credit 
behaviors toward the self. 
 
4.1.2 Impression management motive. Leaders driven by the impression management 
motive may enact blame and credit behaviors to uphold a sense of competency and authority. 
These individuals may attempt to shape others’ views of them so that people believe them 
responsible for successes rather than failures because they are motivated to maintain their image 
in the eyes of others (i.e., external orientation, image objective). Although social psychologists 
developed the concept of impression management, organizational scholars have suggested that 
impression management research in social psychology can generalize to organizational settings 
(Wortman & Linsenmeier, 1977). Impression management is the process or set of strategies that 
people use to influence how others perceive them (i.e., the image that others have of them) 
(Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995; Jones & Pittman, 1982).  
The impression management motive can be linked to the concept of impression 
motivation, which represents the extent to which individuals are motivated to control how others 
see them (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Research suggests that this motivation comes into play 
when an individual wishes to control how others perceive them when they have a goal and when 
presenting themselves in a certain way will help them attain that goal (Leary, 1995). Researchers 
have studied impression motivation in the context of personnel selection (e.g., Jansen et al., 
2012; Ingold et al., 2015); for example, when trying to receive a job offer, job candidates may 
attempt to convey an impression that they perceive to be favorable to the potential employer. In a 
similar vein, a leader may be motivated to portray a favorable impression of herself in light of a 






Therefore, individuals with high levels of impression motivation may be likely to engage 
in blame and credit behaviors that emphasize their own abilities and competencies while 
denigrating those of others around them.  
Hypothesis 2a. There is a positive relationship between impression motivation and blame 
behaviors toward others.  
 
Hypothesis 2b. There is a positive relationship between impression motivation and credit 
behaviors toward the self.  
 
4.1.3 Implicit beliefs motive. As outlined in Chapter 3, individuals hold stored 
conceptions or categorizations about leadership that inform their implicit leadership theories 
about what constitutes an ideal leader. When leaders exhibit “ideal” leader qualities, subordinates 
may show higher overall well-being, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment 
(Epitropaki & Martin, 2005). The GLOBE project led to the development of a scale of 112 
leadership behavior items that determines if an individual believes a behavior or characteristic 
greatly inhibits or greatly contributes to an individual being an outstanding leader (House et al., 
1999). Positive ILTs, or qualities prototypical of an ideal leader, included characteristics such as 
being team-oriented, charismatic, participative, and humane, and excluded characteristics like 
being self-protective and autonomous.  
Leaders themselves, as members of an organization, hold beliefs about ideal leader 
qualities that may prompt them to enact credit and blame behaviors in particular ways. They may 
want to communicate their desired identity as an ideal or effective leader so that others use these 
messages to make inferences about them (Belk, 1988, Berger and Heath, 2007). Furthermore, 
leaders who hold beliefs about an ideal leader prototype may be motivated to enact behaviors 
congruent with an effective leader in order to ultimately enhance their team’s performance. 






align with House et al.’s (1999) prototype of effective leadership may be more likely to enact 
blame and credit behaviors that shift more blame towards themselves and more credit toward 
subordinates because such behaviors are perceived as more team-oriented, charismatic, 
participative, and humane, and less self-protective and autonomous.  
Hypothesis 3a. There is a positive relationship between positive ILTs of an ideal (i.e., 
effective) leader prototype and blame behaviors toward the self. 
 
Hypothesis 3b. There is a positive relationship between positive ILTs of an ideal (i.e., 
effective) leader prototype and credit behaviors toward others. 
 
4.1.4 Relationship building motive. According to the relationship building motive, some 
leaders may be compelled to establish high quality relationships with subordinates, as high 
quality relationships have been linked to higher team performance. As described in Chapter 3, 
leaders who aim to establish a relationship with a subordinate may engage in interpersonal 
exchanges that reinforce norms of interdependence and reciprocity, and blame and credit 
behaviors may be viewed as one way of doing so.  
Comparably, high quality relationships are characterized by mutual trust, respect, and 
obligation (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995); whereas low quality relationships refer to those in which 
leaders instead engage in more contractual exchanges, for example, by allocating standard 
benefits in return for standard job performance. Although quality of a leader-member 
relationship conceptualized in the construct of leader-member exchange, or LMX, has often been 
measured from the perspective of a subordinate’s perception of her relationship with a 
supervisor, leaders can also hold their own beliefs regarding the strength of LMX with certain 
subordinates (e.g., Cogliser et al., 2009; Sin et al., 2009). Furthermore, because not all 
subordinates may desire high quality LMX relationships (Maslyn & Uhl-Bien, 2005), it is 






maintain high quality LMX with subordinates. Some leaders may have a strong desire to 
strengthen LMX, whereas others might not; thus, the motivation to establish a quality 
relationship with subordinates can be conceptualized as a characteristic, or individual difference, 
which leaders hold. Leaders who wish to maintain high quality LMX relationships with 
subordinates thus might engage in distinct blame and credit behaviors in an effort to do so. It 
follows that leaders who are motivated to establish high LMX relationships may be more likely 
to engage in behaviors that shift blame toward themselves and shift credit toward subordinates 
because doing so builds trust and a sense of obligation with subordinates.  
Hypothesis 4a. There is a positive relationship between motivation to establish high 
quality LMX relationships and blame behaviors toward the self. 
 
Hypothesis 4b. There is a positive relationship between motivation to establish high 
quality LMX relationships and credit behaviors toward others. 
  
4.1.5 The role of individual-focused and group-focused factors. Based on the 
theoretical model developed in Chapter 3, individuals may possess all four motives but one 
motive may be more salient and another more muted. Contextual factors proposed in the 
previous chapter may influence the activation or suppression of specific motives, including the 
emphasis the organization’s culture places on individualistic or collectivistic values and the 
organization’s reward structure.  
In an organizational culture that emphasizes individualistic values, the pursuit and 
maximization of individual goals weighs more heavily than shared goals, and individuals tend to 
focus on their own and others’ unique competencies and traits (Chatman & Barsade, 1995). This 
lies in direct contrast to collectivistic values. In an organization whose culture promotes 
collectivistic values, members focus more on shared objectives and interests. An individual’s 






contextual factor like the organizational culture’s emphasis on individualistic or collectivistic 
values then shape the extent to which the motive-aligned behaviors manifest. 
In an individualistic organizational culture, people are focused more on the optimization 
of their own goals, characteristics, and accomplishments, which is aligned with the objective of 
enhancing one’s own image. If a leader is naturally inclined toward the two motives with the 
objective of enhancing group performance (i.e., implicit beliefs motive, relationship building 
motive), being in a context that is more individual-focused may change their inclinations toward 
certain blame and credit behaviors. In contrast, in a collectivistic organizational culture, 
members tend to be more focused on the optimization of shared objectives and group interests; 
as a result, collectivistic values are aligned with the objective of enhancing group performance. If 
a leader is naturally inclined toward the two motives with the objective of enhancing own image 
(i.e., ego-defensive motive, impression management motive), leading in a context that is more 
group-focused may change their tendencies toward certain blame and credit behaviors. Thus, I 
argue that emphasis on individualism or collectivism of an organization’s culture will moderate 
the relationship between the motives and blame and credit behaviors.  
Hypothesis 5a. The relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors is 
moderated by organizational culture such that in an organizational culture that 
emphasizes collectivistic values:  
i) The relationship between narcissism and blame and credit behaviors will have a 
lower correlation than in an organizational culture which emphasizes 
individualistic values.   
ii) The relationship between impression management motivation and blame and 
credit behaviors will have a lower correlation than in an organizational culture 
which emphasizes individualistic values.   
 
Hypothesis 5b. The relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors is 
moderated by organizational culture such that in an organizational culture that 






i) The relationship between ILTs of an ideal leader prototype and blame and credit 
behaviors will have a lower correlation than in an organizational culture which 
emphasizes collectivistic values.   
ii) The relationship between motivation to establish high quality LMX relationships 
and blame and credit behaviors will have a lower correlation than in an 
organizational culture which emphasizes collectivistic values.   
 
A second contextual factor is the reward system within an organization. As described in 
Chapter 3, under an individual reward structure, members are rewarded for performance based 
on their individual achievements, and thus individuals may feel motivated to demonstrate 
individualistic behaviors (e.g., Deutsch, 1949b; Johnson and Johnson, 1989; Tjosvold, 1982). 
Under a shared reward structure, an organization’s members are rewarded for joint contributions 
to the organization, and thus they may demonstrate more cooperative behaviors. Thus, individual 
and shared rewards may moderate the relationship between what leaders are naturally motivated 
by (i.e., the four motives) and various blame and credit behaviors. However, hybrid, or mixed, 
rewards, which are comprised of a combination of individual and shared rewards (e.g., Pearsall 
et al., 2010), may have less of an impact on the degree to which they change the activation or 
suppression of certain motives. An example of a hybrid reward is when an employee in the 
furniture department in a department store receive a salary raise because the department as a 
whole has exceeded their profit goals for the year, but she also receives an additional annual 
bonus because she exceeded her personal sales target. Because hybrid rewards are mixed, 
individuals may simply default to the motive that is most naturally activated, and motives that 
are generally suppressed may remain that way. I argue that the organization’s reward structure 
moderates the relationship between motives and blame and credit behaviors.  
Hypothesis 6a. The relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors is 
moderated by reward structure such that under a shared reward structure,  
i) The relationship between narcissism and blame and credit behaviors will have a 






ii) The relationship between impression management (i.e., self-promotion and 
intimidation) and blame and credit behaviors will have a lower correlation than 
under an individual reward structure. 
 
Hypothesis 6b. The relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors is 
moderated by reward structure such that under an individual reward structure:  
i) The relationship between ILTs of an ideal leader prototype and blame and credit 
behaviors will have a lower correlation than under a shared reward structure. 
ii) The relationship between motivation to establish high quality LMX relationships 
and blame and credit behaviors will have a lower correlation than under a shared 
reward structure. 
 
4.1.6 Attitudes toward the leader. Research on social exchange theory and reciprocity 
norms between two interacting parties suggests that individuals respond in kind to benefits they 
receive. Social exchange theory assumes that exchange relationships that follow expectations of 
reciprocity will “evolve over time into trusting, loyal, and mutual commitments” (Cropanzano & 
Mitchell, 2005: 875). Leaders who blame the employees without including themselves in the 
blame create a fragmented relationship, where the leader’s responsibility for the team’s output is 
unclear. Blaming employees implies that the leader is disconnected from the work, and therefore 
might create a psychological distance between the two parties such that the employees feel 
belittled or disgruntled. Conversely, when a leader takes the blame for subordinates, this gesture 
may be considered a high quality social exchange leading to greater levels of perceived 
organizational support. Additionally, a manager taking the blame for a negative event seemingly 
caused by her team can be categorized as an example of supervisory support. Supervisory 
support, in turn, has been shown to be associated with and potentially a cause of organizational 
support (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002; Eisenberger et al., 2002). Scholars suggest that perceived 
organizational support predicts organizational commitment, in that organizational commitment 
improves with increased perceptions of organizational support (Settoon et al, 1996; Masterson et 






Whether a leader assigns blame to other actors in the organization, or takes the blame 
personally, will influence how employees feel about their leader. Trust in leadership – 
conceptualized as the expectation or belief that a leader has good intentions toward the group and 
that the team can rely on the leader’s actions or words – is positively related to team performance 
(Dirks, 2000). If a leader lays the blame for a diffuse failure on the members of the team, 
suggesting that her behavior is what led to the failure, this may demonstrate a fragmentation 
between the leader and the team that leads to reduced trust. Conversely, a leader who takes the 
blame after a diffuse failure sends the message that the failure was a result of poor leadership, 
not the result of the employee’s behavior. If a leader takes the blame for a negative event and the 
subordinates respond by matching the protection and helpfulness of the blame-taker, the act of 
blame-taking reflects a favorable social exchange. Favorable social exchanges are linked to the 
interpersonal construct of trust, wherein trust between two parties (e.g., an employee in the 
organization and her supervisor) increases with favorable social exchanges (Blau, 1964). By 
blaming her leadership instead of the behavior of the team members, the leader may be perceived 
as more trustworthy because they are fulfilling their role as a leader.  
Because individuals are more likely to feel safer and more positive about a manager 
whom they perceive as trustworthy, trust in leadership is also positively related to organizational 
commitment (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Subordinates who perceive greater levels of supervisory 
support and have higher levels of trust in their leader may be more likely to engage in 
organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs), extra-role behaviors that are discretionary and not 
related to the formal reward system but still supportive of the organization’s functioning (Organ, 
1988a). An example of an OCB would be willingly helping others who have work-related 






receiving extra formal rewards at work. Individuals who experience a great deal of blame may be 
less likely to engage in OCBs and may have lower levels of trust in the leader because they feel 
little supervisory support. Thus, subordinates with leaders who shift blame toward themselves 
and shift credit toward their subordinates are more likely to have higher levels of trust in their 
leader and to exhibit OCBs.  
Hypothesis 7. There is a positive relationship between blame and credit behaviors and 
subordinate OCBs, such that  
a) Leader blame behaviors toward the self are associated with greater OCBs enacted by 
their subordinates.   
b) Leader credit behaviors toward others are associated with greater OCBs enacted by 
their subordinates.   
 
4.2 Study 2: Studying the Motives behind Blame and Credit Behaviors of Managers 
 The purpose of this study was to provide evidence of a link between the four motives 
(ego-defensive, impression management, implicit beliefs, and relationship building) to blame and 
credit behaviors (Hypotheses 1 – 4). This study also aimed to test the effect of organizational 
culture (individualistic vs. collectivistic values) on those relationships (Hypothesis 5) and to test 
the relationship between leader behaviors (both blame and credit) and subordinate OCBs 
(Hypothesis 7). 
4.2.1 Methods.  
Participants. I recruited 210 working managers via Prolific Academic (known as 
Prolific) in exchange for $2.06. Prolific Academic is an online platform that is explicitly 
designed for online participant recruitment by the scientific community (Palan & Schitter, 2018). 
The Prolific Academic platform has the ability to pre-screen participants on demographic 
variables (e.g., gender, age, employment status). A requirement to compensate participants an 






Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisiti, 2017). Recent research provides evidence that higher quality 
data is collected because participants recruited through Prolific are more honest and naïve to 
common measures than other online platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (Peer et al., 
2017). As a result, researchers have used Prolific Academic as an alternative to Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, especially when pre-screening participants on multiple specific demographic 
variables (e.g., Adam, Ku, & Lux, 2019; De Cremer et al., 2018; Kappes, Balcetis, & De 
Cremer, 2018; Matz & Gladstone, 2018; Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2018).  
I pre-screened participants via Prolific Academic to recruit only individuals who were 
currently in a managerial role at work, who had been in this role for over a year, and who had at 
least two direct reports (i.e., subordinates). I refer to these participants as “leader” participants in 
the study. Data from 16 participants who failed attention checks were excluded from the final 
sample. There were four attention check questions displayed randomly in the survey that 
instructed participants to select a specific response option (e.g., “If you are reading carefully, 
please select ‘Agree’.”). An incorrect response option was considered a failed attention check, 
and participants who failed any of the attention checks in the survey were dropped from the 
dataset. Thus, the final sample size was N = 194. Of the participants included in this study, 57% 
were female and 90% were white.  
Procedure. The participants (“leaders”) were directed to an online Qualtrics survey with 
scales measuring their tendency toward each of the four motives and their perception of the 
organization’s culture in terms of individualism or collectivism, detailed below. The leader 
participant responded to items regarding their blame and credit behaviors following a past 







 Ego-defensive motive. In order to assess the extent to which the ego-defensive motive 
was salient, leaders completed a measure of narcissism derived from the original, 40-item 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988): the NPI-16 (Ames, Rose, & 
Anderson, 2005). The NPI-16 measure is a widely used, validated, shorter, unidimensional 
measure derived from the set of items in the NPI-40, consisting of 16 pairs of statements for 
which participants select the statement that best reflects their personality. For example, a pair of 
statements is “I am more capable than other people” and “There is a lot that I can learn from 
other people.” Cronbach’s alpha for the 16 narcissism items was .75.  
 Impression management motive. To assess the extent to which the impression 
management motive was salient, leaders completed a measure of impression motivation adapted 
from three of seven items developed and validated by Jansen et al. (2012) and an additional three 
items. See Appendix B for the entire adapted scale. The adapted impression motivation scale was 
found to be highly reliable (6 items; α = .86).  
 Implicit beliefs motive. To assess the extent to which the implicit beliefs motive was 
salient, leaders responded to 18 items based on findings from the Global Leadership and 
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) research program (House et al., 1999). These 
18 items were comprised of descriptive words or phrases taken from Javidan and colleagues’ 
(2006) conceptualization of the culturally endorsed implicit leadership theory of outstanding 
leadership. The items were presented to leader participants, who then rated to what extent they 
believed that the trait was characteristic of an effective leader, on a 7-point Likert scale from 
“Not at all characteristic” to “Extremely characteristic.” These items measured what 
characteristics and behaviors an individual believes an outstanding or effective leader possesses 






“Motivational,” “Emphasizes team building,” “Supportive,” and “Face-saving.” See Appendix B 
for the entire scale. The implicit beliefs measure of outstanding or effective leadership was found 
to be highly reliable (18 items; α = .83). 
 Relationship building motive. To assess the extent to which the relationship building 
motive was salient, leaders completed items adapted from the multi-dimensional LMX-MDM, 
12-item scale developed by Liden and Maslyn (1998). Participants responded to the items on a 7-
point Likert scale, from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The original items in the 12-item 
scale are used to evaluate an individual’s feelings toward their immediate supervisor. I adapted 
these items to reflect to what extent a leader is or is not motivated to establish high quality LMX 
relationships with subordinates. For example, the original item “My manager would come to my 
defense if I were “attacked” by others” was modified to “I would come to a subordinate’s 
defense if they were “attacked” by others.” I then also added two items to the scale to reflect a 
desire to build relationships with subordinates and checked the reliability of this scale as a whole. 
See Appendix B for the entire adapted 14-item scale. Cronbach’s alpha for the 14 items was .82. 
 Individualistic versus collectivistic organizational culture. To assess the extent to which 
the participant perceived that his or her organization emphasizes individualism or collectivism, 
participants responded to items from the Organizational Culture scale developed by Chatman and 
Spataro (2005). The scale included seven words or phrases measuring organizational culture on a 
7-point Likert scale from “most uncharacteristic” to “most characteristic” of the organization’s 
culture. The seven items were: team-oriented, collaborative, people-oriented, individually 
demanding, supportive, fair, and competitive. Cronbach’s alpha for the seven organizational 






Leader blame and credit behaviors. To assess each leader’s blame and credit behaviors, 
participants were asked to think about how they generally react following an unsuccessful 
outcome (e.g., diffuse failure) at work, with a definition of such an event (e.g., “a negative 
outcome for which the cause is ambiguous”). Then, they were presented with a series of 
statements that reflect three different blame behaviors. The leader participants were asked to 
indicate which one of the three statements most closely reflects how they generally respond after 
that type of outcome. There were three sets of three statements each to form a composite item 
measuring blame behavior. They responded to these items twice, the first time with respect to 
their communication to their subordinates: assigning blame (e.g., “You made a mistake.”), 
sharing blame (e.g., “We made a mistake.”), and taking blame (e.g., “I made a mistake.”). The 
second time, they responded with respect to their communication to their communication to their 
own superiors: assigning blame (e.g., “They made a mistake.”), sharing blame (e.g., “We made a 
mistake.”), and taking blame (e.g., “I made a mistake.”). The full text of the three blame 
statements can be found in Appendix B, “Items Measuring Leader’s Blame and Credit 
Behaviors.” The composites were labeled “general blame behavior,” with respect to an audience 
of subordinates (three items; α = .85), as well as an audience of superiors (three items; α = .87). 
Then, participants were asked to recall a specific situation in which that type of 
unsuccessful outcome occurred at work, and to indicate on the same scales as above what their 
actual response was in the situation they recalled. These were labeled “situation-specific blame 
behavior,” with respect to an audience of subordinates (three items; α = .93), as well as an 
audience of superiors (three items; α = .93). 
The leader participants were also asked to think about how they generally react following 






positive outcome for which the cause is ambiguous”). Then, they were presented with a series of 
statements that reflect three different credit behaviors: assigning credit, sharing credit, and taking 
credit. Then, the leader participants were asked to indicate which one of the three statements 
most closely reflects how they generally respond after that type of outcome. Again, there were 
three sets of three statements each to form a composite item measuring credit behavior. They 
responded to these items twice, the first time with respect to their communication to their 
subordinates, and the second time with respect to their communication to their own superiors. 
The full text of the three credit statements can be found in Appendix B, “Items Measuring 
Leader’s Blame and Credit Behaviors. The composites were labeled “general credit behavior,” 
with respect to an audience of subordinates (three items; α = .85), as well as an audience of 
superiors (three items; α = .88). 
Then, participants were asked to recall a specific situation in which that type of 
successful outcome occurred at work, and to indicate on the same scales as above what their 
actual response was in the situation they recalled. These were labeled “situation-specific credit 
behavior,” with respect to an audience of subordinates (three items; α = .94), as well as an 
audience of superiors (three items; α = .89).   
The order in which they are asked to recall either the most recent diffuse failure or the 
most recent diffuse success was randomized. See Appendix B to see the statements associated 
with each type of blame and credit behavior. 
Attitudes toward the leader. In this study, leaders completed a measure rating the 
organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) of their subordinates. The items in this scale, 
developed by Podsakoff and Mackenzie (1989; Podsakoff et al., 1990), included those based on 






conscientiousness, and civic virtue. The measure of subordinate OCBs was found to be highly 
reliable (10 items; α = .86). 
  Other variables and control variables. In addition to measuring demographic variables 
such as gender, age, and ethnicity, I also measured the leader’s job insecurity as a control 
variable, as job insecurity may be linked to blame and credit behaviors. A leader with high job 
insecurity, in which they feel a “"powerlessness to maintain desired continuity in a threatened 
job situation" (Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984: 438), may be more likely to enact credit 
behaviors toward the self and blame behaviors towards others because they fear that taking more 
blame could increase this insecurity. Conversely, a leader with low job insecurity may think that 
because they are not in a threatened job situation, they can afford to take some risks and instead 
enact blame behaviors toward the self and credit behaviors towards others. Job insecurity was 
assessed using Ashford, Lee, and Bobko’s (1989) items measuring perceived threat to total job 
and powerlessness.  
4.2.2 Results. I computed the means and standard deviations of the various individual 
difference and behavior measures collected in the study. These can be found in Table 4.1 and 
Table 4.2, respectively. Histograms depicting the distributions of the measures can be seen in 
Appendix C, Figures C1 – C14. Additionally, the descriptive statistics and correlations between 
each of the measures are displayed in Table 4.3. 
I conducted a series of regressions to examine the relationship between the motive 
measures and the leader’s self-reported blame and credit behaviors. Then, I conducted 
regressions in which the leader’s scores on each of the four motive measures (separately) served 
as the criterion (i.e., independent) variable, and the blame or credit behavior composites served 






being 1) “situation-specific” or “general” and 2) for an audience of subordinates or an audience 
of superiors. A negative coefficient indicated behavior shifting blame or credit toward others, 
and a positive coefficient indicated a shift toward the self. Control variables included in the 
regression analyses were gender, age, ethnicity, role tenure, and job insecurity, unless otherwise 
noted. Descriptive statistics and correlations of the control variables are also included in Table 
4.3. 




Table 4.2 Study 2 – Means and Standard Deviations – Blame and Credit Measures 
 
 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Narcissism 0.23 0.19 0.00 0.94
Impression Motivation 6.22 0.68 3.00 7.00
ILT of Ideal Leadership 3.86 0.44 2.22 4.72
LMX Motivation 5.72 0.57 3.86 7.00
Organizational Culture 4.66 0.85 1.29 6.43
Subordinate OCBs 4.85 0.95 1.00 7.00
Note: N =194. Potential range for Narcissism was between 0 and 
1. Impression Motivation, LMX Motivation, Organizational 
Culture, and Subordinate OCBs were on a 7-point Likert scale. ILT 
of Ideal Leadership was on a 5-point Likert scale.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Blame - General; subordinate audience 4.43 0.93 2.00 7.00
Blame - General; supervisor audience 4.51 1.06 1.00 7.00
Blame - Situation-specific; subordinate audience 4.31 1.18 1.00 7.00
Blame - Situation-specific; supervisor audience 4.35 1.26 1.00 7.00
Credit - General; subordinate audience 3.66 0.88 1.00 7.00
Credit - General; supervisor audience 3.79 0.85 1.00 7.00
Credit - Situation-specific; subordinate audience 3.62 1.00 1.00 7.00
Credit - Situation-specific; supervisor audience 3.79 0.94 1.00 7.00



























Gender (Female = 1) 0.57 0.50 0 1
Age 37.31 9.57 22.00 66.00 0.04
Ethnicity (White = 1) 0.90 0.30 0 1 0.15* 0.08
Role Tenure 5.15 4.47 1.00 30.00 0.03 0.44** -0.10
Job Insecurity 2.33 0.89 1.00 5.00 0.00 0.06 -0.18* -0.01 α  = .63
Narcissism 0.23 0.19 0.00 0.94 -0.14+ -0.06 -008 0.07 -0.02 α  = .75
Impression Motivation 6.22 0.68 3.00 7.00 0.22** -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.04  0.08 α  = .86
ILT of Ideal Leadership 3.86 0.44 2.22 4.72 0.19** 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04  -0.18*    0.35** α = .83
LMX Motivation 5.72 0.57 3.86 7.00 0.09 0.09 -0.03 0.01 -0.01   0.03    0.53**    0.30** α  = .82
Organizational Culture 4.66 0.85 1.29 6.43 0.09 -0.08 0.03 0.00 -0.18* -0.04 0.17* 0.11 0.11
Subordinate OCBs 4.85 0.95 1.00 7.00 0.13+ -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.26** 0.03 0.21** 0.24** 0.18*
Blame - General; subordinate audience 4.43 0.93 2.00 7.00 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.09  0.18* 0.05 0.15*
Blame - General; supervisor audience 4.51 1.06 1.00 7.00 -0.05 0.09 -0.06 0.09 0.00 -0.10   0.14+ 0.09 0.05
Blame - Situation-specific; subordinate audience 4.31 1.18 1.00 7.00 -0.11 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.05     -0.24** 0.05 0.08 0.03
Blame - Situation-specific; supervisor audience 4.35 1.26 1.00 7.00 -0.06 0.09 0.03 -0.02 -0.05     -0.25** 0.06 0.08 0.04
Credit - General; subordinate audience 3.66 0.88 1.00 7.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 0.12+ 0.07 0.10 0.00 -0.05 0.06
Credit - General; supervisor audience 3.79 0.85 1.00 7.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.14+ 0.04    0.17* 0.07 -0.05 0.02
Credit - Situation-specific; subordinate audience 3.62 1.00 1.00 7.00 -0.08 -0.05 -0.14* 0.15* 0.04    0.18* 0.06 -0.11 0.10
Credit - Situation-specific; supervisor audience 3.79 0.94 1.00 7.00 -0.14* -0.01 -0.08 0.09 0.05    0.16* 0.10 -0.09   0.12+
Note:  N = 194. Job insecurity was measured on a 5-point Likert scale. Potential range for Narcissism was between 0 and 1. Impression Motivation, LMX Motivation, Organizational Culture, and Subordinate OCBs 







































Gender (Female = 1) 0.57 0.50 0 1
Age 37.31 9.57 22.00 66.00
Ethnicity (White = 1) 0.90 0.30 0 1
Role Tenure 5.15 4.47 1.00 30.00
Job Insecurity 2.33 0.89 1.00 5.00
Narcissism 0.23 0.19 0.00 0.94
Impression Motivation 6.22 0.68 3.00 7.00
ILT of Ideal Leadership 3.86 0.44 2.22 4.72
LMX Motivation 5.72 0.57 3.86 7.00
Organizational Culture 4.66 0.85 1.29 6.43 α = .75
Subordinate OCBs 4.85 0.95 1.00 7.00 0.63** α = .86
Blame - General; subordinate audience 4.43 0.93 2.00 7.00 0.06 0.15* α  = .85
Blame - General; supervisor audience 4.51 1.06 1.00 7.00 0.03 0.18* 0.79** α  = .87
Blame - Situation-specific; subordinate audience 4.31 1.18 1.00 7.00 0.13+ 0.19* 0.58** 0.57** α  = .93
Blame - Situation-specific; supervisor audience 4.35 1.26 1.00 7.00 0.14* 0.20* 0.56** 0.59** 0.88** α = .93
Credit - General; subordinate audience 3.66 0.88 1.00 7.00 0.13+ 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 α  = .85
Credit - General; supervisor audience 3.79 0.85 1.00 7.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.07 0.72** α  = .88
Credit - Situation-specific; subordinate audience 3.62 1.00 1.00 7.00 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.62** 0.59** α  = .94
Credit - Situation-specific; supervisor audience 3.79 0.94 1.00 7.00 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.50** 0.67** 0.81** α = .89
Note: N = 194. Job insecurity was measured on a 5-point Likert scale. Potential range for Narcissism was between 0 and 1. Impression Motivation, LMX Motivation, Organizational Culture, and Subordinate OCBs 






Demographic variables. I estimated regression models of gender (male, female), race 
(white, non-white), and role tenure predicting blame and credit behaviors. Controlling for race 
and role tenure, gender was not a significant predictor of general or situation-specific blame or 
credit behavior for both types of audiences. The same was found for race (controlling for the 
other two variables) and role tenure (controlling for the other two variables).  
All four motives as criterion variables. I conducted regression analyses to examine how 
all four motives together were related to blame and credit behaviors. The leader’s scores on all 
four of the motive measures served as the criterion variables and the blame or credit behavior 
composites served as the predictor variables. The regression model of all four motives predicting 
blame behaviors for both types of audiences is shown in Table 4.4, and the regression model of 
all four motives predicting credit behaviors for both types of audiences is shown in Table 4.5.  
Table 4.4 All Four Motives Predicting Blame Behaviors 
 
Audience Type: Subordinates Superiors Subordinates Superiors
Narcissism -0.12+ -0.13+ -0.31** -0.33**
Impression Motivation 0.18* 0.21* 0.13 0.11
Effective Leader ILT -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03
LMX Motivation 0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.005
Gender (Female = 1) -0.07 -0.12 -0.20* -0.14
Age 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.14
Ethnicity (White = 1) -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.03
Role Tenure 0.03 0.08 0.03 -0.08
Job Insecurity -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05
Constant 4.44** 4.51** 4.31** 4.35**
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.05
Residual Std. Error (df = 180) 0.93 1.06 1.16 1.23
F Statistic (df = 9; 180) 1.33 1.30 1.96* 2.03*
Note:
Criterion: Blame Behavior
General Behaviors Situation-specific Behaviors






Table 4.5 All Four Motives Predicting Credit Behaviors 
 
In terms of blame behavior, for an audience of subordinates, narcissism was a significant 
predictor of situation-specific blame behavior toward others, b = -0.31, p < .001, and a 
marginally significant predictor of general blame behavior toward others, b = -0.12, p = .09. For 
an audience of superiors, narcissism was also a significant predictor of situation-specific blame 
behavior toward others, b = -0.33, p < .001, and a marginally significant predictor of general 
blame behavior toward others, b = -0.13, p = .10. For an audience of subordinates, impression 
motivation was a significant predictor of general blame behavior toward the self, b = 0.18, p 
= .04. For an audience of superiors, impression motivation was also a significant predictor of 
general blame behavior toward the self, b = 0.21, p = .03. No other motives in this regression 
model were significant predictors of blame behaviors, regardless of behavior or audience type.  
Audience Type: Subordinates Superiors Subordinates Superiors
Narcissism 0.06 0.11+ 0.11 0.08
Impression Motivation -0.03 0.08 0.05 0.11
Effective Leader ILT -0.04 -0.02 -0.13+ -0.11
LMX Motivation 0.10 -0.01 0.13 0.10
Gender (Female = 1) -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.13+
Age -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 -0.05
Ethnicity (White = 1) -0.05 0.03 -0.11 -0.03
Role Tenure 0.14+ 0.16* 0.19* 0.11
Job Insecurity 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.03
Constant 3.67** 3.80** 3.62** 3.79**
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.09
Adjusted R2 0.0004 0.02 0.06 0.04
Residual Std. Error (df = 180) 0.89 0.85 0.98 0.92
F Statistic (df = 9; 180) 1.01 1.33 2.26* 1.87+
Note:
Criterion: Credit Behavior
General Behaviors Situation-specific Behaviors






In terms of credit behavior, for an audience of superiors, narcissism was a marginally 
significant predictor of credit behavior toward the self, b = 0.11, p = .09. For an audience of 
subordinates, effective leader ILT was a marginally significant predictor of credit behavior 
toward others, b = -0.13, p = .09. No other motives in this regression model were significant 
predictors of credit behaviors, regardless of behavior or audience type. 
In the following sections, I test each individual hypothesis and report the results of the 
regression analyses conducted by including each motive, separately, as the criterion variable. 
Narcissism. In terms of blame behavior, for an audience of subordinates, narcissism was 
a significant predictor of situation-specific blame behavior toward others, b = -0.30, p < .001. 
For an audience of superiors, narcissism was also a significant predictor of situation-specific 
blame behavior toward others, b = -0.32, p < .001. See Table 4.6 for the regression models of 
narcissism predicting blame behavior. When reflecting on a specific past situation, for both an  
Table 4.6 Narcissism Predicting Blame Behaviors: Regression Models 
 
 
Audience Type: Subordinates Superiors Subordinates Superiors
Narcissism -0.09 -0.12 -0.30** -0.32**
Gender (Female = 1) -0.03 -0.06 -0.16+ -0.11
Age 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.14
Ethnicity (White = 1) -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 0.02
Role Tenure 0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.09
Job Insecurity  -0.004 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05
Constant     4.43**      4.50** 4.31** 4.35**
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.08
Adjusted R2 -0.02 -0.004 0.05 0.05
Residual Std. Error (df = 183) 0.95 1.07 1.16 1.23
F Statistic (df = 6; 183) 0.49 0.87 2.54* 2.77*
Note:
Criterion: Blame Behavior
General Behaviors Situation-specific Behaviors






audience of subordinates and an audience of superiors, the more narcissistic an individual, the 
more likely they were to report shifting blame toward their subordinates. In terms of general 
blame behavior, narcissism was not a significant predictor for both types of audiences. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1a was supported for situation-specific blame for both types of audiences, but not 
supported for general blame.  
In terms of credit behavior, for an audience of superiors, narcissism was a significant 
predictor of general credit behavior toward the self, b = 0.12, p = .05. For an audience of 
subordinates, narcissism was a marginally significant predictor of situation-specific credit 
behavior toward the self, b = 0.14, p = .056. For an audience of superiors, narcissism was a 
marginally significant predictor of situation-specific credit behavior toward the self, b = 0.12, p 
= .089. See Table 4.7 for the regression models of narcissism predicting credit behavior.  
Table 4.7 Narcissism Predicting Credit Behaviors: Regression Models 
 
 
Audience Type: Subordinates Superiors Subordinates Superiors
Narcissism 0.07 0.12* 0.14+ 0.12+
Gender (Female = 1) -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.12+
Age -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.04
Ethnicity (White = 1) -0.04 0.03 -0.09 -0.02
Role Tenure 0.13+ 0.15* 0.19* 0.10
Job Insecurity 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05
Constant 3.67** 3.80** 3.62** 3.79**
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02
Residual Std. Error (df = 183) 0.89 0.85 0.99 0.93
F Statistic (df = 6; 183) 1.21 1.79 2.47* 1.66
Note:
Criterion: Credit Behavior
General Behaviors Situation-specific Behaviors






Narcissism was not a significant predictor of general credit behavior for an audience of 
subordinates. Thus, the data provide partial evidence supporting Hypothesis 1b, except for 
general credit in front of an audience of subordinates. See Table 4.8 for a summary of significant 
and non-significant findings related to narcissism. 
Table 4.8 Narcissism Predicting Blame and Credit Behaviors: Summary of Findings 
 
 
Impression motivation. For audiences of subordinates and of superiors, impression 
motivation significantly predicted general blame behavior in the direction opposite of what was 
predicted – general blame behavior was directed toward the self rather than toward others. 
Specifically, for an audience of subordinates, impression motivation was a significant predictor 
of general blame behavior toward the self, b = 0.18, p = .01. For an audience of superiors, 
impression motivation was a significant predictor of general blame behavior toward the self, b = 
0.17, p = .03. When reflecting on their behaviors in general, for both an audience of subordinates 
and an audience of superiors, the more motivated an individual was to manage impressions, the 
more likely they were to report shifting blame toward themselves. In terms of situation-specific 
blame behavior, impression motivation was not a significant predictor for both types of 




Shift toward others n.s. n.s.
Situation-specific
Shift toward others p < .001 p < .001
Credit Behaviors
General
Shift toward self n.s. p = .05
Situation-specific







regression models of impression motivation predicting blame behavior and Table 4.11 for a 
summary of findings related to narcissism and blame behavior. 
Table 4.9 Impression Motivation Predicting Blame Behaviors: Regression Models 
 
 
For an audience of superiors, impression motivation significantly predicted situation-
specific credit behavior toward the self, as predicted, b = 0.14, p = .05. When reflecting on a 
specific past situation, for an audience of superiors, the more motivated an individual was to 
manage impressions, the more likely they were to report shifting credit toward themselves. 
Impression motivation did not significantly predict situation-specific credit behavior for an 
audience of subordinates. Thus, Hypothesis 3b was supported for situation-specific credit in front 
of an audience of superiors, but it was not supported for an audience of subordinates or for 
general credit in front of both types of audiences. See Table 4.10 for the regression models of 
impression motivation predicting credit behavior and Table 4.11 for a summary of findings 
related to impression motivation and credit behavior. 
Audience Type: Subordinates Superiors Subordinates Superiors
Impression Motivation 0.18** 0.17* 0.09 0.08
Gender (Female = 1) -0.06 -0.09 -0.14 -0.08
Age 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.18+
Ethnicity (White = 1) -0.03 -0.05 -0.004 0.03
Role Tenure 0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.12
Job Insecurity -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05
Constant 4.43** 4.51** 4.30** 4.35**
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Residual Std. Error (df = 183) 0.93 1.06 1.19 1.27
F Statistic (df = 6; 183) 1.39 1.28 0.58 0.79
Note:
Criterion: Blame Behavior
General Behaviors Situation-specific Behaviors

















Audience Type: Subordinates Superiors Subordinates Superiors
Impression Motivation 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.14*
Gender (Female = 1) -0.05 -0.08 -0.09 -0.16*
Age -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.06
Ethnicity (White = 1) -0.05 0.02 -0.10 -0.02
Role Tenure    0.14+ 0.17* 0.21* 0.12
Job Insecurity  0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04
Constant      3.67** 3.80** 3.62** 3.79**
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.01 0.03 0.03
Residual Std. Error (df = 183) 0.89 0.85 0.99 0.93
F Statistic (df = 6; 183) 1.06 1.41 2.05+ 1.85+
Note:
Criterion: Credit Behavior
General Behaviors Situation-specific Behaviors




Shift toward self p = .01 p = .03
Situation-specific
Shift toward self n.s. n.s.
Credit Behaviors
General
Shift toward self n.s. n.s.
Situation-specific
Shift toward self n.s. p = .05
Audience Type
Note: Impression motivation led to blame behaviors that were in the direction 
opposite of what was predicted. In other words, for the results reported in this 







Implicit leadership theory. Implicit leadership theory of outstanding leadership was not a 
significant predictor of any type of blame or credit behavior for any types of audiences. In this 
study, there was no evidence supporting Hypotheses 3a and 3b. See Tables 4.12 and 4.13 for the 
regression models of effective leader ILT predicting blame and credit behaviors respectively, and 
see Table 4.14 for a summary of findings related to effective leader ILT and blame and credit 
behaviors.  
















Audience Type: Subordinates Superiors Subordinates Superiors
Effective Leader ILT 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.11
Gender (Female = 1) -0.03 -0.07 -0.15 -0.09
Age  0.07 0.07 0.05 0.17
Ethnicity (White = 1) -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.05
Role Tenure     0.0001 0.06 -0.01 -0.12
Job Insecurity 0.002 -0.002 -0.04 -0.04
Constant 4.43** 4.50** 4.30** 4.35**
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03
Adjusted R2 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.003
Residual Std. Error (df = 183) 0.95 1.07 1.19 1.27
F Statistic (df = 6; 183) 0.31 0.81 0.75 0.91
Note:
Criterion: Blame Behavior
General Behaviors Situation-specific Behaviors



















Audience Type: Subordinates Superiors Subordinates Superiors
Effective Leader ILT -0.03 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06
Gender (Female = 1) -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.12+
Age -0.07 -0.10 -0.12 -0.05
Ethnicity (White = 1) -0.05 0.02 -0.11 -0.03
Role Tenure 0.14+ 0.16* 0.20* 0.11
Job Insecurity 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04
Constant 3.67** 3.80** 3.62** 3.79**
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.04
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.004 0.03 0.01
Residual Std. Error (df = 183) 0.89 0.85 0.99 0.94
F Statistic (df = 6; 183) 1.08 1.13 2.12+ 1.28
Note:
Criterion: Credit Behavior
General Behaviors Situation-specific Behaviors




Shift toward self n.s. n.s.
Situation-specific
Shift toward self n.s. n.s.
Credit Behaviors
General
Shift toward others n.s. n.s.
Situation-specific







LMX motivation. For an audience of subordinates, motivation to build a relationship was 
a significant predictor of general blame behavior toward the self, b = 0.14, p = .04. When 
reflecting on their behaviors in general, for an audience of subordinates, the more motivated an 
individual was to build relationships with their employees, the more likely they were to shift 
blame toward themselves. LMX motivation was not a significant predictor of general blame 
behavior in front of an audience of superiors. In terms of situation-specific blame behavior, LMX 
motivation was not a significant predictor for both types of audiences. See Table 4.15 for the 
regression models of LMX motivation predicting blame behavior and Table 4.17 for a summary 
of significant and non-significant findings related to LMX motivation and blame behavior. For 
all types of credit behaviors for both audiences, coefficients for credit behavior were not 
significant.  






Audience Type: Subordinates Superiors Subordinates Superiors
LMX Motivation 0.14* 0.04 0.03 0.04
Gender (Female = 1) -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 -0.07
Age 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.17
Ethnicity (White = 1) -0.03 -0.05 -0.004 0.03
Role Tenure 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.13
Job Insecurity -0.002 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04
Constant 4.44** 4.50** 4.30** 4.35**
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
Adjusted R2 -0.003 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
Residual Std. Error (df = 183) 0.94 1.07 1.20 1.27
F Statistic (df = 6; 183) 0.90 0.53 0.44 0.71
Note:
Criterion: Blame Behavior
General Behaviors Situation-specific Behaviors






See Table 4.16 for the regression models of LMX motivation predicting credit behavior and 
Table 4.17 for a summary of findings related to effective leader ILT and credit behaviors.  
 





Table 4.17 LMX Motivation Predicting Blame and Credit Behaviors: Summary of Findings 
 
 
Audience Type: Subordinates Superiors Subordinates Superiors
LMX Motivation 0.08 0.03 0.12+ 0.13+
Gender (Female = 1) -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.14*
Age -0.08 -0.10 -0.14+ -0.07
Ethnicity (White = 1) -0.04 0.02 -0.09 -0.02
Role Tenure 0.15* 0.17* 0.21* 0.12
Job Insecurity 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04
Constant 3.68** 3.80** 3.62** 3.79**
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.06
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02
Residual Std. Error (df = 183) 0.89 0.85 0.99 0.93
F Statistic (df = 6; 183) 1.29 1.17 2.30* 1.78
Note:
Criterion: Credit Behavior
General Behaviors Situation-specific Behaviors




Shift toward self p = .04 n.s.
Situation-specific
Shift toward self n.s. n.s.
Credit Behaviors
General
Shift toward self n.s. n.s.
Situation-specific







Thus, Hypothesis 4a was supported only for general blame behavior in front of an 
audience of subordinates, but neither for an audience of superiors nor for situation-specific 
blame. Hypothesis 4b was not supported.  
Organizational culture. I conducted a series of regressions to examine whether the 
relationships from the four different motives to blame and credit behaviors are moderated by 
organizational culture. The individualistic or collectivistic nature of the organizational culture 
appeared to shape some of the relationships between narcissism, impression motivation, and 
implicit beliefs and blame or credit behaviors, although not always in the predicted direction. For 
the regression models of each motive and their interaction with organizational culture predicting 
blame and credit behaviors in front of each audience type, see Tables 4.18 – 4.33. 
For an audience of subordinates, managers who were more narcissistic tended to take 
more general credit in a more collectivistic organizational culture than in an individualistic 
culture. The coefficient for the interaction between narcissism and organizational culture was 
marginally significant, b = 0.75, p = .05. This marginally significant result ran counter to 
Hypothesis 5a. See Figure 4.1 for the interaction plot, and see Table 4.20 for the corresponding 
regression model. Other than this significant interaction term, for all other blame and credit 
behaviors and audience types, the coefficients for the interaction between narcissism and 
organizational culture were not significant. Specifically, the coefficients of the interaction 
between narcissism and organizational culture predicting the following behaviors were not 
significant at the p < .05 level: general credit behaviors for an audience of superiors, situation-
specific credit behaviors for both audiences, and all types of blame behaviors in front of either 






for narcissism and organizational culture predicting all other blame and credit behaviors are 
displayed in Tables 4.18, 4.19, and 4.21.  
 















Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Narcissism -0.43 -0.43 -0.54 -0.54
Organizational Culture 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05
Narcissism × Organizational Culture -0.07 -0.22
Constant 4.43** 4.43** 4.51** 4.51**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Adjusted R2 0.001 -0.004 0.0002 -0.004
Residual Std. Error 0.93 (df = 191) 0.93 (df = 190) 1.06 (df = 191) 1.06 (df = 190)
F Statistic 1.11 (df = 2, 191) 0.75 (df = 3, 190) 1.02 (df =2, 191) 0.75 (df = 3, 190)
Note:
Criterion: General Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates Audience: Superiors
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Narcissism -1.44** -1.44** -1.64** -1.64**
Organizational Culture 0.17+ 0.16+ 0.20+ 0.19+
Narcissism × Organizational Culture 0.26 0.32
Constant 4.31** 4.31** 4.35** 4.35**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Residual Std. Error 1.15 (df = 191) 1.15 (df = 190) 1.22 (df = 191) 1.22 (df = 190)
F Statistic 7.28** (df = 2, 191) 4.92** (df = 3, 190) 8.44** (df = 2, 191) 5.72** (df = 3, 190)
Note:
Criterion: Situation-specific Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates Audience: Superiors















Figure 4.1. Interaction between Narcissism and Organizational Culture on General Credit 
Behavior for an Audience of Subordinates (Note: Lower values on the Credit Behavior scale 
indicate credit-giving behavior, and higher values indicate credit-taking behavior.) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Narcissism 0.48 0.47 0.76* 0.75*
Organizational Culture 0.14+ 0.11 -0.006 -0.02
Narcissism × Organizational Culture 0.75+ 0.38
Constant 3.67** 3.67** 3.80** 3.80**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Residual Std. Error 0.87 (df = 191) 0.87 (df = 190) 0.84 (df = 191) 0.84 (df = 190)
F Statistic 2.66+ (df = 2, 191) 3.05* (df = 3, 190) 2.82+ (df = 2, 191) 2.22+ (df = 3, 190)
Note:
Criterion: General Credit Behavior
Audience: Subordinates Audience: Superiors











Similarly, for an audience of subordinates, managers who scored higher on impression 
motivation took more situation-specific credit in a more collectivistic organizational culture than 
in an individualistic culture. The coefficient for the interaction between impression motivation 
and organizational culture was significant, b = 0.30, p = .01. See Figure 4.2 for the interaction 
plot, and see Table 4.25 for the corresponding regression model. This result ran counter to the 
prediction made in Hypothesis 5a. For all other blame and credit behaviors and audience types, 
the coefficients for the interaction between impression motivation and organizational culture 
were not significant. Specifically, the coefficients of the interaction between impression 
motivation and organizational culture predicting the following behaviors were not significant at 
the p < .05 level: situation-specific credit behaviors for an audience of superiors, general credit 
behaviors for both audiences, and all blame behaviors in front of all audience types. Thus, these 
results do not provide support for Hypothesis 5a. The regression models for impression 
motivation and organizational culture predicting all other blame and credit behaviors are 
displayed in Tables 4.22 – 4.24. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Narcissism 0.94* 0.94* 0.78* 0.78*
Organizational Culture 0.07 0.07 -0.004 -0.01
Narcissism × Organizational Culture 0.09 0.11
Constant 3.62** 3.62** 3.79** 3.79**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Residual Std. Error 0.99 (df = 191) 0.99 ( df= 190) 0.93 (df = 191) 0.93 (df = 190)
F Statistic 3.37* (df = 2, 191) 2.25+ (df = 3, 190) 2.43+ (df = 2, 191) 1.64 (df = 3, 190)
Note:
Audience: Subordinates Audience: Superiors
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01






Table 4.22 Impression Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting General Blame 







Table 4.23 Impression Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific 












Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Impression Motivation 0.24* 0.27* 0.22+ 0.26*
Organizational Culture 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.002
Impression Motivation × Organizational Culture 0.09 0.15
Constant 4.43** 4.42** 4.51** 4.49**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Residual Std. Error 0.92 (df = 191) 0.92 (df =190) 1.05 (df = 191) 1.05 (df =190)
F Statistic 3.30* (df = 2, 191) 2.44+ (df = 3, 190) 1.92 (df = 2, 191) 1.75 (df = 3, 190)
Note:
Criterion: General Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates Audience: Superiors
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Impression Motivation 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.03
Organizational Culture 0.18+ 0.17+ 0.21+ 0.21+
Impression Motivation × Organizational Culture 0.09 -0.09
Constant 4.31** 4.30** 4.35** 4.36**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.005 0.01 0.01
Residual Std. Error 1.18 (df = 191) 1.18 (df = 190) 1.26 (df = 191) 1.26 (df = 190)
F Statistic 1.81 (df = 2, 191) 1.33 (df = 3, 190) 2.12 (df = 2, 191) 1.52 (df = 3, 190)
Note:
Criterion: Situation-specific Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates Audience: Superiors






Table 4.24 Impression Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting General Credit 







Table 4.25 Impression Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific 









Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Impression Motivation -0.03 -0.007 0.09 0.13
Organizational Culture 0.14+ 0.13+ -0.03 -0.03
Impression Motivation × Organizational Culture 0.07 0.11
Constant 3.67** 3.66** 3.79** 3.78**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.020 0.02 0.01 0.01
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.004 -0.01 -0.004
Residual Std. Error 0.88 (df =191) 0.88 (df = 190) 0.85 (df =191) 0.85 (df =190)
F Statistic 1.66 (df = 2, 191) 1.26 (df = 3, 190) 0.50 (df = 2, 191) 0.74 (df = 3, 190)
Note: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
Criterion: General Credit Behavior
Audience: Subordinates Audience: Superiors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Impression Motivation 0.07 0.17 0.15 0.21
Organizational Culture 0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.05
Impression Motivation × Organizational Culture 0.30* 0.18
Constant 3.62** 3.59** 3.79** 3.77**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03
Adjusted R2 -0.01 0.02 0.001 0.01
Residual Std. Error 1.00 (df = 191) 0.99 (df = 190) 0.94 (df = 191) 0.93 (df = 190)
F Statistic 0.48 (df = 2, 191) 2.46* (df = 3, 190) 1.09 (df = 2, 191) 1.61 (df = 3, 190)
Note: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
Criterion: Situation-specific Credit Behavior








Figure 4.2. Interaction between Impression Motivation and Organizational Culture on Situation-
specific Credit Behavior for an Audience of Subordinates. (Note: Lower values on the Credit 
Behavior scale indicate credit-giving behavior, and higher values indicate credit-taking 
behavior.) 
 
Furthermore, for an audience of subordinates, managers who scored lower on the implicit 
beliefs measure about leadership took more situation-specific blame in a more collectivistic 
organizational culture than in an individualistic one. The coefficient for the interaction between 
implicit beliefs and organizational culture was significant, b = -0.52, p = .03. The same pattern 
was detected for an audience of superiors, and the coefficient for the interaction was significant, 
b = -0.53, p = .04. See Figures 4.3 and 4.4 for the interaction plots, and see Table 4.27 for the 
corresponding regression models. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 5b with respect 







Table 4.26 Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture Predicting General Blame 








Figure 4.3. Interaction between Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture on Situation-
specific Blame Behavior for an Audience of Subordinates. (Note: Lower values on the Blame 
Behavior scale indicate blame-giving behavior, and higher values indicate blame-taking 
behavior.) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Effective Leader ILT 0.10 0.08 0.22 0.21
Organizational Culture 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03
Effective Leader ILT × Organizational Culture -0.22 -0.04
Constant 4.43** 4.44** 4.51** 4.51**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Adjusted R2 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006
Residual Std. Error 0.93 (df =191) 0.93 (df = 190) 1.06 (df = 191) 1.06 (df = 190)
F Statistic 0.58 (df = 2, 191) 0.85 (df = 3, 190) 0.89 (df = 2, 191) 0.60 (df = 3, 190)
Note:
Criterion: General Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates Audience: Superiors






Table 4.27 Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific Blame 








Figure 4.4. Interaction between Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture on Situation-
specific Blame Behavior for an Audience of Superiors. (Note: Lower values on the Blame 
Behavior scale indicate blame-giving behavior, and higher values indicate blame-taking 
behavior.) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Effective Leader ILT 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.12
Organizational Culture 0.18+ 0.20+ 0.20+ 0.23*
Effective Leader ILT × Organizational Culture -0.52* -0.53*
Constant 4.31** 4.33** 4.35** 4.37**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03
Residual Std. Error 1.18 (df = 191) 1.17 (df = 190) 1.26 (df = 191) 1.24 (df = 190)
F Statistic 2.22 (df = 2, 191) 3.09* (df = 3, 190) 2.41+ (df = 2, 191) 3.11* (df = 3, 190)
Note:
Criterion: Situation-specific Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates Audience: Superiors






For an audience of subordinates, however, managers who scored lower on the implicit 
beliefs measure took more general credit in a more collectivistic organizational culture than in an 
individualistic culture. In this case, the coefficient for the interaction between implicit beliefs and 
organizational culture was significant, b = -0.55, p = .002, and this finding runs counter to 
Hypothesis 5b with respect to general credit behavior. See Figure 4.5 for the interaction plot, and 
see Table 4.28 for the corresponding regression model. For all other blame and credit behaviors 
and audience types, the coefficients for the interaction between implicit beliefs and 
organizational culture were not significant. Specifically, the coefficients of the interaction 
between an effective leader ILT and organizational culture predicting the following behaviors 
were not significant at the p < .05 level: general blame behaviors for both audiences, general 
credit behaviors for an audience of superiors, and situation-specific credit behaviors for both 
audience types. Thus, these results do not provide support for Hypothesis 5b. The regression 
models for implicit beliefs and organizational culture predicting the other blame and credit 
behaviors are displayed in Tables 4.26 and 4.29. 
Table 4.28 Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture Predicting General Credit 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Effective Leader ILT -0.13 -0.19 -0.09 -0.12
Organizational Culture 0.14+ 0.16* -0.01 0.003
Effective Leader ILT × Organizational Culture -0.55** -0.26
Constant 3.67** 3.69** 3.79** 3.80**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.02 0.07 0.002 0.01
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.001
Residual Std. Error 0.88 (df = 191) 0.86 (df = 190) 0.85 (df = 191) 0.85 (df =190)
F Statistic 2.00 (df = 2, 191) 4.73** (df = 3, 190) 0.22 (df =2, 191) 0.93 (df = 3, 190)
Note: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
Criterion: General Credit Behavior








Figure 4.5. Interaction between Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture on General 
Credit Behavior for an Audience of Subordinates. (Note: Lower values on the Credit Behavior 




Table 4.29 Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific Credit 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Effective Leader ILT -0.27 -0.29+ -0.20 -0.20
Organizational Culture 0.08 0.08 0.0005 0.001
Effective Leader ILT × Organizational Culture -0.15 -0.01
Constant 3.62** 3.62** 3.79** 3.79**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.004 -0.002 -0.01
Residual Std. Error 1.00 (df = 191) 1.00 (df =190) 0.94 (df = 191) 0.94 (df = 190)
F Statistic 1.60 (df = 2, 191) 1.24 (df = 3, 190) 0.83 (df = 2, 191) 0.55 (df = 3, 190)
Note: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
Criterion: Situation-specific Credit Behavior






No significant interaction effects of organizational culture on the relationship between 
LMX motivation and blame or credit behaviors were found in this data, for either type of 
audience, at the p < .05 level. The regression models for LMX motivation and organizational 
culture predicting the various blame and credit behaviors are displayed in Tables 4.30 – 4.33. 
Thus, there was no evidence to support Hypothesis 5b regarding LMX motivation. 
 






Table 4.31 LMX Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific Blame 
Behavior: Regression Models 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LMX Motivation 0.24* 0.24* 0.08 0.08
Organizational Culture 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
LMX Motivation × Organizational Culture -0.06 0.04
Constant 4.43** 4.43** 4.51** 4.51**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.03 0.03 0.003 0.003
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Residual Std. Error 0.92 (df =191) 0.93 (df = 190) 1.06 (df = 191) 1.06 (df =190)
F Statistic 2.41+ (df = 2, 191) 1.64 (df = 3, 190) 0.30 (df = 2, 191) 0.22 (df = 3, 190)
Note:
Criterion: General Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates Audience: Superiors
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LMX Motivation 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.08
Organizational Culture 0.18+ 0.19+ 0.21+ 0.22*
LMX Motivation × Organizational Culture -0.03 -0.19
Constant 4.31** 4.31** 4.35** 4.36**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.01
Residual Std. Error 1.18 (df = 191) 1.18 (df = 190) 1.26 (df = 191) 1.26 (df = 190)
F Statistic 1.73 (df = 2, 191) 1.16 (df = 3, 190) 2.10 (df = 2, 191) 1.70 (df = 3, 190)
Note:
Criterion: Situation-specific Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates Audience: Superiors












Table 4.33 LMX Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific Credit 




Subordinate organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs). Leaders completed measures 
indicating their perceptions of their subordinates’ OCBs. Regression analyses reveal that a 
leader’s blame behavior toward the self has a significant relationship with subordinate OCBs 
when controlling for gender, age, race, role tenure, and job insecurity. See Table 4.34 for the 
regression models of blame behaviors predicting subordinate OCBs. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LMX Motivation 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.03
Organizational Culture 0.13+ 0.13+ -0.02 -0.01
LMX Motivation × Organizational Culture -0.13 -0.02
Constant 3.67** 3.67** 3.79** 3.80**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.02 0.02 0.001 0.001
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
Residual Std. Error 0.88 (df = 191) 0.88 (df = 190) 0.85 (df = 191) 0.86 (df = 190)
F Statistic 1.86 (df = 2, 191) 1.53 (df = 3, 190) 0.05 (df = 2, 191) 0.04 (df = 3, 190)
Note: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
Criterion: General Credit Behavior
Audience: Subordinates Audience: Superiors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LMX Motivation 0.17 0.16 0.20+ 0.19
Organizational Culture 0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.03
LMX Motivation × Organizational Culture 0.08 0.14
Constant 3.62** 3.61** 3.79** 3.78**
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Adjusted R2 0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.004
Residual Std. Error 1.00 (df = 191) 1.00 (df = 190) 0.94 (df = 191) 0.94 (df = 190)
F Statistic 1.14 (df = 2, 191) 0.85 (df = 3, 190) 1.43 (df = 2, 191) 1.23 (df = 3, 190)
Note: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
Criterion: Situation-specific Credit Behavior










Specifically, for an audience of subordinates, general blame behavior toward the self was 
a significant predictor of subordinate OCBs, b = 0.15, p = .02. For audience of subordinates, 
situation-specific blame-taking behavior was a significant predictor of subordinate OCBs, b = 
0.19, p = .004. For audience of superiors, general blame behavior toward the self was a 
significant predictor of subordinate OCBs, b = 0.17, p < .009. For audience of superiors, 
situation-specific blame behavior toward the self was a significant predictor of subordinate 
OCBs, b = 0.21, p = .002. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Audience: Subordinates
          General Blame 0.15*
          Situation-specific Blame 0.19**
Audience: Superiors
          General Blame 0.17**
          Situation-specific Blame 0.21**
Gender (Female = 1) 0.13* 0.15* 0.14* 0.14*
Age -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07
Ethnicity (White = 1) -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07
Role Tenure 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.10
Job Insecurity -0.26** -0.25** -0.26** -0.25**
Constant 4.86** 4.86** 4.86** 4.86**
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.11
Residual Std. Error (df = 183) 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.90
F Statistic (df = 6; 183) 4.16** 4.75** 4.47** 5.05**
Note:
DV: Subordinate OCBs






 In this study, credit behaviors, both general and situation-specific and toward either type 
of audience, did not explain subordinate OCBs, regardless of audience type. The coefficients of 
credit behaviors predicting subordinate OCBs were all not significant at the p < .05 level. See 
Table 4.35 for the regression models of credit behaviors predicting subordinate OCBs. Thus, 
there is support for Hypothesis 7a but not for Hypothesis 7b.  




4.2.3 Discussion. Taken together, these results provide mixed support for the main 
effects hypotheses proposed in this chapter. No effect was observed for the relationship between 
the implicit beliefs motive and blame or credit behaviors. While the implicit beliefs motive had 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Audience: Subordinates
          General Credit 0.07
          Situation-specific Credit 0.09
Audience: Superiors
          General Credit -0.02
          Situation-specific Credit 0.05
Gender (Female = 1) 0.14* 0.14* 0.13+ 0.14*
Age -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
Ethnicity (White = 1) -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
Role Tenure 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.08
Job Insecurity -0.26** -0.26** -0.26** -0.26**
Constant 4.85** 4.86** 4.86** 4.86**
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Residual Std. Error (df = 183) 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
F Statistic (df = 6; 183) 3.39** 3.50** 3.23** 3.28**
Note:
Criterion: Subordinate OCBs






limited effects on blame and credit behaviors, the results demonstrate some evidence for the 
other three motives. With respect to the effects of these motives on leader blame or credit 
behavior, the effects varied with the type of audience (e.g., subordinate or superior) and the type 
of blame or credit behavior (e.g., behavior in general or behavior tied to a specific situation).  
The findings regarding narcissism and impression motivation in the regression models 
that include all four motives as criterion variables indicate that narcissism (i.e., the ego-defensive 
motive) and impression motivation (i.e., the impression management motive) are strong drivers 
of blame behaviors in particular. These findings reinforce the link between the ego-defensive 
motive and blame-assigning behaviors in the predicted direction. In addition, the findings 
reinforce the (unexpected) link between the impression management motive and blame-taking 
behaviors, which ran counter to the blame-assigning predictions in the theoretical model. 
Specifically, the results illustrate that a leader with an ego-defensive motive may be more 
likely to shift blame toward their subordinates in front of various audiences, which provides 
evidence for the predicted link between an ego-defensive motive and blame behaviors toward 
others. Although no significant effect was detected when examining credit behaviors, this may 
indicate that leaders motivated to defend their ego are more likely to shift blame away from 
themselves rather than take credit for successes.  
The results of the regression analyses for each individual motive also provide evidence 
counter to the predictions regarding the impression management motive and blame behaviors. 
Namely, the data demonstrate that the more motivated a leader is to manage impressions, the 
more likely they may be to take blame instead of blame others after an unsuccessful outcome, 
regardless of whether the audience is comprised of subordinates or superiors. This is interesting 






that shift blame away from the self in order to maintain an image of being competent. It is 
possible that leaders may view blame-giving behaviors as incompetent leader behaviors, and thus 
may view blame-taking behaviors as a way to portray themselves as a “good” leader in the 
stereotypical sense, similar to the implicit beliefs motive. However, with respect to credit 
behaviors, the data showed that an impression management motive may drive a leader to take 
credit after a successful outcome in front of an audience of superiors. This was not the case for 
an audience of subordinates. This evidence may indicate that after a successful outcome, leaders 
who are motivated to manage impressions may communicate differently to an audience of 
superiors than to an audience of subordinates. In front of superiors, taking credit may strengthen 
their image as a leader while not appearing as though credit is being taken away from 
subordinates. Conversely, in front of subordinates, the leader may refrain from taking credit, as 
they might realize that the subordinates have a more accurate understanding with respect to 
where credit is due. 
Organizational culture. Moreover, in general, the results for organizational culture did 
not support Hypotheses 5a and 5b, which predicted that the individualistic or collectivistic nature 
of the organization’s culture would influence the relationship between motive and blame or 
credit behaviors. In most cases, the findings did not provide support for Hypothesis 5, and in 
some cases, the findings ran counter to Hypothesis 5. The main exception was that of a manager 
whose implicit beliefs about leadership did not match that of the culturally endorsed implicit 
leadership theory of outstanding leadership (Javidan et al., 2006). For these managers, when 
recalling a specific past situation and communicating to an audience of subordinates, they 
reported taking more blame when recalling on a specific situation in their past in an 






Hypothesis 5b because managers who did not tend to share the widely endorsed beliefs regarding 
effective leadership and perceived their organizational context to be collectivistic took more 
blame than those who perceived their organizational context to be more individualistic.  
However, with respect to credit, the results showed that these managers, whose implicit 
beliefs did not match the widely endorsed beliefs regarding effective leadership and perceived 
their organizational culture to be more collectivistic, took more general credit (i.e., not reflecting 
on a specific situation) than those who perceived a more individualistic organizational culture. 
Additionally, there was a lack of significant findings for the relationship building motive, and the 
results for the ego-defensive motive and impression management motive (operationalized by 
narcissism and impression motivation, respectively) were contrary to Hypothesis 5 as a whole. 
For leaders who were naturally inclined to be more ego-defensive (i.e., narcissistic) or more 
motivated to impression manage (i.e., impression motivation), working in a culture that was 
more collectivistic and group-focused did not appear to change their tendencies toward certain 
blame and credit behaviors. In fact, the findings reveal that being in a more collectivistic rather 
than individualistic organizational culture appeared to intensify credit-taking behaviors. The 
unusual findings that ran counter to Hypothesis 5 may be related to measurement errors and 
should be explored in future studies. A possible source of error may be tied to limitations in how 
leader behaviors and organizational culture were measured, because the leaders themselves 
completed the scales for leader behavior and organizational culture. Leaders may report enacting 
certain behaviors that they believe they enact in general or have enacted in specific situations, 
but their subordinates may report that their leader enacted slightly different behaviors. If 
measures of leader behavior and organizational culture were collected from multiple other 






 Subordinate OCBs. The findings in Study 2 demonstrate that blame behaviors, and not 
credit behaviors, are more strongly linked to subordinate OCBs, as reported by leaders in this 
dataset. Thus, the findings provide support for Hypothesis 7a but not 7b. For both audiences of 
subordinates and superiors, a leader who shifts blame more toward themselves and less toward 
their subordinates may be more likely to observe subordinate OCBs. The results provide 
correlational evidence of a relationship between leader blame-taking behaviors and subordinate 
OCBs. Conversely, no relationships were observed between credit behaviors and subordinate 
OCBs for either type of audience, as reported by the leader participant. Therefore, it is possible 
that a leader’s behaviors with respect to blame hold more weight compared to a her behaviors 
with respect to credit. For example, a subordinate may be more likely to engage in OCBs when 
their leader takes blame rather than when their leader gives them credit.  
Limitations. The data in Study 2 are single source and self-reported: the measures of 
leader blame and credit behaviors as well as motives were taken from only one source – the 
leaders themselves. Because online Prolific Academic participants self-reported their blame and 
credit behaviors on the online questionnaire, a discrepancy might exist between their self-
perceptions of their own blame and credit behaviors and their subordinates’ perceptions of the 
leader’s blame and credit behaviors. Leaders may report enacting certain behaviors that they 
believe they in general enact or have enacted in specific past situations, but their subordinates 
may report slightly different general and specific behaviors. Because the measures of motives 
and behaviors were self-reported, individuals may be biased in reporting their own blame and 
credit behaviors, whereas multi-source data may provide a more accurate measure of behaviors 
(e.g., subordinates reporting their leader’s blame and credit behaviors). Future research should 






would provide a more accurate measure of the leader’s behavior, which may not perfectly match 
to the leader’s self-reported behavior. In addition, these participants self-reported the OCBs of 
their subordinates, which reflects their own perceptions of their subordinates’ behaviors but may 
not reflect the actual behaviors or perceptions of the subordinates themselves.  
Furthermore, the validity of the organization’s emphasis on individualistic versus 
collectivistic values may, at first glance, seem weak because these measures were only taken 
from the participants themselves: they reported on their organization’s culture, and the 
perceptions of organizational culture across other members in the organization were not 
measured. The perception of individualistic versus collectivistic values across the organization as 
a whole, however, may not be as important here. How a leader herself perceives the 
organization’s cultural emphasis on individualistic or collectivistic values may matter more, 
because her perception is what directly influences blame and credit behaviors, not necessarily the 
general perception of organization culture across all members in the organization.  
Lastly, the data and results collected in this study established certain correlational 
patterns but could not test for causal links from motives to blame and credit behaviors.  
4.3 Study 3: Examining the Relationship between Motives and Blame Behaviors 
 The objective of Study 3 was to examine the hypothesized relationships regarding blame 
behaviors in a laboratory setting that enables randomization and precision of measurement. 
Study 3 tested the causal link from the four motives to blame (Hypotheses 1a – 4a) by 
conducting an experiment in which motive is manipulated. This study focused exclusively on 
diffuse failure and blame behaviors, and thus, all study participants perceived their performance 






Study 3 was a between-subjects experimental design with five treatment conditions that 
varied motive (i.e., ego-defensive vs. impression management vs. implicit beliefs vs. relationship 
building motives) in addition to a control condition. It addresses the main effects from the four 
drivers to blame behaviors.  
4.3.1 Methods.  
Participants. I recruited 240 undergraduate lab participants through the Olin Research 
Subject Pool. The final sample consisted of N = 191 participants. The average age of the 
participants was 19.3 years, and the sample was 52% female and 64% white. I dropped 49 
participants from the dataset who failed attention checks, failed manipulation checks, or who had 
previously done the Moon Survival Task (the first task, as described below). Attention and 
manipulation checks included questions that evaluated whether the participant had read and 
understood the instructions, including the motive information relayed during the task and the 
negative performance feedback on the Moon Survival Task. I removed the data of any 
participants who failed to select the correct responses to any of these questions (e.g., if a 
participant selected a motive condition that did not correspond to their randomly assigned 
motive, or if they reported that they had performed above average on the Moon Survival Task). 
In all, 49 participants failed at least one of these checks, and therefore they were excluded from 
the final sample.   
The participants were told that they were randomly assigned to be the leader of a two-
person team (i.e., dyad), and that their pa"rtner (i.e., subordinate) would interact with them from 
another room in the lab via a computer chat interface. This partner was a research assistant 
serving as a confederate, posing as a study participant. Each participant was randomly assigned 






received 0.5 course credits for participating in subject pool research, with the opportunity to earn 
a cash prize. All participants had an equal chance of winning the cash prize, and those who 
performed in the top 10% of all study participants received a prize of $10.00 based on task 
performance.  
Tasks. Participants were instructed to complete two tasks. The first task was completed 
once solo and a second time with their partner. The second task was completed once only and 
with their partner. The first task was a survival scenario task adapted for this study: the moon 
survival task (Hall & Watson, 1970; e.g., Bottger & Yetton, 1988; Ferrin & Dirks, 2003), in 
which participants must work together to prioritize a set of items necessary for survival. The 
second task was a brainstorming task, in which participants worked together with their partner to 
generate a list of uses for a brick. This brainstorming task is commonly used in creativity 
research as a dependent measure of creativity (Frick et al., 1959; Guilford, 1975).  
 Two tasks were used in this experiment, instead of one, in order to create a more realistic 
working environment. Individuals in organizations engage in repeated interactions under the 
assumption that their blame behaviors in one situation may influence their relationships and 
work dynamics over time. Therefore, informing the participants that they will work with the 
same individual on a second task following the first task provides stakes that are more realistic 
with respect to maintenance of working relationships and opportunities for repeated interaction 
as observed in organizational settings outside of the laboratory. More specifically, the two-task 
design increases the likelihood that a participant’s blame behaviors following the first task may 
be more realistic in light of the fact that he or she will be interacting with their subordinate 






In the moon survival task, individuals are presented with a scenario in which they are 
stranded on the moon with a set of items (e.g., water, compass, oxygen, rope) that may help them 
survive. The objective of the task is to rank order the items based on their importance for 
survival; to do so, the participants in each dyad must work together to determine which items are 
most important. I adapted the task so that only the leader of each dyad would be able to edit the 
list of items and submit the final solution (see Appendix D for details regarding the situation, the 
task, and the list of items). This task gave the leader (i.e., the study subject) the opportunity to 
problem solve, communicate, and analyze information with their subordinate (i.e., the 
confederate partner).  
 The moon survival task was selected because this type of exercise has been shown to be 
an effective method of studying group problem solving in previous research (e.g., Bottger & 
Yetton, 1988; Ferrin & Dirks, 2003). Those studies indicated that participants become highly 
involved in these types of tasks. To further encourage engagement, an additional monetary 
incentive was provided in the study. Because I wanted to manipulate the perception of 
performance (i.e., failure of the team’s performance), the survival scenario task is useful because 
pre-determined negative feedback can be given to the participants to manipulate their perceptions 
of their dyad’s performance on the task. I also wanted to manipulate reward structure in 
subsequent Study 4, so these tasks provide an opportunity for the dyad members to perform the 
task individually and as a team. In addition, regardless of what performance feedback the 
participants receive, the dyad’s actual performance on the task can be measured objectively. 
Procedure. All participants performed the same two tasks and underwent the same 
procedure, with the exception of the manipulation of the leader motive. Participants were told 






was actually a trained confederate. They were informed that they would work on two tasks with 
the same partner. Each dyad received the same amount of time to rank the items in the first task 
(6 minutes) and brainstorm uses for a brick in the second task (3 minutes). They were seated at a 
computer workstation, communicating through a custom-built web-based computer program (see 
Appendix D, Figure D1 for screenshot of the program) that allowed them to chat with each other 
and submit their solution to the tasks. I chose to use virtual communication via computer in order 
to reduce possible confounds that might occur, such as judgments of similarity, attractiveness, 
liking, and other nonverbal signals about their partner (Byrne, 1971; Frank, 1988). These could 
independently induce cooperative (or non-cooperative) behavior.  
The participant received information about the potential to earn a cash prize of $10.00, 
their role as a leader, the scoring system, and task instructions. They were also informed during 
the instructions and on the task page itself that success on the moon survival task was strongly 
tied to specific leader ability, which served as the motive manipulation (see Manipulation of 
motives section for more details, below). First, the participant was given 6 minutes to submit 
their own, individual rankings for the items in the moon survival task. Then, the participant and 
confederate had another 6 minutes to work together as a team on the moon survival task and then 
submit a shared ranking of the items. At this point, each participant was given feedback 
regarding their performance as a team that their performance was well below average (i.e., 
diffuse failure): “Based on your team rankings, you and your partner performed “well below 
average”.” 
Next, the leader communicated his or her thoughts about their pair’s performance, based 
on the feedback received, to the other participant (i.e., the confederate) by selecting from a range 






behaviors). These response options can be found in the Measures – Leader blame behavior 
section, as well as in Appendix D. Then, they answered three questions that they were told would 
be seen by the lab administrator (i.e., superior); they measured the extent to which the leader 
believed they were to blame for the poor performance. See Measures – Leader blame behavior 
for more details.  
Next, the participants were told that they would work with the same person to complete 
another task – the brick uses brainstorming task. Each dyad was given 3 minutes to brainstorm as 
many non-redundant uses of a brick as possible. Finally, the participants completed a post-study 
questionnaire including manipulation checks, attention checks, and leader self-assessment. To 
complete the session, the lab administrator debriefed all participants regarding the existence of a 
confederate and the contrived performance feedback. Participants were then informed that an 
average score of their performances on the solo and team Moon Survival Task would be used to 
calculate their final score. If they achieved a score that fell within the top 10% of all study 
participants, they would receive an email with information about when and where to receive their 
$10.00 cash prize (for more details, see Participant compensation section).  
Perceived performance. Following the completion of the moon survival task, the 
participants were given feedback on their performance as a dyad. All participants were displayed 
the same message on the screen: “Based on your team rankings, you and your partner performed 
“well below average”.” 
Manipulation of motives. The participant (i.e., the leader) was randomly shown one of 
four statements in order to activate one specific motive. The leader of the dyad was informed that 
success in the moon survival task is strongly tied to the leader’s ability to (1) think highly of 






administrator (impression management motive); (3) act in ways that fit the stereotype of an ideal 
leader (implicit beliefs motive); or (4) develop strong relationships with their partner and earn 
their trust (relationship building motive). They were then instructed: “as the leader, you must do 
your best to act in a way that is consistent with a leader whose role requires him or her to [motive 
condition] as you complete the tasks in this study. In the control condition, no information was 
given regarding the successful behaviors of a leader. 
Pilot test of the manipulation of motives. The wording of the manipulations was pilot 
tested prior to the lab study. The purpose of the pilot test was to test and confirm that the 
manipulations in the experimental study induced the desired motive and none of the other 
motives being tested. N = 150 subjects were recruited via the online research platform Prolific 
participated in an online survey, and three subjects were dropped due to failed attention checks. 
The participants were 53% female and 90% white. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four motive conditions. They first read about a specific type of leader, and then answered 
questions about how this particular type of leader might act in the workplace. The wording of 
these instructions changed based on the motive condition to which the participant was assigned. 
For example, participants in the ego-defensive motive condition saw the following text: 
“Leaders often find themselves in situations where it is important that they think highly 
of themselves as leaders.  
 
As you answer the questions in this survey, respond in a way that would be consistent 
with a leader who thinks highly of himself/herself as a leader. In other words, as you 
answer the questions in this survey, take the perspective of a leader whose role requires 
that he or she thinks highly of himself/herself.” 
 
Next, the pilot test participants responded to six multiple-choice questions, indicating 






perspective of a certain type of leader. Each one of the four options to the survey questions 
corresponded directly to each one of the four motives. An example of a question is: 
 “When a goal is successfully reached by the team, the leader is most likely to:  
(a) Express that their leadership led to the successful outcome 
(b) Hope that the successful outcome will boost their reputation with their supervisor 
(c) Express that they believe the team effectively worked together and can achieve future 
successes 
(d) Take time to individually let each employee know their contribution is valued”, 
where (a) corresponded to the ego-defensive motive, (b) to the impression management motive, 
(c) to the implicit beliefs motive, and (d) to the relationship building motive. 
I conducted one-way ANOVAs to compare the effect of the motive manipulation on the 
survey question responses for each of the four motive conditions. These ANOVA analyses tested 
if participants in a specific motive condition most often selected the corresponding behavioral 
response in the follow-up survey questions. This was based on a count of the number of 
responses that were congruent with motive condition, and counts were averaged across all 
participants within that condition. For example, I counted the number of times a participant in 
the relationship building condition most often selected the relationship building leader behaviors 
in the survey questions over the other three, non-relationship-building behaviors. Then, I found 
the average of this count across all participants in the relationship-building condition. 
 In addition to ANOVA analyses, I conducted a Tukey’s honest significance (HSD) 
multiple pairwise comparisons test to examine whether individuals in each condition most often 
selected items corresponding to that motive or another one of the four motives. For example, I 
conducted Tukey’s HSD test would check whether participants in the relationship building 
condition most often selected the relationship building items over the ego-defensive items (in 






For each motive condition, there was a significant effect of motive condition on the 
participants’ responses corresponding to their assigned motive at the p < .01 level. For the ego-
defensive motive, there was a significant effect of the ego-defensive motive on whether or not 
participants selected the ego-defensive leader behavior versus the other three behaviors [F(3, 
144) = 20.23, p < .001]. For the impression management motive, there was a significant effect of 
the impression management on whether or not participants selected the impression management 
behavior versus the other three behaviors [F(3, 152) = 17.63, p < .001]. For the implicit beliefs 
motive, there was a significant effect of the implicit beliefs motive on whether or not participants 
selected the implicit beliefs leader behavior versus the other three behaviors [F(3, 132) = 56.77, 
p < .001]. For the relationship building motive, there was a significant effect of the relationship 
building motive on whether or not participants selected the relationship building leader behavior 
versus the other three behaviors [F(3, 144) = 69.47, p < .001]. 
Taken together, the pilot test results indicated that the wording for each motive 
manipulation was effective in directing a participant to visualize and think like the type of leader 
who would be motivated to act in alignment with each of the four motives. 
Scoring of moon survival task. Performance was evaluated based on the accuracy of the 
ranking of the twelve items in the moon survival task. For each item ranked, the number of ranks 
that each ranking differs from the corresponding correct ranking is calculated as a difference 
score. For example, if the participant ranks a map in first place and a first aid kit in second place, 
but the expert-assigned rankings are third place and seventh place correspondingly, the 
difference score calculated for these two items equals 7. Thus, a lower difference score indicates 
greater accuracy, or higher achievement. The achievement score is then assigned based on the 






Participant compensation. Participants were told that their final score would be 
determined by two different scores: the achievement score and the contribution score. The 
achievement score was described above. Participants were also informed that their contribution 
score would be based on the lab administrator’s evaluation of the extent to which they, the 
leader, contributed to the pair’s success or failure. As the “supervisor” and “superior” figure, the 
lab administrator’s evaluation was based on the participant’s blame behavior as the leader (see 
“Measures – Leader blame behavior”), which was comprised of three items visible to the lab 
administrator regarding their dyad’s (poor) performance on the task. 
As a performance incentive, participants were informed that they would win a cash prize 
of $10.00 if they achieved a score that fell within the top 10% of study participants, and that they 
would be contacted via email within two weeks of study completion if they earned this prize.  
Participants were informed that their compensation would be based equivalently on two 
scores, the achievement score and the contribution score, in order to create a more realistic 
balance of their final score on both dimensions of motive objective: performance and image. The 
achievement score captures the performance aspect of completing the task and accounts for half 
of their possible high score. On the other hand, the contribution score captured the image aspect 
of completing the task as the dyad leader. A score that was based solely on task performance 
would not allow for any impression management or self-defense through the blame behavior. By 
equally balancing their composite score between achievement and contribution, participants 
would also be more balanced between the performance and image dimensions of motive 
objective, across all four motives.  
During the study debriefing, however, I informed participants that only their achievement 






to calculate their final score, and compensation would be awarded accordingly based on the 
average of their solo and team performance on the Moon Survival Task. 
Measures. 
Manipulation checks. The effectiveness of the manipulations and comprehension of the 
study parameters was determined by having the participants complete a set of survey questions at 
the end of the lab session. To ensure that the participants understood that their performance was 
a failure, I asked each participant to select whether or not their team performed below or above 
average. The effectiveness of the motive manipulation was assessed by asking the participants to 
indicate which of four statements reflected what type of leader behavior was linked to success on 
the moon survival task. Another question determined whether participants understood that their 
total score was comprised of two types of scores, the achievement score and contribution score.  
 Leader blame behavior. Following the completion of the moon survival task, the leader 
saw a set of response options and was asked to select one of these messages to send to their 
partner in light of their below average performance on the task. The options were: (1) You are to 
blame for this outcome, (2) You are somewhat to blame for this outcome, (3) We are equally to 
blame for this outcome, (4) I am somewhat to blame for this outcome, and (5) I am to blame for 
this outcome (see Appendix D). The leader then selected one of these statements with the 
knowledge that their partner (i.e., the confederate) would see the message. The message was 
framed as a response or feedback to the other team member. This variable represented the blame 
observed by a subordinate audience.  
Next, the leader responded to three items assessing their beliefs regarding who was to 
blame for the performance on the team task. These measures were framed as the extent to which 






participant was told that the lab administrator would be able to view their responses to these 
items. These items were then viewed as communications to the lab administrator, who 
participants believed to be evaluating the them, as the leader participant, and assigning the 
contribution score, the level of their contributions to the pair’s overall achievement, or 
performance. See Appendix D for full items measuring these blame behaviors. Cronbach’s alpha 
for the three items measuring the participant’s beliefs regarding who was to blame was .84. This 
measure represented the blame observed by an audience of superiors, as it indicated the leader’s 
communication to the supervisor (i.e., superior) regarding their beliefs as to who was the blame 
for the team’s unsuccessful performance. 
4.3.2 Results. Descriptive statistics and correlations between each of the measures are 
displayed in Table 4.36 and Table 4.37. For the blame that the study participants, as the leader, 
communicated to their subordinate, on a 5-point Likert scale, the average blame behavior was 
3.64 (SD = 0.98). For the blame that the study participants, as the leader, communicated to their 
superior, on a 5-point Likert scale, the average blame behavior was 3.84 (SD = 0.66). Histograms 
showing the distribution of these two measures are depicted in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7.  
 















Age 19.27 1.17 18.00 23.00
Gender (Female = 1) 0.52 0.50 0 1 -0.07
Blame communicated to subordinate 3.64 0.98 1 5 0.13+ 0.01
Blame communicated to superior 3.84 0.66 1 5 0.05 -0.15* 0.68* α = .84
















Figure 4.6. Study 3 – Distribution of Blame Communicated to Subordinate. 
 
 
N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Blame communicated to subordinate
Ego-defensive motive 37 3.51 1.17 1.00 5.00
Impression management motive 33 3.55 1.09 1.00 5.00
Implicit beliefs motive 36 3.72 0.94 1.00 5.00
Relationship building motive 44 3.70 0.85 2.00 5.00
Control group 41 3.68 0.88 1.00 5.00
Blame communicated to superior
Ego-defensive motive 37 3.72 0.93 1.00 5.00
Impression management motive 33 3.91 0.64 2.67 5.00
Implicit beliefs motive 36 3.93 0.56 2.67 5.00
Relationship building motive 44 3.78 0.66 2.00 5.00
Control group 41 3.89 0.46 2.67 5.00








Figure 4.7. Study 3 – Distribution of Blame Communicated to Superior. 
 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA compared the effect of leader motive on blame 
behavior in ego-defensive, impression management, implicit beliefs, and relationship building 
motive conditions, as well as the control condition. Two ANOVAs were conducted, one where 
the dependent variable was the blame observed by subordinate audience and a second where the 
dependent variable was the blame observed by an audience of superiors. There was no 
significant effect of motive condition on blame behavior, for blame behavior observed by either 
an audience of subordinates or an audience of superiors at the p < .05 level. For the blame 
observed for a subordinate audience, the effect of motive was not significant when comparing 
the blame communication across motive conditions, F(4, 186) = .357, n.s. For the blame 
observed for a superior audience, the effect of motive was not significant when comparing the 
blame communication across motive conditions, F(4, 186) = .671, n.s. Therefore, the data in this 







Figure 4.8. Study 3 – Average Response to Blame Items Sent to Superior versus Subordinate. 
(Note: Lower values on the Blame Behavior scale indicate blame-giving behavior, and higher 
values indicate blame-taking behavior.) 
 
A one-way ANOVA examined whether there were any differences in blame behavior as a 
message sent to the partner (i.e., blame observed by a subordinate audience) versus the 
communication sent to the lab administrator (i.e., blame observed by an audience of superiors) in 
each motive condition. Within each of the four motive conditions, as well as in the control 
condition, there were no significant differences regarding the audience of the blame behavior, 
subordinate or superior at the p < .05 level, F(9, 372) = 1.019, n.s. See Figure 4.8 for a chart 
comparing the average blame communicated to a subordinate compared to a superior. 
4.3.3 Discussion. Findings from this experiment testing the link from the four motives to 
blame behaviors in a laboratory setting did not provide causal evidence for the hypothesized 
relationships. Similarly, compelling evidence was not found for differences between 
communications of blame with a superior versus a subordinate. The lack of significant findings 






possible that the effects of the manipulation were not strong enough or were dulled while 
participant worked on the moon survival task such that the effects disappeared during the time 
the participant progressed through the tasks in the study. By the time the participant was 
instructed to respond to the blame measures, they had worked on the moon survival task solo and 
then a second time with their partner, and the manipulation may have lost its effect. 
 Second, the study design may have been weak with respect to the extent to which the 
participants perceived their partner (i.e., the confederate posing as the follower) as having 
contributed enough to the task to warrant being blamed for an unsuccessful performance. The lab 
participants may not have perceived their follower to have much potential for blame because 
there was no clear opportunity for their follower to make a substantial contribution to the task 
solution. As a result, there may have been neither enough variance in the blame behavior 
measure nor a justified reason for some lab participants to feel as though the unsuccessful 
outcome was the confederate’s fault. 
 Lastly, given the compact nature of the student subject pool, it may have been possible 
that word of the deception regarding performance on the Moon Survival Task (i.e., that all 
participants were told that they performed below average) leaked through the subject population. 
If this occurred, it may have comprised the manipulation and data.  
4.4 Study 4: Examining the Effects of Motives and Reward Structures on Blame Behaviors 
The objective of Study 4 was to examine the hypothesized relationships regarding blame 
behaviors in a laboratory setting, in addition to the effects of reward structures, which were not 
examined in Study 3. Study 4 focused specifically on the ego-defense motive and the implicit 
beliefs motive and their relationships with blame behavior (Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 3a). 






motive objective but still have the same inward (instead of outward) direction. The ego-defensive 
motive objective is focused on image in an inward direction, while the implicit beliefs motive 
objective is focused on performance in an inward direction. These two motives are also of 
specific interest because they are linked to opposite predictions regarding blame behavior. Study 
4 also tested the moderating effect of reward structure on the relationship from these two motives 
to blame (individual vs. shared rewards, Hypothesis 6a(i) and Hypothesis 6b(i)). 
Thus, Study 4 was a between-subjects experimental study with a hanging control group 
design: a 2 (motive: ego-defensive motive vs. implicit beliefs motive) x 2 (reward structure: 
shared rewards vs. individual rewards) + 1 (control group) design. Like Study 3, Study 4 focused 
exclusively diffuse failure and blame behaviors, and thus, participants perceived their 
performance on the experimental task to be well below average (i.e., a failure). 
4.4.1 Methods. 
Participants. I recruited 315 undergraduate lab participants through the Olin Research 
Subject Pool to participate in the study. Before analysis, 58 participants were dropped due to 
failed attention and manipulation checks, resulting in a total of N = 257. The average age of the 
participants was 19.26, and the sample was 50% female and 54% white.  
A participant’s data was dropped from the sample if the participant failed attention 
checks, failed manipulation checks, or had previously completed the Moon Survival Task. As in 
Study 3, attention and manipulation checks included questions that evaluated whether the 
participant had read and understood the instructions, including both the motive and reward 
information relayed during the task and the negative performance feedback on the Moon 
Survival Task. I removed the data of any participants who failed to select the correct responses to 






their randomly assigned motive, or if they reported that they had performed above average on the 
Moon Survival Task). As a new addition in Study 4, participants were asked to reflected on their 
experience as a leader and specifically how what it meant to them to act in accordance with the 
motive condition to which they had been randomly assigned (see “Additional Instructions” 
section, below). Participants who reported that they had not acted or felt in a way consistent with 
their randomly assigned motive condition were considered manipulation check failures. Thus, 58 
participants were excluded from the final sample (N = 257).   
As in Study 3, the participants were told that they had been randomly assigned as the 
leader of a two-person team (i.e., dyad). Each participant was randomly assigned to a group – 
treatment (with randomly assigned motive condition and reward structure) or control (no motive 
condition and no reward structure specified). The students received 0.5 course credits for 
participating in subject pool research, with the opportunity to earn a cash prize. All participants 
had an equal chance of winning the cash prize, and those who performed in the top 10% of all 
study participants received a prize of $10.00 based on task performance. 
 Procedure, scoring, and compensation. Study 4 was identical to Study 3 except for five 
key changes. These changes involved the number of motive manipulations, the inclusion of a 
reward structure manipulation, additional instructions for the study participant acting as the 
leader, and expanding the blame behavior measure. Each change is described in the following 
sections. 
Manipulation of motives. In Study 4, there were only two motive manipulations instead 
of four, although a control condition was still included. As mentioned above, the two motive 
manipulations included the ego-defensive motive and the implicit beliefs motive. The 






Manipulation of reward structure. Before the task begins, the participant read 
information about how the moon survival task would be scored. The manipulation of two reward 
structures, individual and shared, was derived from definitions accepted in the literature (e.g., 
see Rosenbaum et al., 1980). Participants were given different descriptions of reward structure, 
or the basis upon which their scores for the task were assessed, in the different conditions. 
Individuals in both conditions were told that their total score would be a composite of two 
different scores: an achievement score and a contribution score. The manipulation of reward 
structure directly affects only the achievement score.  
Prior to starting the moon survival task, participants in the shared reward condition were 
told that their achievement score was based upon the team’s performance in the moon survival 
task – their score was determined by the ranking of items that they, as the leader, and their 
partner determine together. Participants in the individual reward condition were told that their 
achievement score was determined by their individual performance on the moon survival task –
their score was determined by the ranking that they determine on their own, and not with their 
partner. Of note, in the individual reward condition, participants’ achievement score was not 
based on their performance relative to their partner because this would effectively pit the 
participant against their partner. If a purely competitive reward system was instituted, then under 
this type of reward structure, the participant would have no motivation to collaborate with their 
partner to submit a joint ranking of items.  
 Additional instructions. In Study 4, the study participant received two new instructions 
on top of the existing instructions in Study 3. These changes were added to the study design in 
order to address two potential weaknesses in the design of Study 3 – the dulling of the motive 






(i.e., the confederate). First, when the participant began working on the moon survival task with 
their partner, they were given additional instructions to ask their partner (i.e., the confederate 
“subordinate” partner) to send them an initial draft of the item rankings. These instructions were 
added to Study 4 in order to increase the likelihood and potential for blame to be allocated to the 
partner in addition to (or instead of) oneself. This study also included these new instructions in 
order to increase the participant’s feeling that they are the leader in the situation, by delegating a 
task to their follower. The new wording included in Study 4 was as follows: 
“As the leader of the team, please use the chat window to instruct your partner to work on 
and send you a draft of the list of items ranked from most important to least important.  
 
If you approve of their work, you can arrange the items in the proposed order and submit 
the list. If you believe certain changes need to be made, please make suggestions and chat 
with your partner about them until you are satisfied.” 
 
In response to the study participant requesting this initial draft, the research assistant 
posing as the participant’s partner then sent a pre-determined ranking of the fifteen items to the 
participant. The same ranking of items was sent to every study participant, with the more 
obviously important and not important items placed accordingly in the list, as follows: “oxygen, 
20 L water, food concentrate, 50 ft of nylon rope, signal flares, dehydrated milk, stellar map, 
portable heating unit, parachute silk, first aid kit, the two pistols, FM receiver/transmitter, life 
raft, matches, compass.”   
With respect to the second addition, for participants in the ego-defensive motive 
condition and the implicit beliefs motive condition, a new set of instructions and short reflection 
task was added. Immediately after the participant viewed their performance feedback on the 
moon survival task completed with their partner (i.e., “Based on your team rankings, you and 






as a leader. Specifically, they were instructed: “Reflect back on the team task you just completed. 
In 3-4 sentences, what did it mean to you to act like a leader who [thinks highly of himself or 
herself / acts in ways that fit the stereotype of an ideal leader]?” They were then required to type 
a response of a minimum 200 characters into a text box. To detect whether the manipulation was 
getting “lost” over time during the study, I asked participants to reflect in this way in order to get 
a sense of what they were thinking or feeling based on their experience during the moon survival 
task and on the information they had previously read regarding leader behavior linked to success 
on the task. Participants who reported that they did not act or did not feel consistently with the 
motive condition to which they had been randomly assigned were dropped from the final sample.  
Leader blame behavior. As in Study 3, following the completion of the moon survival 
task, the leader saw a set of response options and was asked to select one of these messages to 
send to their partner in light of their below average performance on the task. However, the 
response options were expanded from a 5-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale. The revised 
options were: (1) You are to blame for this outcome, (2) You are somewhat to blame for this 
outcome, (3) You are slightly to blame for this outcome, (4) We are equally to blame for this 
outcome, (5) I am slightly to blame for this outcome, (6) I am somewhat to blame for this 
outcome, and (5) I am to blame for this outcome (see Appendix D). The leader then selected one 
of these statements with the knowledge that their partner (i.e., the confederate) would see the 
message. The message was framed as a response or feedback to the other team member. This 
variable represented the blame observed by a subordinate audience. 
As in Study 3, the leader also responded to three items assessing their beliefs regarding 
who was to blame for the performance on the team task. These measures were framed as the 






was told that the lab administrator would be able to view their responses to these items. Again, 
this measure was expanded from a 5-point Likert scale to a 7-point Likert scale. See Appendix D 
for full items. Cronbach’s alpha for the three items measuring the participant’s beliefs regarding 
who was to blame was .80. This measure represented the blame observed by an audience of 
superiors, as it indicated the leader’s communication to the superior regarding their beliefs as to 
who was the blame for the team’s unsuccessful performance. 
Measures. Regarding the post-lab survey items including manipulation checks, attention 
checks, and self-assessment, the exact same measures administered in Study 3 were administered 
in Study 4. One additional item was a comprehension (i.e., attention) check regarding reward 
structure, in which the participant was instructed to indicate if their moon survival task score was 
based on their team’s performance, their individual performance, or an average of both tasks 
combined.  
Participant compensation. As in Study 3, participants were told that their final score 
would be determined by two different scores: the achievement score and the contribution score. 
However, in Study 4, participants were told that their achievement score was based on the 
reward structure manipulation (shared rewards, individual rewards, or control – average of both 
individual and team tasks). A participant assigned to the shared reward structure condition was 
told they would be scored on the Moon Survival Task completed with a partner, while a 
participant assigned to the individual reward structure condition was told they would be scored 
based on their solo performance.  
However, during the study debriefing, I informed participants that compensation would 






Survival Task. Participants performing in the top 10% of all participants in this study were 
rewarded $10.00 in cash for their performance.  
4.4.2 Results. Descriptive statistics and correlations between each of the measures are 
displayed in Table 4.38 and Table 4.39. For the blame that the study participants, as the leader, 
communicated to their subordinate, the average blame behavior was 5.08 (SD = 1.31) (on a 7-
point Likert scale). For the blame that the study participants, as the leader, communicated to the 
superior, the average blame behavior was 5.19 (SD = 0.91). Histograms showing the distribution 
of these two measures are depicted in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10.  
 





Table 4.39 Study 4 – Motive and Reward conditions: Means and SDs of Blame Communications 
 
 









Age 19.34 1.05 18 22
Gender (Female = 1) 0.50 0.50 0 1 -0.10
Motive (ego-defensive = 0; implicit beliefs = 1) n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.12+ -0.16*
Reward structure (individual = 0; shared = 1) n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.12+ 0.09 0.00
Blame communicated to subordinate 5.08 1.31 1.00 7.00 -0.01 -0.13+ 0.24** 0.01
Blame communicated to superior 5.19 0.91 1.00 7.00 0.1 -0.15* 0.22** 0.14+ 0.73** α = .80
Note: N =257. Blame measures were on a 7-point Likert scale.
N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Blame communicated to subordinate
Ego-defensive motive 97 4.78 1.36 1.00 7.00
Implicit beliefs motive 105 5.45 1.29 1.00 7.00
Individual reward structure 98 5.11 1.32 1.00 7.00
Shared reward structure 104 5.14 1.42 1.00 7.00
Control group 55 4.89 1.06 4.00 7.00
Blame communicated to superior
Ego-defensive motive 97 5.03 0.98 1.00 7.00
Implicit beliefs motive 105 5.45 0.88 3.00 7.00
Individual reward structure 98 5.12 0.90 2.33 7.00
Shared reward structure 104 5.38 0.98 1.00 7.00
Control group 55 4.97 0.73 3.33 6.67













Figure 4.10. Study 4 – Distribution of Blame Communicated to Superior. 
I considered whether participants internalized the motive manipulation or if they were 
simply responding in line with how they thought they should respond (i.e., an experimenter 






demand effect would lead participants in the ego-defensive motive condition to provide very low 
blame behavior scores (e.g., the extreme blame-giving end of the scale), but the mean blame 
behavior was above 4.5 out of 7.0, instead of closer to 2.0 (see Table 4.39). Additionally, 
participants in the implicit beliefs motive condition would provide very high blame behaviors 
scores (e.g., the extreme blame-taking end of the scale), but the mean blame behavior was below 
5.5 out of 7.0, instead of closer to 6.0 (see Table 4.39). The results, therefore, are not consistent 
with an experimenter demand effect.  
I computed ANOVAs to determine if there were differences in blame communications to 
both the subordinate and the superior across the 5 cells (ego-defensive motive/individual reward, 
ego-defensive motive/shared reward, implicit beliefs motive/individual reward, implicit beliefs 
motive/shared reward, and control condition), as well as an ANOVA comparing 4 cells (without 
the control condition). Both sets of analyses yielded the same results regarding the effects of the 
motive and reward manipulations, and therefore I chose to drop the control condition in 
subsequent analyses (see Table 4.39 for means of blame communicated to subordinate and 
superior in each condition, including the control group).   
A two-way ANOVA (leaving out the control group) with an interaction was conducted to 
compare the effects of motive and reward structure on blame communicated to the superior in 
the ego-defensive motive and implicit beliefs motive conditions, as well as the individual reward 
structure and shared reward structure conditions. See Figure 4.11 for boxplot comparisons of 
blame communicated to the superior across the four motive-reward conditions. A main effect of 
motive was found for blame message sent to the superior, F(1, 198) = 10.779, p = .001. 
Participants in the ego-defensive motive condition (M = 5.03, SD = .98) took significantly less 






implicit beliefs motive condition (M = 5.45, SD = .88). Thus, Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 3a 
were both supported for blame behaviors communicated to a superior. A main effect of reward 
structure was also found for blame communicated to the superior, F(1, 198) = 4.005, p = .047. 
Participants in the individual reward condition (M = 5.12, SD = .90) took significantly less blame 
for the unsuccessful outcome on the Moon Survival Task than did participants in the shared 
reward condition (M = 5.38, SD = .98). See Table 4.39 for means in each motive condition and 
reward condition. The interaction effect of motive and reward structure on blame communicated 




Figure 4.11. Study 4 – Boxplot Comparisons – Blame Communicated to Superior. 
 
Because of the statistically significant results in this ANOVA, I computed a post hoc test. 






designed to compare each of the conditions to every other conditions. I conducted a Tukey’s 
HSD test to compare the ego-defensive motive and implicit beliefs motive conditions in addition 
to the individual reward and shared reward conditions. Post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD 
test indicated that implicit beliefs participants in the shared reward condition took significantly 
more blame (M = 5.54, SD  = .96) at the p < .01 level when communicating to the superior 
compared to ego-defensive participants in the individual reward condition (M = 4.85, SD  = .96).  
 
 
Figure 4.12. Study 4 – Blame Communicated to Superior – Means and SDs. 
 
The post hoc comparisons test further indicated that implicit beliefs participants in the 
individual reward condition took significantly more blame (M = 5.36, SD  = .78) at the p < .05 
level when communicating to the superior compared to ego-defensive participants in the 
individual reward condition (M = 4.85, SD  = .96). The ego-defensive participants in the shared 
reward condition did not exhibit significantly different blame behaviors compared to all other 






participants in either reward condition). In addition, the implicit beliefs participants did not 
exhibit significantly different blame behaviors across the two reward conditions. While there was 
minimal support for Hypotheses 6a(i) and 6b(i), there was support for some individual 
comparisons across cells in line with these predictions. See Figure 4.12 for each cell’s mean and 
standard deviation for blame communicated to the superior. 
Next, a two-way ANOVA with an interaction was computed to compare the effects of 
motive and reward structure on blame communicated to the subordinate in the ego-defensive 
motive and implicit beliefs motive conditions, as well as the individual reward and shared reward 
structure conditions. See Figure 4.13 for boxplot comparisons of blame communicated to the 
subordinate across the four motive-reward conditions. A main effect of motive was found for 
blame message sent to the subordinate, F(1, 198) = 12.637, p < .001. Participants in the ego-
defensive motive condition (M = 4.78, SD = 1.36) took significantly less blame for the 
unsuccessful outcome on the Moon Survival Task than did participants in the implicit beliefs 
motive condition (M = 5.45, SD = 1.29). Thus, Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 3a were both 
supported for blame behaviors communicated to a subordinate. The main effect of reward 
structure on blame communicated to the subordinate was not significant at the p < .05 level, F(1, 
198) = .031, n.s. Participants in the individual reward structure condition and participants in the 
shared reward structure condition did not differ significantly on the blame they communicated to 
their subordinate. See Table 4.39 for means in each motive condition and reward condition. The 
interaction effect of motive and reward structure on blame communicated to the subordinate was 










Figure 4.13. Study 4 – Boxplot Comparisons – Blame Communicated to Subordinate. 
 
I conducted a Tukey’s HSD test to compare all conditions to every other condition. Post 
hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test indicated that implicit beliefs participants in the shared 
reward condition took significantly more blame (M = 5.33, SD = 1.45) at the p < .05 level when 
communicating to the subordinate compared to ego-defensive participants in the individual 
reward condition (M = 4.62, SD = 1.36). The post hoc comparisons test further indicated that 
implicit beliefs participants in the individual reward condition took significantly more blame (M 
= 5.57, SD = 1.10) at the p < .01 level when communicating to the subordinate compared to ego-
defensive participants in the individual reward condition (M = 4.62, SD = 1.36). Again, similar to 
communication to a superior, for communication to a subordinate, the ego-defensive participants 






to all other participants (i.e., ego-defensive participants in the individual reward condition, 
implicit beliefs participants in either reward condition) at the p < .05 level. In addition, the 
implicit beliefs participants did not exhibit significantly different blame behaviors across the two 
reward conditions at the p < .05 level. Again, while there was minimal support for Hypotheses 
6a(i) and 6b(i), there was support for some individual comparisons across cells in line with these 
predictions. See Figure 4.14 for each cell’s mean and standard deviation for blame 




Figure 4.14. Study 4 – Blame Communicated to Subordinate – Means and SDs. 
 
4.4.3 Discussion. The results reveal that motive affects blame communicated to a 
subordinate and to a superior. Specifically, the results indicate that participants in the implicit 
beliefs motive condition took more blame when communicating to either subordinates or 
superiors than participants in the ego-defensive condition. With respect to blame communicated 






on the blame communicated. Specifically, ego-defensive participants in the individual reward 
condition took significantly less blame than participants in the implicit beliefs motive condition 
subject to either individual or shared reward structures. However, ego-defensive participants in 
the shared reward condition exhibited no significant differences in blame behavior 
communicated to a superior compared to all other participants, and that when examining all 
participants within the implicit beliefs motive condition, there was no difference in blame 
communicated to a superior when comparing between individual and shared reward structures.  
Taken together, these findings show that the two motives examined in this study matter 
for blame behaviors in the direction predicted. Namely, people driven by the implicit beliefs 
motive tend to take more blame for an unsuccessful outcome than people driven by the ego-
defensive motive. This pattern appeared for blame communicated to both a subordinate and a 
superior. Reward structure did not have a main effect on blame communicated to a subordinate, 
but there was a main effect of reward structure on blame communicated to a superior. When 
communicating blame to a superior, individuals in the shared reward condition took significantly 
more blame for the unsuccessful outcome than individuals in the individual reward condition. It 
is possible that individuals who were informed that their score on the task would be computed 
based on their team performance believed that as the leader of a team, they were accountable and 
thus shifted more blame toward themselves when their team fell short in the lab exercise. 
Conversely, perhaps participants who were informed that their score on the task would be 
dependent on their solo performance on the task were not as invested in the task because their 
partner’s score would rest on their performance as a leader, and thus they refrained from taking 






Envisioning the motive condition and reward structure conditions in a 2 x 2 design, the 
effect of the two conditions together was most powerful on the diagonal, where the motive is 
“congruent” with the reward structure. An individual with an ego-defensive motive in a context 
with an individual reward structure tends to shift blame away (i.e., assign more blame) compared 
to individuals with an implicit beliefs motive in a context with a shared reward structure. When 
looking at the opposite diagonal, in which the motive is incongruent with the reward structure 
(i.e., ego-defensive motive with a shared reward structure, and implicit beliefs motive with an 
individual reward structure), the differences seem to wash out and counteract each other. 
However, the ego-defensive motive appears to be particularly powerful, in that the effect lasts 
beyond reward condition. Individuals driven by an ego-defensive motive in an individual reward 
structure still assign more blame compared to individuals with an implicit beliefs motive in an 
individual reward structure. The differences observed in this study appear to be driven by the 
combination of an ego-defensive motive in a context with individual rewards.  
As with any study, the findings are limited by the design of the experiment. One 
limitation with respect to the theoretical model is that this study examines two of the four 
motives proposed – the ego-defensive and implicit beliefs motive. While blame behaviors linked 
to these two motives appear to be significantly different in this sample, conclusions cannot be 
drawn regarding the other two motives in the model – the impression management motive and 
the relationship building motive – because they were not examined here. In addition, the study 
was conducted in a sample of undergraduates in a laboratory setting. As with any study of this 
kind, the sterility of a laboratory environment and the nature of a student subject pool sample 
must be noted as limitations of the study’s overall ecological validity. This limitation itself may 






students may not have been motivated enough by the $10.00 cash prize, either due to $10.00 as 
an insufficiently large prize or by the low probability of earning. All participants were informed 
that 320 students would be participating in the study (although only 315 were ultimately 
recruited), and that participants who performed in the top 10% of all participants would receive a 
$10.00 cash prize, while the other 90% would receive no prize.  
4.5 Key Takeaways 
Taken together, results from the studies in this chapter indicate that the ego-defensive 
motive and the implicit beliefs motive have very different effects on leader blame behavior in 
particular. The ego-defensive motive is linked to behaviors that shift blame away from the 
leader, while the implicit beliefs motive is linked to behaviors that shift blame toward the leader.  
4.5.1 Ego-defensive motive and blame-assignment. Together, the findings from a study 
of an online sample of managers and an experimental study demonstrate that an ego-defensive 
motive is strongly related to blame assignment. Leaders driven by the ego-defensive motive tend 
to assign more blame than take blame. Based on the data collected, I argue that this behavioral 
tendency persists in front of an audience of subordinates and an audience of superiors. This falls 
in line with the predictions and the literature indicating that individuals who are inclined to 
defend a positive self-image will shift blame away from rather than towards themselves (e.g., 
Ross, 1977). Although the laboratory study examined only blame behaviors and not credit 
behaviors, findings from the online sample of managers indicate that ego-preserving tendencies 
may be more apparent when it comes to blame than when it comes to credit, as no effect was 
observed for self-reported credit behaviors. 
Perhaps it is the case that individuals are more likely to shift blame away for unsuccessful 






blame, which typically has a negative connotation, as being more negative than they see credit as 
being positive. This is related to the notion in prospect theory that, with respect to a leader’s 
reference point, the effect of a loss is much larger than that of a gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Loss aversion may partly explain the strong relationship between the ego-defensive 
motive and blame behaviors. That the link between the ego-defensive motive and blame 
behaviors towards others was observed across two studies (Study 2 and Study 4) demonstrates 
that the ego-defensive motive has a particularly powerful effect on blame behaviors. While no 
interaction between ego-defensive motive, operationalized by narcissism, and organizational 
culture was observed in Study 2, the contextual factor of individual reward structure in the lab 
study seemed to emphasize the difference in blame behaviors between ego-defensive individuals 
and individuals who are driven by implicit beliefs of an ideal leader. This shows that contextual 
factors do matter, as they may augment the link between motive and blame behavior, but that the 
strength of the motive may at times outweigh the influence of one’s context.  
4.5.2 Implicit beliefs and blame-taking. Furthermore, findings from Study 4 reveal that 
the implicit beliefs motive has a main effect on blame-taking behaviors, regardless of reward 
structure. There were negligible differences in blame behavior between the implicit beliefs 
motive participants in the individual versus shared reward conditions. However, in the online 
sample of managers, main effects were not observed between the implicit beliefs motive and 
blame behaviors. Yet, within this sample, individuals who scored low on the implicit beliefs 
measure of an ideal leader took more blame in the context of a collectivistic culture than in an 
individualistic culture, which may indicate that organizational culture is a strong contextual 
factor, perhaps stronger than reward structure, in shaping the link from the implicit beliefs 






for example, the existence of an individual reward structure in an organization is an aspect of the 
organization that signals a more individualistic culture. Organizational culture as a whole, with 
reward structure as one component, may have a deeper influence on the link between the implicit 
beliefs motive and blame behavior, and perhaps the other motives and blame behavior.  
4.5.3 Impression management and blame-taking. The findings from Study 2 reveal 
that the impression management motive may be linked to blame behaviors opposite that 
predicted by the theoretical model proposed in Chapter 3. The findings reveal that a leader who 
is highly motivated to manage impressions is more likely to report taking blame instead of 
blaming others after an unsuccessful outcome, regardless of whether they are communicating 
this blame to a group of subordinates or superiors. As discussed previously, leaders who take 
blame may perceive these types of behaviors as a way to manage others’ impressions of them as 
a “good” leader, which ties into the implicit beliefs motive. However, the implicit beliefs 
motives is directed inward, in that leaders who are driven by the implicit beliefs motive behave 
congruently with their personal beliefs regarding good leadership in an attempt to behave 
consistently with their own self-concept (e.g., Lord & Brown, 2001) and their implicit theories 
regarding ideal leadership. On the other hand, the impression management motive is directed 
outward, in that individuals driven by the impression management motive are driven to shape 
their image in the eyes of others, and they may view blame-taking behaviors as a way of shaping 
how others perceive them as a leader. With respect to credit behaviors, leaders may take credit in 
front of a group of superiors in order to strengthen their image as a leader. But in front of 
subordinates, a leader driven by the impression management motive may not take the credit for a 
successful outcome, as their subordinates are closer to the circumstances surrounding the 






4.5.4 Link between blame-taking and subordinate OCBs. While subordinate OCBs 
were not included in the experimental studies, from the online sample of managers, it appears 
that leaders who shift blame more toward themselves and less toward their subordinates may be 
more likely to observe subordinate OCBs. This paper provides correlational evidence of a 
relationship between leader blame-taking behavior and subordinate OCBs. No relationships were 
observed between credit behaviors and subordinate OCBs. Therefore, it is possible that a leader’s 
blame behaviors hold more weight compared to a leader’s credit behaviors. For example, a 
subordinate may be more likely to engage in OCBs when their leader takes blame rather than 
when their leader gives them credit. Perhaps subordinates perceive their leader’s blame-taking 
actions as protecting the subordinate from harm whereas credit-giving behaviors are perceived as 
giving them the credit they are due. Social exchange theory argues that reciprocity norms 
between two parties signify that if one party supplies a benefit (e.g., a leader takes the blame for 
an unsuccessful outcome), the receiving party should respond correspondingly in the future 
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). As a result, based on reciprocity norms, subordinates may 
indeed repay a supportive, blame-taking leader who has protected them from potential harm by 
engaging in organizational citizenship behaviors.  
In Chapter 4, three studies were conducted to empirically examine selected elements in 
the theoretical model. Field data was collected from an online sample of managers, followed by 
two experimental studies in a population of undergraduates that focused specifically on blame 
behaviors. The studies in this chapter provide evidence for some of the hypotheses and key 
propositions in the theoretical model posed in Chapter 3, with more support for the connections 






Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I examine how and why leaders communicate accountability by 
addressing blame and credit, thus generating and establishing the conversation about blame and 
credit behaviors in the workplace in three distinct ways. First, this dissertation evolves the 
current state of thought regarding blame and credit by acknowledging the existence and 
importance of unexplored blame and credit behaviors. Second, it introduces a theoretical 
framework of the motives driving the blame and credit behaviors of leaders, including the effects 
of two contextual factors on such behaviors. Third, the empirical work conducted provides some 
evidence for the validity of the theoretical model. As a whole, this dissertation brings to the 
forefront the importance of various blame and credit behaviors in organizations and explains 
why leaders enact these behaviors following diffuse positive or negative outcomes.  
5.1 Contributions 
The existing literature has operated on the assumption that individuals want to reduce the 
blame assigned to them and increase the credit they receive – they more often take credit for 
successful outcomes than take blame for unsuccessful ones because of a desire to avoid threats to 
self-esteem (Shaver 1985; Gioia & Sims, 1985; Greenwald, 1980). Only a few researchers have 
provided scientific analysis, including Crant and Bateman (1983), who found that individuals 
strategically use self-handicapping tactics and casual accounts in order to shift blame away and 
shift credit towards themselves in order protect or enhance the self. Gunia (2011) was the first 
the introduce the notion of blame-taking, by studying the incidence and effectiveness of blame-
taking, as compared to remorse and evasion. Beyond this, the conversation regarding blame and 






accounts of U.S. Navy SEAL training (e.g., Bregman, 2013; Cannon & Cannon, 2003; Sharer, 
2014; Suddath, 2012).  
Therefore, the first main contribution of this dissertation is that it identifies a new area of 
research and generates new conversation regarding the existence and importance of various 
blame and credit behaviors. It acknowledges, explains, and examines other types of blame and 
credit behaviors beyond blame assignment and credit-taking, such as blame-taking and credit-
giving. Other researchers in the blame and credit literature, such as Crant and Bateman (1983) 
and Gunia (2011), have yet to acknowledge and examine the comprehensive map of blame and 
credit behaviors. Thus, the theoretical framework developed in this paper serves as an initiating 
and propelling force to strengthen and compound our current understanding of a wide variety of 
blame and credit behaviors, their antecedents, and subsequent outcomes. Furthermore, 
practitioners, such as Bregman (2013), Sharer (2014), and Suddath (2012), have provided 
anecdotal evidence illustrating instances of blame-taking and the benefits of blame-taking in the 
workplace, but a major shortcoming of this conversation stems from its reliance on unscientific 
speculation. Therefore, the empirical work presented in this dissertation comprises the scientific, 
empirical evidence to date regarding a more comprehensive range of leader blame and credit 
behaviors. As a result, this dissertation is the first paper of its kind to provide both theory on and 
empirical evidence for various blame and credit behaviors, their drivers, and a potential 
downstream outcome. In effect, this dissertation pushes the boundaries of the current knowledge 
space that comprises the blame and credit literature.  
This dissertation discerns blame and credit behaviors as two separate spectrums of 
behavior. Blame or credit is shifted toward others on one end and toward the self on the opposite 






3.1). In the first two chapters, I highlight the importance of blame and credit behaviors and the 
salience of such behaviors in leaders’ thoughts and statements. I conducted two studies to map 
out leader blame and credit behaviors beyond blame-assignment and credit-taking, creating a 
more comprehensive view of the various types of blame and credit behaviors and what they look 
like. In the Pilot Study interviews, coaches conveyed that, as leaders of sports teams, they 
attempt to think carefully about their communications regarding blame or credit toward the 
athletes on the team because they believe that these behaviors can have positive or negative 
consequences on their relationships with the athletes and on the athletes’ performance. Study 1, 
which involved canvassing and analyzing statements in NFL coaches’ press conferences, 
illustrated that expressions of blame and credit occur asymmetrically in a public context. In this 
study, I examined blame and credit behaviors directly, without the measurement error that 
sometimes occurs when assessing memories, perceptions, or hypothetical scenarios.  
The second main contribution of this dissertation is that it integrates four unique 
perspectives in the literature to create a theoretical framework of the motives driving blame and 
credit behaviors. The framework also includes a classification scheme that categorizes each 
motive by its objective and direction. Drawing from the psychology literature on self-image and 
ego-defensiveness bias (e.g., Greenwald, 1980; Ross, 1977) and the impression management 
literature (e.g., Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Staw, McKechnie, and 
Puffer, 1983; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971), the theoretical model links the ego-
defensive and impression management motives to blame behaviors toward others and credit 
behaviors toward the self. Stemming from the literature on implicit leadership theory (e.g., Eden 
& Leviatan, 1975; House et al., 1999; Nye & Forsyth, 1991) and theories in LMX and social 






Mitchell, 2005), the model links the implicit beliefs and relationship building motives to blame 
behaviors toward the self and credit behaviors toward others. By tying together these four unique 
perspectives, this dissertation contributes a theoretical model of four motives that drive blame 
and credit behaviors. 
In addition to these four motives, the theoretical model also integrates the role of 
contextual factors. Previous literature has considered organizational cultures that emphasize 
individualistic or collectivistic values (Chatman & Barsade, 1995; Chatman and Jehn, 1994). The 
model in this dissertation argues that when a leader’s motive is incongruent with the 
organization’s culture, the emphasis on individualistic or collectivistic values may attenuate the 
behavioral tendencies associated with this motive. As a result, the leader’s blame or credit 
behaviors become more compatible (or less incongruent) with the organizational culture. 
Drawing from the literature on reward structures (e.g., Johnson and Johnson, 1989; Tjosvold, 
1982; Triandis, 1989), individual and shared reward structures will have a similar influence on 
the relationship between motive and blame or credit behavior. By introducing these two 
contextual factors, the theoretical model proposes that leader blame and credit behaviors are 
shaped not only by a leader’s motives but also by the environment in which they lead.  
Lastly, the empirical work in this dissertation contributes by providing partial evidence 
for the theoretical model. The evidence presented in this dissertation reveals that the ego-
defensive motive is particularly powerful in driving leader blame behaviors. In line with the 
theoretical model, the ego-defensive motive was linked to behaviors that shifted blame away 
from the leader, while the implicit beliefs motive was linked to behaviors that shifted blame 
toward the leader (i.e., toward the self). There was evidence of a strong relationship between the 






to assign more blame than take blame. This behavioral tendency was observed regardless of 
whether the audience was comprised of subordinates or superiors, which parallels the predictions 
in the model drawn from literature arguing that individuals who are inclined to defend a positive 
self-image will shift blame away from rather than towards themselves (e.g., Ross, 1977).  
The empirical work in this dissertation reinforces the difference in blame behaviors 
between ego-defensive leaders and leaders who are driven by implicit beliefs of an ideal leader 
with respect to the contextual factor of reward structure. The relationship between the ego-
defensive motive and blame behaviors was stronger under an individual reward structure but was 
also observed under a shared reward structure. The implicit beliefs motive was related to blame-
taking behaviors, regardless of reward structure. Together, these results comprise the current 
evidence of the validity of the model.  
The evidence in Study 2 illustrates, however, that the impression management motive 
may be more complex than currently proposed. The empirical evidence links the impression 
management motive to blame behaviors toward the self, opposite to the prediction in the 
theoretical model. Instead, leaders highly motivated to manage impressions were more likely to 
report taking blame instead of assigning blame after an unsuccessful outcome. One explanation 
is that blame-taking may be perceived as a way to manage others’ impressions of them as a 
“good” leader. For a leader who is highly motivated to manage impressions, this motivation may 
translate into a desire to be viewed as an “ideal” leader or as a leader who builds relationships. 
The unexpected pattern regarding the impression management motive observed in the online 
sample of managers should be explored in future research, as it seems that taking blame may be a 






While the theoretical model focuses on the motives of blame and credit behaviors, the 
empirical work in this dissertation speaks to one consequence of blame-taking behaviors: 
subordinate OCBs. This dissertation provides evidence for a correlational link between leader 
blame-taking behaviors and subordinate OCBs, but not credit-giving behaviors and subordinate 
OCBs. Subordinates may perceive their leader’s blame-taking actions as protecting them from 
harm. According to reciprocity norms (e.g., Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), subordinates may be 
spurred to repay a supportive, blame-taking leader who has protected them from potential harm 
by engaging in organizational citizenship behaviors. In addition, subordinates may view an act of 
blame-taking as part of a favorable social exchange, which is related to trust and organizational 
commitment (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Supervisory support, in the form of blame-taking, may lead 
to subordinates to engage in OCBs because they feel more supported by both their supervisor 
and the organization.   
5.2 Practical Implications 
 This dissertation argues that leaders will engage in blame and credit behaviors not yet 
examined by the literature. Their behaviors are partly explained by their motives and by the 
environment in which they operate. The theoretical model in Chapter 3 proposes that there are 
four motives that drive leaders’ behaviors in shifting blame and credit towards or away from 
themselves. Moreover, there are certain contextual factors that may work to shape these 
behaviors. The empirical work in Chapter 4 provides mixed support for the predictions derived 
from the model. Based on this evidence, I offer three key practical implications.  
 First, the theory and evidence in this dissertation demonstrate that managers have 
tendencies that stem from their motives, manifesting as blame and credit behaviors. Therefore, it 






push them to enact certain types of behaviors. Having an awareness of one’s behavioral 
tendencies stemming from one’s natural motivations might help an individual, in a managerial 
role, think more deliberately regarding their actions and reactions following a successful or an 
unsuccessful diffuse outcome. Being particularly mindful of the context (for instance, whether 
individualistic or collectivistic values and reward structures are a part of the environment) may 
help managers better understand their own behaviors and tendencies. Given the correlational 
evidence linking blame-taking behaviors to increased reports of subordinate OCBs, managers 
may be motivated to build strong relationships with their subordinates by taking blame in order 
to establish organizational and supervisory support. This may be especially helpful for managers 
working in individualistic contexts or who are aware that they are driven by the ego-defensive 
motive, for example.  
 Second, from an employee or subordinate perspective, it may be helpful and important to 
recognize that a manager’s behaviors may be a result of long-lasting motives and their link to 
blame and credit behaviors, and that these links may be difficult to weaken or eliminate. 
Furthermore, a manager’s behaviors could be driven not only by individual characteristics but 
also by the situation and context in which she works. For example, from a subordinate’s 
perspective, they may observe a manager shifting blame toward their subordinates, which they 
may in turn interpret as the manager lashing out against subordinates following an unsuccessful 
outcome. Then, the subordinate may take a moment to consider that perhaps their manager may 
be driven by the ego-defensive motive, a long-lasting state, as well as being in an organization 
that values individual performance or has implemented an individual (or even a competitive) 
reward structure. In this type of situation, it could be helpful to take an alternate perspective by 






productive, not necessarily as a means of absolving the manager of any unproductive behaviors 
or actions, but as an employee’s strategy of mitigating her own unproductive reactions or 
behaviors to a manager’s blaming behaviors (or other potentially damaging behaviors). Then, the 
employee might be able to effectively engage in a more productive sequence of events following 
the unsuccessful outcome and the manager’s undesirable response.  
 Lastly, there may be practical implications from this line of research at the organizational 
design level. Organizations themselves can be mindful about creating and fostering an 
organizational culture, or reward structure, to counteract leaders’ motives and tendencies. For 
example, if decision-makers of an organization wish to establish an organization that values 
leaders who take blame, or a leader who shares and disperses credit, they can refer to the 
theoretical model in this paper or some of the findings from the empirical studies regarding 
individual- and group-focused contextual factors. Developing and fostering an organizational 
culture that values collectivism and implements a shared reward structure may lead managers to 
shift blame towards themselves and credit towards others, whereas developing an individualistic 
organizational culture with an individual reward structure may lead to the opposite behaviors. 
Organizations that are interested in promoting particular blame and credit behaviors might 
benefit from being mindful about the values, norms, and beliefs espoused in the workplace.  
5.3 Future Research 
The development of a theoretical framework explaining the motives driving blame and 
credit behaviors was a necessary first step to understand blame and credit behaviors and their 
consequences. There is more work to be done. To begin, from a theoretical standpoint, the 
current model can be extended by considering other factors, such as the magnitude of the 






With respect to magnitude, positive or negative outcomes can have varying effects on an 
organization. The ramifications of certain outcomes may be contained within a particular team or 
department, whereas other outcomes may threaten the viability of an organization. The degree to 
which an outcome impacts an organization may change the magnitude of blame or credit that is 
allocated, as well as the way in which blame or credit is communicated (e.g., Cornelissen, 2008). 
For example, the effects of a negative outcome of a small magnitude may be confined within a 
team, and the blame communicated may be toward an internal, intra-team audience and the 
effects temporary. However, if the negative outcome is of a large magnitude, the leader may 
want or need to communicate blame to an external audience as well as an internal audience, and 
the effects may be more permanent and severe (e.g., an individual(s) may lose their job). The 
relationships theorized by the model proposed in this dissertation may be more fitting for 
outcomes that are smaller in magnitude, and the model may evolve when the assumption of the 
homogeneity of outcome magnitude is relaxed. A larger, more threatening failure, because of its 
extreme nature compared to a more trivial failure, could warrant and trigger a more extreme 
response from a leader. For example, if the company faces a multibillion-dollar lawsuit because 
of a large diffuse failure, the magnitude of this failure may impact the relationship between a 
leader’s motives and subsequent behavior, and perhaps directly impact the behaviors themselves. 
For example, the relationship between the motives and behaviors could be washed out if a leader 
responding to and managing a legal crisis must act in accordance with the law or may enact 
behaviors under the advisement of their general counsel.  
With respect to hierarchical positioning of an audience, future research should continue 
to tease apart the upward and downward (and lateral) communication of blame and credit. Given 






explore the discrepancies (or similarities) between communications to superiors versus 
subordinates. Individuals may differ in their communications to separate audiences (e.g., Celsi & 
Gilly, 2010; Cornelissen, 2008), and research in this area should continue to parse the reasons 
behind differences in blame and credit communications as well as the impact of these 
discrepancies on organizational outcomes. While this paper included audiences comprised of 
subordinates and superiors, it is important to consider audiences of a laterally equivalent 
hierarchical position. Furthermore, individuals may not only communicate blame and credit 
differently to unique audiences, but the relationships they seek to establish may be different 
across their subordinates, their peers, and their own superiors. The relationship building motive 
in the current theoretical model focuses only on relationships in a hierarchically downward 
direction, from a leader to a subordinate. Future research should examine the relationship 
building motive by incorporating relationships in multiple directions – not only downward to a 
subordinate, but also upward to a supervisor, across to a peer, or outward to the public. In 
practice, managers simultaneously juggle multiple relationships, and how this juggling factors 
into the relationship building motive and the resulting blame or credit behaviors is important to 
understand.  
Based on the findings in this dissertation, the theoretical model can be further refined in 
future research. The empirical evidence illustrates a discrepancy between the impression 
management motive and its proposed blame behaviors. Individuals who were highly motivated 
to manage impressions reported taking blame following a diffuse failure. Researchers should 
investigate what image an impression-managing leader wishes and attempts to convey by blame-
taking, and why. Future research should also explore the impression management motive with 






individuals “have an ongoing interest in how others perceive and evaluate them” (Leary & 
Kowalski, 1990: 34), they may want to control how they are perceived in terms of their 
competence, benevolence, and integrity, specifically. If a leader is driven by the impression 
management motive, she may enact credit behaviors in line with her desire to be perceived as 
being competent – for example, by taking credit for a successful outcome. If she wants to be 
perceived as being benevolent, she may take blame for an unsuccessful outcome, as blame-
taking might be perceived as protecting subordinates from blame or as a generous act of taking 
the fall for the team. A leader who wishes to manage an impression of integrity may enact 
behaviors that uphold her moral principles or that are in line with what she believes is the truth, 
which lends additional complexity to the already complex link between the impression 
management motive and blame and credit behaviors. Future research should study the effects of 
the impression management on perceptions of competence, benevolence, and integrity, as well as 
examine whether the desire to be seen as a leader of competence, benevolence, or integrity is an 
accurate reflection of a genuine desire to be competent, benevolent, or a leader of integrity, 
rather than merely seeming like one.   
Furthermore, the scope of the current theoretical model excludes deflecting behaviors 
(i.e., deflecting blame, deflecting credit). While deflection does not exist on the spectrum of 
blame or credit behaviors established in this dissertation (see Figure 3.1) because it is not 
directed toward others, toward the self, or to anyone in between, deflection of blame or credit 
does indeed occur in the workplace. While observations of deflection were noted in Study 1, 
future research should explore deflection by expanding the theoretical model to include 






Furthermore, the empirical work completed in this dissertation involved an online field 
sample of managers and two experimental lab studies. Future research should turn to a field 
context to examine the connection between the four motives proposed in this dissertation. A field 
study with multi-source data, rather than only single-source, self-reported data, that explores the 
drivers of blame and credit behaviors, as well as the potential individual and team outcomes of 
these behaviors, would extend the credibility of the theoretical framework proposed. Linking a 
leader’s motives (which are self-reported) to blame and credit behaviors as reported by her own 
subordinate(s) would not only provide more conclusive and compelling evidence for the model, 
but would also provide more insight into the potential practical implications of this area of 
research. In addition, a field study of working managers would strengthen the ecological validity 
of the findings in this paper. 
 Additionally, further research should be conducted regarding credit behaviors. The 
experimental studies in this paper focus on blame rather than credit behaviors, and while there is 
undoubtedly room to continue exploring the drivers and consequences of blame behaviors, by 
comparison, our current understanding of credit behaviors is limited. Future research can 
determine whether there are benefits to blame-taking that outweigh credit-giving, or compare the 
effects of blame-assignment to those of credit-taking. By probing into the drivers and 
consequences of blame and credit behaviors, research may uncover unique patterns in blame 
behaviors that are different than those in credit behaviors. Future work should also delve into the 
consequences of blame and credit behaviors beyond subordinate OCBs. Examining the effects of 
leader behaviors on their employees, as well as on the teams they lead, could have substantial 






to positive individual and team outcomes, whereas others may be counterproductive and provoke 
dysfunctional team outcomes.    
Lastly, future research should commit to examining differences in gender and in national 
culture. Researchers should explore gender differences with respect to how and why leaders 
enact blame and credit behaviors and whether contextual factors shape the leadership behaviors 
of men and women differently. While significant gender differences were not detected in the 
studies conducted for this dissertation, it is possible that being driven by a particular motive(s) 
has divergent effects in different contexts or industries for female leaders compared to male 
leaders. Researchers should also consider not only the gender of the leader enacting the blame or 
credit behavior, but also the gender of the subordinates who are the receiving end of those 
behaviors. The leadership literature has explored differences in gender and perceptions of 
leadership effectiveness (e.g., Eagly et al., 1992; Paustian-Underdahl et al., 2014). Future work 
should delve deeper into whether men and women, as employees, react or perceive a manager’s 
blame and credit behaviors differently and evaluate their managers differently as a result, 
whether these differences in perception have varying effects on performance, attitudes toward 
work, or other outcomes. Research should also investigate whether there is an interaction 
between the gender of the employee and that of the manager. 
The theoretical model in this dissertation acknowledges differences in organizational 
culture (e.g., individualism versus collectivism), but it does not speak to national cultural 
differences. When considering the cultural dimension of power distance, the propositions, as 
well as the empirical results, may not hold for countries that have higher power distance as 
compared to the United States. Power distance refers to the distribution of power and strength of 






distribute power more equally to minimize inequality, whereas in high power distance societies, 
this is not the case, and individuals are more inclined to adapt to a hierarchy. Countries that have 
low power distance include the United States and Australia, whereas countries with high power 
distance include India and China. In high power distance cultures where leaders are expected to 
be more autocratic and opposition to authority is less accepted, there may be different norms 
with respect to leader blame and credit behaviors. It may be more appropriate (or less 
inappropriate) for leaders to blame subordinates for failures and to take credit for successes 
compared to leaders in low power distance cultures. Subordinates may not question such 
behaviors or feel mistrust towards leaders who blame them because hierarchy generally goes 
unquestioned.  
In addition to the individualistic or collectivistic nature of an organization’s culture, 
national cultural differences with respect to individualism and collectivism must also be 
examined. In collectivistic national cultures, people are interdependent within their groups and 
tend to be more concerned with relationships (e.g., Mills & Clark, 1982; Triandis, 1996). In 
individualistic national cultures, however, people are more independent from their group and 
prioritize their personal goals, and their social behaviors and interactions can be predicted by 
social exchange (Triandis, 2001). Therefore, the degree to which a leader operates in a society 
that is more individualistic or collectivistic may shape how a leader’s motives translate into 
blame and credit behaviors, as well as which motives are more likely to drive their behavior. In a 
more collectivistic nation, perhaps relationship building is a higher priority than in an 
individualistic nation.  
There is an interesting dynamic to explore with respect to the individualism or 






should study these differences in national culture, taking into account that there could be 
different values associated with leader-follower relationships in different countries. These 
societal elements may influence blame and credit dynamics with respect to the implicit beliefs 
held about leaders, as well as attitudes towards relationship building between leaders and 
followers. Leaders may hold vastly different implicit beliefs regarding ideal leadership in 
countries that have collectivistic values and high power distance, as these societies operate 
differently than in the United States, which has low power distance and more individualistic 
norms (Hofstede, 1984). The relationships built between leaders and followers in countries 
dissimilar from the United States on these dimensions may look different as well. For example, a 
strong relationship between a leader and follower in China might be established not only through 
social exchanges as a relationship might be in the United States, but also by other factors such as 
kinship relations, shared birthplace, shared acquaintances, and even the exchange of gifts or 
banquets (Nie & Lämsä, 2015). These factors are not as relevant in building Western 
relationships. Different ILTs may also inform the ways in which leaders are trained to act, for 
example, in press conferences. Leaders may receive training according to their society’s implicit 
beliefs about ideal leaders, which are shaped by their national culture, to communicate blame and 
credit in a normatively appropriate way, although they might occasionally be prone to deviate 
from these normative behaviors when under stress (e.g., Coach Mark Rivera taking credit in 
Study 1). Future research should examine national culture and ILTs alongside the media training 
of leaders in response to crises. 
The international growth of many companies may serve as an interesting backdrop to 
further our understanding of leader blame and credit behaviors with respect to national cultural 






relationships and communicate with individuals who do not share their national culture. 
Exploring the impact of power distance and individualism versus collectivism on motives and 
their relationship with blame and credit behaviors will be important with the continued 
globalization of the economy.   
5.4 Final Note 
The key contributions of this dissertation include (1) evolving our understanding of the 
communication and variety of blame and credit in organizations, (2) establishing a theoretical 
model delineating the motives driving leader blame and credit behaviors, and (3) providing 
empirical evidence that speaks to the validity of the theoretical model. This is the first paper of 
its kind to theorize, categorize, and empirically examine the motives behind blame and credit 
behaviors of leaders. While Crant and Bateman (1993) and Gunia (2011) have provided 
scientific analysis, the conversation regarding the possible spectrum of leader blame and credit 
behaviors has rested primarily on unscientific explanation and anecdote, predominantly in the 
popular business news media. Therefore, this dissertation breaks new ground for the blame and 
credit literature by delivering both theory and empirical evidence.  
Through the integration of four separate literatures, I establish a categorization of those 
motives and present evidence that illustrates that leaders with disparate motives may act 
differently in light of unsuccessful outcomes in particular. Specifically, the ego-defensive motive 
appears to be a strong driver of blame behaviors toward others (i.e., blame-assignment), which 
lay in contrast to the blame-taking behaviors linked to the implicit beliefs motive. The findings 
from this dissertation also support the notion that a leader’s motive is more important than the 
context they operate in, but that contextual factors still remain a possible means of shaping or 






factors that are congruent with the nature of the leader’s motive may heighten the tendency for a 
leader to enact certain types of behaviors. It will be important to continue developing research 
and extending the theoretical model of motives driving blame and credit behaviors, their 
connection to contextual factors, and key downstream consequences, in order to tease apart the 
link between motives and behaviors and to uncover potential interventions that discourage or 
reduce behaviors that are harmful to individuals and teams. 
The findings in this dissertation reveal that there are unique, underexplored blame and 
credit behaviors, that there are key theoretical drivers of blame and credit behaviors, and that 
there are contextual factors that shape leader behaviors. While this paper looks primarily at 
subordinate OCBs, blame and credit behaviors may be linked to other individual- and team-level 
outcomes. By initiating a dialogue of the drivers of leader blame and credit behaviors, this paper 
serves to stimulate future research on the consequences of blame and credit behaviors. In 
examining these motives of leader behaviors, as well as the individual- and group-focused 
contextual factors, we can better understand why there is variation across leader behaviors. 
Investigating the drivers of these behaviors matters as we seek to discern their consequences as 
well as how to improve managerial behaviors and team dynamics. In order to move towards a 
more comprehensive understanding, future research must be conducted regarding leader blame 
and credit behaviors given the salience, relevance, and importance of blame and credit in the 
workplace. Through this dissertation work, I aim to inspire other researchers to explore this area 
of research, so that we can work together to improve the ways leaders manage their subordinates 
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Measures Used in Study 2 
 
Items Adapted from Impression Motivation Scale (Jansen et al., 2012) and Additional 
Items 
 
In the following set of questions, please think about the extent to which each statement is true for 
you, as a leader. Then select your response from the 7-point scale below, ranging from “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree.” Additional items are designated with *. 
 
1. It is important to me to present myself positively in my job. 
2. I am very motivated to present myself as optimally as possible in my job. 
3. My ambition to present myself at my best is very high. 
4. I want people at work to see me in a positive light.* 
5. I want people at work to think that I am very good at my job.* 
6. It is very important to me to be seen as a high performer.* 
 
 
Items Adapted from Culturally Endorsed Implicit Leadership Theory of Outstanding 
Leadership (Javidan et al., 2006) 
 
For each word below, please rate how characteristic you believe this trait is of an effective 
leader, from “not at all characteristic” to “extremely characteristic.” Reverse coded items are 




3. Involves others in making decisions 
4. Involves others in implementing decisions 
5. Humane 
6. Autonomous 
7. Self-protective (R) 
8. Inspirational 
9. Motivational 
10. Emphasizes team building 
11. Emphasizes team purpose or goals 
12. Allows others to offer opinions 
13. Supportive 
14. Considerate 
15. Independent (R) 
16. Individualistic (R) 
17. Self-centered (R) 







Items Adapted from LMX-MDM Scale (Liden & Maslyn, 1998) and Additional Items 
 
Please think about the extent to which each statement is true for you. Then select your response 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Additional items are designated with *. 
 
1. I would like my subordinates to respect my knowledge of and competence on the job. 
2. I would like to defend my subordinates to others in the organization if they made an 
honest mistake. 
3. I would like to be the kind of person my subordinates would like to have as a friend. 
4. I would like my subordinates to not mind working their hardest for me. 
5. I would like to come to a subordinate’s defense if they were “attacked” by others. 
6. I would like my subordinates to like me very much as a person. 
7. I would like my subordinates to do work for me that goes beyond what is specified in 
their job descriptions. 
8. I would like my subordinates to admire my professional skills. 
9. I would like to defend my subordinates’ work actions to a superior, even without 
complete knowledge of the issue in question. 
10. I would like to be a lot of fun for my subordinates to work with. 
11. I would like my subordinates to be willing to apply extra efforts, beyond those normally 
required, to meet my work goals. 
12. I would like my subordinates to be impressed with my knowledge of my job. 
13. I would like to strengthen my working relationship with subordinates.* 
14. I would like to build positive working relationships with my subordinates.* 
 
Items Measuring Leader’s Blame and Credit Behaviors 
 
Instructions for leader participants: Please carefully read the following statements. Then, indicate 
which one of the three statements most closely reflects your actual response in the situation you 
were asked to imagine. (When asked about communication to a superior audience (i.e., the 
leader’s own superiors), all instances of “you” or “yours” were replaced with “they” or “theirs.”) 
 
Blame Items: (communicating to subordinate audience) 
1. “You made a mistake.” // “We made a mistake.” // “I made a mistake.” 
2. “The fault is yours.” // “The fault is ours.” // “The fault is mine.” 
3. “You are responsible for this outcome.” // “We are responsible for this outcome.” // “I am 
responsible for this outcome.” 
 
Credit Items: (communicating to subordinate audience) 
1. “You made this a success.” // “We made this a success.” // “I made this a success.” 
2. “The win is yours.” // “The win is ours.” // “The win is mine.” 
3. “You are responsible for this outcome.” // “We are responsible for this outcome.” // “I am 









Distributions of Measures in Study 2 
 
 















Figure C2. Distribution of Impression Motivation Measure. 
 
 







Figure C4. Distribution of LMX Motivation Measure. 
 
 











































































Tasks and Blame or Credit Responses Used in Studies 3 and 4 
 
Moon Survival Task 
 
In the following situation, your “life” and “death” depends upon how well you can prioritize 
items for survival in a relatively unfamiliar environment. This problem is fictional, although the 
ranking to which you will compare your results was done by a number of space experts.   
 
The Situation 
You are a member of a lunar exploration crew originally scheduled to rendezvous with a mother 
ship on the lighted surface of the moon.  Due to mechanical difficulties however, your ship was 
forced to land at a spot some 320 kilometers (200 miles) from the rendezvous point.  During the 
re-entry and landing, much of the equipment aboard was damaged, and, since survival depends 
on reaching the mother ship, the most critical items available must be chosen for the 320 km trip. 
 
The Task 
Below are listed the 15 items left intact and undamaged after landing. Your task is to rank these 
items according to their importance in aiding you to reach the mother ship, starting with “1” the 
more important, to “15” the least important. You should assume that you and your team 




- Box of matches 
- Food concentrate  
- 50 feet of nylon rope  
- Parachute silk  
- Portable heating unit  
- Two .45 caliber pistols  
- One case of dehydrated milk  
- Two 100 lb. tanks of oxygen  
- Stellar map  
- Self-inflating life raft  
- Magnetic compass  
- 20 liters of water  
- Signal flares  
- First aid kit, including injection needle  


































Leaders’ Options in Communicating Blame 
 
To Partner (Subordinate) 
Your team performed “well below average”. 
 
As team leader, you must communicate with your partner about the outcome achieved. 
 
Choose one of the below messages to send to your partner. 
 
Study 3: 
You are to blame for this outcome 
You are somewhat to blame for this outcome 
We are equally to blame for this outcome 
I am somewhat to blame for this outcome 
I am to blame for this outcome 
 
Study 4: 
You are to blame for this outcome 
You are somewhat to blame for this outcome 
You are slightly to blame for this outcome 
We are equally to blame for this outcome 
I am slightly to blame for this outcome 
I am somewhat to blame for this outcome 
I am to blame for this outcome 
 
 
To Lab Administrator (Superior) 
Your answers to the below three questions will impact your Contribution Score. 
  
As a reminder, your Contribution Score is based the lab administrator’s evaluation of the leader’s 
contribution (your contribution) to your team’s performance on the Moon Survival Task.  
  
The administrator of the lab study will see your responses to these questions. 
 
1. To what extent are you, as the leader, or your partner to blame for your team’s 
performance? 
a) My partner is entirely to blame 
b) My partner is somewhat to blame 
c) My partner is slightly to blame* 
d) My partner and I are both to blame 
e) I am slightly to blame* 
f) I am somewhat to blame 
g) I am entirely to blame 
 







a) I take none of the responsibility 
b) I take very little of the responsibility 
c) I take some of the responsibility 
d) I take a considerable amount of the responsibility 
e) I take all of the responsibility  
 
Study 4: 
a) I take none of the responsibility 
b) I take a very small amount of the responsibility 
c) I take a small amount of the responsibility 
d) I take a moderate amount of the responsibility 
e) I take a large amount of the responsibility 
f) I take a very large amount of the responsibility 
g) I take all of the responsibility 
 
3. As the leader, to what extent do you agree that your team’s performance was your fault? 
a) Strongly disagree 
b) Disagree* 
c) Somewhat disagree 
d) Neither agree nor disagree 
e) Somewhat agree 
f) Agree* 
g) Strongly agree 
 
Note: Items labeled with * or “Study 4” were included in Study 4 but not included in Study 3. 
 
